I use a life-cycle model of housing demand to infer expectations about house prices and home equity requirements for the housing boom of the 2000s from observed household choices. Expectations and credit constraints are separately identified from the intensive and extensive margins of housing demand. The main results are that (1) expected price growth was close to average long-run growth, (2) home equity requirements were lax initially, but tightened after the bust, and (3) subjective uncertainty about future price growth was large. Given the option to default on mortgage debt, greater price uncertainty leads to higher optimal household leverage.

I use a life-cycle model of housing demand to infer expectations about house prices and home equity requirements for the housing boom of the 2000s from observed household choices. Expectations and credit constraints are separately identified from the intensive and extensive margins of housing demand. The main results are that (1) expected price growth was close to average long-run growth, (2) home equity requirements were lax initially, but tightened after the bust, and (3) subjective uncertainty about future price growth was large. Given the option to default on mortgage debt, greater price uncertainty leads to higher optimal household leverage.

We develop a general equilibrium model in which households’ mortgage leverage is determined by supply and demand forces, where the price of credit impacts the quantity of leverage households choose. Mortgages are supplied by financial intermediaries, who offer households a menu of mortgage contracts whose pricing varies with intermediaries’ equity capital. In the model, growth in the demand for safe assets that replicates the falling interest rates in the 2000s causes an empirically realistic boom in household borrowing, debt-financed consumption, and house prices. This boom results in a larger bust in asset prices and household borrowing in future financial crises.

We analyze interactions between fiscal and monetary stimulus in a new Keynesian model with nominal mortgage debt that can be inflated away. Redistributive transfers are most impactful when followed by a temporary deviation from inflation-targeting monetary policy. Unlike other fiscal policies, redistribution causes inflation even in the absence of long-run debt sustainability problems, and inflating away mortgages results in additional redistribution. In a quantitative model with mortgage refinancing frictions, transfer payments provide much more stimulus than the redistributive effects of inflation. Borrowers gradually refinance after their mortgages are inflated away, dampening their immediate consumption response and reducing their long-run labor supply.

How much capital should financial intermediaries hold? We propose a general equilibrium model with a financial sector that makes risky long‐term loans to firms, funded by deposits from savers. Government guarantees create a role for bank capital regulation. The model captures the sharp and persistent drop in macro‐economic aggregates and credit provision as well as the sharp change in credit spreads observed during financial crises. Policies requiring intermediaries to hold more capital reduce financial fragility, reduce the size of the financial and non‐financial sectors, and lower intermediary profits. They redistribute wealth from savers to the owners of banks and non‐financial firms. Pre‐crisis capital requirements are close to optimal. Counter‐cyclical capital requirements increase welfare.

ABSTRACT Shared appreciation mortgages (SAMs) feature mortgage payments that adjust with house prices. They are designed to stave off borrower default by providing payment relief when house prices fall. Some argue that SAMs may help prevent the next foreclosure crisis. However, home owners' gains from payment relief are mortgage lenders' losses. A general equilibrium model in which financial intermediaries channel savings from saver to borrower households shows that indexation of mortgage payments to aggregate house prices increases financial fragility, reduces risk‐sharing, and leads to expensive financial sector bailouts. In contrast, indexation to local house prices reduces financial fragility and improves risk‐sharing.

This paper uses an assignment model to understand the cross section of house prices within a metro area. Movers’ demand for housing is derived from a life-cycle problem with credit market frictions. Equilibrium house prices adjust to assign houses that differ by quality to movers who differ by age, income, and wealth. To quantify the model, we measure distributions of house prices, house qualities, and mover characteristics from micro-data on San Diego County during the 2000s boom. The main result is that cheaper credit for poor households was a major driver of prices, especially at the low end of the market. (JEL D14, D91, R21, R31)

This paper studies housing markets where a subset of houses in a restricted area is available exclusively to a subset of “eligible” buyers. An empirical part shows that houses on Stanford campus (available only to faculty) trade at substantial discounts to comparable houses off campus. The theoretical part describes an assignment model with heterogeneous houses and buyers which predicts such discounts if the matchup of quality and buyer pools is sufficiently different inside versus outside the restricted area. The restriction can distort allocations by making eligible buyers choose either higher or lower qualities than ineligible buyers with the same characteristics.

We examine the ability of the government to impact mortgage refinancing activity and spur consumption by focusing on the Home Affordable Refinance Program (HARP) that relaxed housing equity constraints by extending government credit guarantee on insufficiently collateralized refinanced mortgages. Difference-in-difference tests based on program eligibility criteria reveal a significant increase in refinancing activity by HARP. More than three million eligible borrowers with primarily fixed-rate mortgages refinanced under HARP, receiving an average reduction of 1.45% in interest rate ($3,000 in annual savings). Durable spending by borrowers increased significantly after refinancing. Regions more exposed to the program saw a relative increase in non-durable and durable consumer spending, a decline in foreclosure rates, and faster recovery in house prices. Competitive frictions in the refinancing market hampered the program’s impact: the take-up rate and annual savings among those who refinanced were reduced by 10–20%, with amplified effects for the most indebted borrowers.