We study the effects of employee welfare policies (EWPs) on labor investments of U.S. firms. We show that EWPs are associated with a significantly weaker pass-through of industry sales shocks to firm employment growth. EWPs’ insulation effect is stronger in states with less generous unemployment insurance, in states with lower wage growth, and in firms relying more on qualified labor. We corroborate our results exploring policy-induced variation in workforce policies from the adoption of Paid Sick Leave laws, and industry-wide shocks to labor ESG incidents. Our findings suggest that EWPs may insure workers against employment fluctuations.

I examine whether competition from domestic industry rivals affects firms’ proclivity to undertake foreign direct investment (FDI) and their country location choices. I find that competition affects foreign production decisions and the geography of international investments. While firms enduring stiffer competition are significantly less likely to undertake FDI, this effect is heterogeneous across firms. Competition deters FDI more strongly when costs are heavier, whereas it has weaker effects when efficiency is higher, growth opportunities are valuable, and cash reserves are higher. FDI location models suggest that when going abroad, firms facing stronger competition are more likely to pursue economies of productivity and taxation.

Does capital structure influence firms' FDI capital expenditure decisions into countries with varying degrees of political risk? We explore this question using a novel dataset that matches 10,000 unique outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) projects with 1135 distinct U.S. firms over the period 2003–2014. We find that capital expenditures allocated to FDI projects are significantly lower for highly leveraged firms, in particular for firms with low growth opportunities. Firms also commit lower capital amounts to investments located in countries characterized by higher political risk. Furthermore, leverage and political risk interact with one another in determining the financial commitment of the FDI, with leverage exerting a significantly stronger negative effect on capital expenditures in countries where political risk is elevated. Our findings are consistent with the monitoring role of debt in curbing exposure to political risk in multinational firms' foreign operations, and corroborate the disciplinary role of leverage on firms' investment decisions.