[We study the effects of physical distance on the acquisition and use of private information in informationally opaque credit markets. Using a unique data set of all loan applications by small firms to a large bank, we show that borrower proximity facilitates the collection of soft information, leading to a trade-off in the availability and pricing of credit, which is more readily accessible to nearby firms albeit at higher interest rates ceteris paribus. Analyzing loan rates and firms' decision to switch lenders provides further evidence for banks' strategic use of private information. However, distance erodes our lender's ability to collect proprietary intelligence and to carve out local captive markets, suggesting that the requisite soft information is primarily local.]

We study a controlled experiment in which a bank's loan officers were incentivized based on originated loan volume to encourage prospecting for new business. While treated loan officers did attract new applications, both extensive and intensive margins of loan origination expanded (+ 31% new loans; loan size + 15%). We find that loan officers gave greater weight to hard information in approval decisions. Despite no change in the observable characteristics of approved loans, their default rate increased (+ 24%). Finally, the bank's imputed credit default model lost its predictive power. Overall, loan prospecting incentives led to unfavorable soft information being overlooked in the origination process.

Using several large data sets of mortgage loans originated between 2004 and 2007, we find that in the prime mortgage market, banks generally sold low-default-risk loans into the secondary market while retaining higher-default-risk loans in their portfolios. In contrast, these lenders retained loans with lower prepayment risk relative to loans they sold. Securitization strategy of lenders changed dramatically in 2007 as the crisis set in with most unwilling to retain higher-default-risk loans in return for lower prepayment risk. Contrary to the prime market, the subprime market does not exhibit any clear pattern of adverse selection.

[This paper investigates the role of ethnic matching between buyers and sellers in Singapore’s public housing market. We find that sellers sell homes in blocks with a high concentration of their own (other) ethnic group (s) at significant premiums (discounts). Chinese sellers earn 1.7% higher premiums when selling homes to Chinese buyers in high Chinese concentrations housing blocks, but Malay sellers accept 1.6% discounts from Malay buyers in the same blocks. We find that the high volume of within-ethnicity transactions with the price discounts is supported by the ethnic social networks, that is, through ethnicity-specialized real estate agents.]

We analyze an experiment conducted by a large U.S. bank that offered consumers achoice between two credit card contracts, one with an annual fee but a lowerinterest rate and one with no annual fee but a higher interest rate. We findthat on average consumers chose the credit contract that minimized their costs.A substantial fraction of consumers (about 40%) still chose the suboptimalcontract. Nonetheless, the probability of choosing the suboptimal contractdeclines with the dollar magnitude of the potential error, and consumers withlarger errors are more likely to subsequently switch to the optimalcontract.

We study the effects of physical distance on the acquisition and use of private information in informationally opaque credit markets. Using a unique data set of all loan applications by small firms to a large bank, we show that borrower proximity facilitates the collection of soft information, leading to a trade-off in the availability and pricing of credit, which is more readily accessible to nearby firms albeit at higher interest rates ceteris paribus. Analyzing loan rates and firms’ decision to switch lenders provides further evidence for banks’ strategic use of private information. However, distance erodes our lender’s ability to collect proprietary intelligence and to carve out local captive markets, suggesting that the requisite soft information is primarily local.

We find that regulators can implement identical rules inconsistently due to differences in their institutional design and incentives, and this behavior may adversely impact the effectiveness with which regulation is implemented. We study supervisory decisions of U.S. banking regulators and exploit a legally determined rotation policy that assigns federal and state supervisors to the same bank at exogenously set time intervals. Comparing federal and state regulator supervisory ratings within the same bank, we find that federal regulators are systematically tougher, downgrading supervisory ratings almost twice as frequently as do state supervisors. State regulators counteract these downgrades to some degree by upgrading more frequently. Under federal regulators, banks report worse asset quality, higher regulatory capital ratios, and lower return on assets. Leniency of state regulators relative to their federal counterparts is related to costly outcomes, such as higher failure rates and lower repayment rates of government assistance funds. The discrepancy in regulator behavior is related to different weights given by regulators to local economic conditions and, to some extent, differences in regulatory resources. We find no support for regulator self-interest, which includes “revolving doors” as a reason for leniency of state regulators.

This paper shows how liquidity infusions affect loan modification in the mortgage market. The design of pooling and servicing agreements leads mortgage servicers to prefer foreclosure over modification when they are liquidity constrained. Therefore, a positive liquidity shock is expected to boost modification rates. Using a residential mortgage dataset that includes loan-level information, we find that the Troubled Asset Relief Program significantly increased the modification rate. Our findings help us better understand the economic consequences of government intervention and have important policy implications for the renegotiation of distressed mortgages.

This paper theoretically and empirically studies the interaction of search and application approval in credit markets. Risky borrowers internalize the probability that their application is rejected and behave as if they had high search costs. Thus, “overpayment” may be a poor proxy for consumer sophistication since it partly represents rational search in response to rejections. Contrary to standard search models, our model implies (1) endogenous adverse selection through the search and application approval process, (2) a possibly non‐monotone or non‐decreasing relationship between search and realized interest, default, and application approval rates, and (3) search costs estimated from transaction prices alone are biased. We find support for the model's predictions using a unique data set detailing search behavior of mortgage borrowers. Estimating the model, we find that screening is informative and search is costly. Counterfactual analyses reveal that tightening lending standards and discrimination through application rejection both increase equilibrium interest rates. This increase in realized interest rates is in part due to strategic complementarity in bank rate setting.

Given the growth in home equity lending during the 1990s, it is imperative that lenders and regulators understand the risks associated with this segment of the residential mortgage market. Using a unique panel data set of over 135,000 homeowners with second mortgages, our analysis indicates that significant differences exist in the prepayment and default probabilities of home equity loans and lines, providing insights into bank minimum capital requirements. We find that households with equity loans are relatively more sensitive to changes in interest rates. By contrast, households with equity lines are more sensitive to appreciation in property value.