Mergers and acquisitions are well-suited events for a detailed study of the valuation effects of corporate governance structures. Using a sample of 388 takeovers announced in the friendly environment of the 1990s, I empirically show that target shareholder control, proxied by low target chief executive officer share ownership, low fractions of inside directors, and the presence of large outside blockholders, is positively correlated with takeover premiums. In contrast, studies of takeovers in the hostile environment of the 1980s have shown a negative relation between target shareholder control and takeover premiums.

We document that acquirer announcement returns decrease and takeover premiums increase with the length of time since targets’ initial public offerings. Declining asymmetric information that leads to lower target valuation uncertainty for the acquirer can explain these effects. Newly public targets have greater information asymmetry (relative to their established counterparts) making their valuation more uncertain for a less-informed acquirer. Risk-averse acquirer managers pay less for riskier targets, resulting in lower takeover premiums and higher acquirer announcement returns. Over time, as the target builds a public track record, the asymmetric information about its valuation declines and takeover premiums increase to the benefit (detriment) of target (acquirer) shareholders.

We examine acquisitions of private firms with valuation histories and find a positive relation between acquirer announcement returns and target valuation revisions. Similar to other studies, acquirer announcement returns are positive, on average. However, positive acquirer announcement returns are mainly driven by targets that are acquired for more than their prior valuation. This relation is consistent with pricing effects associated with target valuation uncertainty and behavioral biases in negotiation outcomes.

A substantial and increasing proportion of corporate assets consists of intangible assets. Despite their growing importance, internally-generated intangible assets are largely absent from balance sheets and other corporate reports. Consequently, the empirical capital structure research has struggled to evaluate the effects of intangible assets on financial leverage. High valuation risk and poor collateralizability of some intangible assets — e.g. goodwill, may discourage debt financing. In contrast, identifiable intangible assets may support debt because they are separately identifiable, valuable, and potentially collateralizable, and are instrumental in generating cash flows. Utilizing a recent accounting rule change that allows us to observe granular market-based valuations of intangible assets, we find a strong positive relation between identifiable intangible assets and leverage. Overall, identifiable intangible assets support debt financing as much as tangible assets do, in particular in firms that lack abundant tangible assets.