This paper investigates the impact of rating agencies in a market with asymmetric information. In particular, the role of credit rating agencies as an intermediary between investors and bond issuers is discussed. We model this setting in a dynamic framework in which both rating agencies and bond issuers are of heterogeneous quality. Rating agencies can apply costly research technology to reveal the fundamental nature of bond issuers and engage in rating smoothing. We show that rating smoothing can compensate for low research quality, even though it is accompanied by a quality deterioration in the rating market and market clustering. Moreover, low-quality bond issuers have a general tendency to match with low-quality rating agencies. If investors place a strong emphasis on the reputation of rating agencies, rating markets also tend to be strongly clustered.

We apply the Atkinson (1970) inequality index to time series of asset returns to offer a novel measure of financial risk consistent with expected-utility theory. This measure is converted to a certainty-equivalent return serving as a performance measure. We extend the Atkinson index to HARA utility and derive closed-form solutions to our measures for a number of preference-return combinations. Further, we establish relationships between risk aversion and the weights assigned to the cumulants of the return distribution for our performance measure. Using data from hedge funds and asset-pricing anomalies, we find that our performance measure contains additional, economically meaningful information.