I examine two hypotheses of auditor resignation: litigation risk and clientele adjustment. I find resignation is positively related to increased client legal exposure, and to occurrence of clientele mismatch. The summary-measure approach allows me to distinguish clientele mismatch caused by changes in auditor (supply-side) characteristics vs. changes in client (demand-side) characteristics. Evidence suggests resignation is likely driven by supply-side changes. I also find investors react negatively to resignations, and the price drop varies cross-sectionally with litigation risk. Further, the tendency of dropped firms to engage small auditors is positively related to increased litigation risk, and to mismatch with large auditors.

This study examines the effect of corporate tax enforcement on managerial self-dealing, with a focus on manipulated gifts of insider stock. Prior work suggests that managers employ a variety of manipulative techniques to maximize their personal tax benefits from donating corporate stock, such as strategically timing gifts based on private information and fraudulently backdating gifts to the date with the highest price. Building on prior literature suggesting that the tax authority can discipline managerial misconduct, we hypothesize that IRS scrutiny from a corporate tax audit raises managers' perceived risk of detection, who refrain from making manipulated stock gifts while the firm is under audit. Using a novel, firm-specific measure to identify firms under audit, we find direct evidence that heightened scrutiny from tax enforcement serves as an effective monitoring mechanism and reduces managers' self-dealing behavior.

Securities litigation poses large costs to firms. The risk of litigation is heightened when firms have unexpectedly large earnings disappointments. Previous literature presents mixed evidence on whether voluntary disclosure of the bad news prior to scheduled earnings announcements deters or triggers litigation. We show that the counterintuitive finding in prior literature that disclosure triggers litigation could be driven by the endogeneity between disclosure and litigation. Using a simultaneous equations methodology, we find no evidence that disclosure triggers litigation. In fact, consistent with economic arguments, our evidence suggests that disclosure potentially deters certain types of litigation.

We examine the relation between risk and IPO underpricing and test two aspects of the litigation-risk hypothesis: (1) firms with higher litigation risk underprice their IPOs by a greater amount as a form of insurance (insurance effect) and (2) higher underpricing lowers expected litigation costs (deterrence effect). To adjust for the endogeneity bias in previous studies, we use a simultaneous equation framework. Evidence provides support for both aspects of the litigation-risk hypothesis.

Does enhanced regulatory transparency facilitate alignment of private and public enforcement? Utilizing the SEC's 2004 decision to publicly disclose its comment letters, we explore the actions of the SEC and shareholder litigants. We find the two parties converge more on enforcement targets after the public disclosure. The increased alignment is attributable to public scrutiny of SEC oversight enhancing regulator incentives and reducing regulatory capture, and to shareholder plaintiffs gaining information previously accessible only by regulators, enabling litigants to identify cases with “merit.” These findings suggest regulatory transparency enhances the complementarity of public and private enforcement, potentially improving enforcement outcomes.

ABSTRACT We examine how corporate social media affects the capital market consequences of firms’ disclosure in the context of consumer product recalls. Product recalls constitute a “product crisis” exposing the firm to reputational damage, loss of future sales, and legal liability. During such a crisis it is crucial for the firm to quickly and directly communicate its intended message to a wide network of stakeholders, which, in turn, renders corporate social media a potentially useful channel of disclosure. While we document that corporate social media, on average, attenuates the negative price reaction to recall announcements, the attenuation benefits of corporate social media vary with the level of control the firm has over its social media content. In particular, with the arrival of Facebook and Twitter, firms relinquished complete control over their social media content, and the attenuation benefits of corporate social media, while still significant, lessened. Detailed Twitter analysis confirms that the moderating effect of social media varies with the level of firm involvement and with the amount of control exerted by other users: the negative price reaction to a recall is attenuated by the frequency of tweets by the firm, while exacerbated by the frequency of tweets by other users.

ABSTRACT In this study, we examine whether managers delay disclosure of bad news relative to good news. If managers accumulate and withhold bad news up to a certain threshold, but leak and immediately reveal good news to investors, then we expect the magnitude of the negative stock price reaction to bad news disclosures to be greater than the magnitude of the positive stock price reaction to good news disclosures. We present evidence consistent with this prediction. Our analysis suggests that management, on average , delays the release of bad news to investors.

ABSTRACT We examine the relative accuracy of management and analyst forecasts of annual EPS. We predict and find that analysts’ information advantage resides at the macroeconomic level. They provide more accurate earnings forecasts than management when a firm's fortunes move in concert with macroeconomic factors such as Gross Domestic Product and energy costs. In contrast, we predict and find that management's information advantage resides at the firm level. Their forecasts are more accurate than analysts’ when management's actions, which affect reported earnings, are difficult to anticipate by outsiders, such as when the firm's inventories are abnormally high or the firm has excess capacity or is experiencing a loss. Although analysts are commonly viewed as industry specialists, we fail to find evidence that analysts have an information advantage over managers at the industry level. The two have comparable abilities to forecast earnings for firms with revenues or earnings that are more synchronous with their industries.

While shareholders have strong incentives to limit value-destroying perquisite consumption, it is challenging to identify such perquisites. Many corporate assets that enable forms of perquisite consumption also provide operational benefits. Corporate jets represent a potent example. We find business-related flights increase firm performance. Our results also highlight the channels through which jet use can either enhance or destroy firm value. Consistent with the benefits of information gathering and monitoring, firms with soft and complex information that is difficult to transmit remotely are more likely to fly to company subsidiaries and plants, and these flights positively affect firm value. In contrast, among firms with weak governance structures where flights are more likely motivated by agency factors, jet use is more likely to be value-decreasing. The ability to differentiate has important implications in today's activism environment.

We study whether social media can play a negative information role by impeding price discovery in the presence of highly speculative rumors. We focus on merger rumors, where most do not materialize. We find that merger rumors accompanied by greater Twitter activity elicit greater immediate market reaction even though rumor-related Twitter activity is unrelated to the probability of merger realization. The price distortion associated with tweet volume persists weeks after a rumor and reverses only after eight weeks. The price distortion is more pronounced for rumors tweeted by Twitter users with greater social influence, for target firms with low institutional ownership, and for rumors that supply more details. Our evidence suggests that social media can be a rumor mill that hinders the market's price discovery of potentially false information.