We study the sensitivity of banks’ credit supply to small and medium size enterprises (SMEs) in the UK with respect to the banks’ financial condition before and during the financial crisis. Employing unique data on the geographical location of all bank branches in the UK, we connect firms’ access to bank credit to the financial condition (i.e., bank health and the use of core deposits) of all bank branches in the vicinity of the firm for the period 2004–2011. Before the crisis, banks’ local financial conditions did not influence credit availability irrespective of the functional distance (i.e., the distance between bank branch and bank headquarters). However, during the crisis, we find that SMEs with banks within their vicinity that have stronger financial conditions faced greater credit availability when the functional distance is close. Our results point to a “flight to headquarters” effect during the financial crisis.

We evaluate how the liquidity coverage rule affects US banks’ opacity and funding liquidity risk. Banks subject to the rule become significantly more opaque and funding liquidity risk increases by $245 million per quarter. Higher funding liquidity risk is more pronounced among banks that are subject to the rule’s more stringent liquidity buffers, and systemically riskier banks. Rising opacity reflects an increase in banks’ holdings of complex assets whose value is difficult to communicate to investors. The evidence highlights the unintended consequences of liquidity regulation and is consistent with theoretical models’ predictions of a trade-off between liquidity buffers and bank opacity that exacerbates funding liquidity risk.

We examine how market power in the run-up to the 2007–2009 crisis affected banks’ systemic risk during the crisis, and whether this effect was influenced by two key factors: securitization and bank capital. Using a sample of the largest listed banks from 15 countries, we find that more market power prior to the crisis is connected to larger levels of realized systemic risk during the crisis. The use of securitization exacerbated the effect of market power on systemic risk, while capitalization partially mitigated it.

This paper attempts to evaluate the competitiveness of British banking in the presence of cross-selling and switching costs during 1993–2008. It presents estimates of a model of banking behaviour that encompasses switching costs as well as cross-selling of loans and off-balance sheet transactions. The evidence from panel estimation of the model indicates that the consumer faced high switching costs in the loan market in the latter part of the sample period, as a result of weaker competitiveness in the loan market. Additionally, the weaker competitiveness in the loan market appears to facilitate the cross-selling behaviour of British banks, which helps explain the rapid growth of non-interest income during the last two decades.

This paper evaluates the impact of financial sector reforms on the cost structure characteristics and on the ownership–cost efficiency relationship in Indian banking. It also examines the impact of reforms on the dynamics of competition in the lending market. We find evidence that deregulation improves banks performance and fosters competition in the lending market. Results suggest technological progress, once Indian commercial banks have adjusted to the new regulatory environment. This, however, does not translate in efficiency gains. There is also evidence of an ownership effect on the level and pattern of efficiency change. Finally, competition keeps building pace even in the re-regulation period and technological improvements are not hampered by the tightening of prudential norms.

This paper reports an empirical assessment of competitive conditions among the major British banks, during a period of major structural change. Specifically, estimates of the Rosse–Panzar H-statistic are reported for a panel of 12 banks for the period 1980–2004. The sample banks correspond closely to the major British banking groups specified by the British Banking Association. The robustness of the results of the Rosse–Panzar methodology is tested by estimating the ratio of Lerner indices obtained from interest rate setting equations. The results confirm the consensus finding that competition in British banking is most accurately characterised by the theoretical model of monopolistic competition. There is evidence that the intensity of competition in the core market for bank lending remained approximately unchanged throughout the 1980s and 1990s. However, competition appears to have become less intense in the non-core (off-balance sheet) business of British banks.

This paper examines the impact of regulatory reform on productivity growth and its components for Indian banks from 1992 to 2009. We estimate parametric and nonparametric efficiency frontiers, followed by Divisia and Malmquist indexes of total factor productivity, respectively. To account for technology heterogeneity among ownership types, we use a metafrontier approach. Results are consistent across methodologies and show sustained productivity growth, driven mainly by technological progress. Furthermore, results indicate that different ownership types react differently to changes in the operating environment. The position of foreign banks becomes increasingly dominant, and their production technology becomes the best practice in the industry.