We study data from an organization in which fund managers privately share and discuss detailed investment recommendations. Buy recommendations generate positive abnormal returns, and sell recommendations result in negative abnormal returns. In the context of these results, we explore an important economic question: Why do skilled investors share profitable ideas with others? Evidence suggests that the managers in our sample share to receive feedback on their ideas and to attract additional arbitrageur capital to the securities they recommend in order to correct mispricings.

This study examines the impact of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 (TCJA) on U.S. corporate investment. We examine U.S. firms and compare them to Canadian firms from 2010 to 2019 in a multivariate firm fixed-effects difference-in-differences analysis. Our results indicate that investment increases for U.S. firms relative to Canadian firms after the tax cuts. We also find that capital intensive and financially constrained firms increase investment the most. We explore how the TCJA impacted firm payouts and find some evidence that the tax cuts are associated with increased dividends. The paper contributes to the literature by providing evidence on the effects of the TCJA on corporate investment which have been debated extensively by politicians, journalists, tax policy experts, and academics.

ABSTRACT We examine how the information produced by analysts when they initiate coverage contributes to the mix of firm-specific, industry-, and market-wide information available about the firm. We hypothesize that the first analyst to initiate coverage provides low-cost market and industry information allowing him/her to follow more stocks, whereas subsequent analysts provide firm-specific information to distinguish themselves from existing analysts. We use stock return synchronicity to measure the mix of information available about a firm, with higher synchronicity indicating more industry and market information. Coverage initiations of firms with no prior analyst coverage increase synchronicity, suggesting that analysts produce industry- and market-wide information. In contrast, analysts initiating coverage on firms with existing coverage appear to focus on producing firm-specific information as these initiations lead to reduced synchronicity. Together, our findings indicate that the type of information that analysts produce at initiation depends on the information provided by other analysts. Data Availability: All data are available from public sources identified in the paper.

ABSTRACT This study examines the association between customer base concentration and corporate public disclosure policy. When the customer base is more concentrated, large customers face lower costs of accessing the supplier firm's private information, reducing customers' overall demand for the supplier's public information, suggesting a negative association between customer concentration and the amount of public disclosure. Alternatively, large customers have greater bargaining power and may demand that the supplier firm provide more public disclosures. Consistent with customer concentration facilitating private information flow from the supplier to customers, we find that the frequencies of management earnings and sales forecasts are negatively associated with customer concentration among firms with major corporate customers. These associations are stronger when the supplier and customers are engaged in more relationship‐specific investments, when customers' private information acquisition costs are lower, and when it is less costly for customers to find another supplier.