Auditing standards prescribe a risk‐based approach where auditors assess the risk of material misstatement and then design and perform audit procedures to reduce audit risk to an appropriately low level. Prior research suggests that auditors are responsive to high control‐risk assessment ( CRA ), but that this response is, perhaps, only partially effective at reducing audit risk, with relatively little insight into where and why this occurs. By refining analyses to more detailed levels of the audit, I extend this research by providing further insight into auditors’ response to high CRA . I examine and find that audit fees are significantly higher for high CRA in revenue relative to high CRA in other accounts, suggesting that auditor effort in response to high CRA is more pronounced in audit areas of particular interest and concern to investors and regulators. Despite this, I find evidence suggesting that revenue is the only audit area examined where auditor effort in response to high CRA does not attenuate the likelihood of misstatement. Finally, because auditors face time constraints, I examine whether increased effort in response to high CRA in certain audit areas diverts auditors’ attention from other areas with lower risk, thus contributing to the overall association between misstatements and internal control deficiencies documented in prior research. I find a greater likelihood of misstatement in non‐core operating accounts with lower CRA as audit effort increases in response to high CRA in revenue, consistent with the explanation that high CRA in revenue may divert auditors’ attention from other areas of the audit with lower CRA .

ABSTRACT The engagement quality review is a key component of an audit firm's quality control system. This study leverages unique data on individual engagement quality reviewers (EQRs) to examine how previous shared working experience between EQRs and engagement partners affects audit quality. While prior research suggests that within‐firm network ties between predecessor and successor partners facilitate knowledge transfer, we find that prior shared working experience between EQRs and engagement partners is associated with lower audit quality. Mechanism tests indicate that such experience is associated with a higher likelihood of regulatory enforcement actions related to deficiencies in audit procedures, insufficient evidence, and a lack of professional skepticism. We also find that such experience corresponds with higher materiality thresholds, suggesting reduced scrutiny during audit planning and execution. Additional analyses reveal that these adverse effects primarily arise when previous shared working relationships did not produce adverse outcomes, when EQRs are not audit industry leaders, and when they face lower reputational risk. These findings are especially salient given that EQRs’ previous shared working experience with engagement partners appears to weigh heavily in EQR assignments. Overall, our study provides important insights into the implications of EQR independence and the determinants of engagement quality review effectiveness.

ABSTRACT We examine whether firms with managers that have prior internal audit experience are less likely to manage earnings. This examination is important because the internal audit function (IAF) is uniquely positioned to provide experiences that could influence future managerial behavior, including limiting the potential negative repercussions of earnings management. We find that firms with managers that have internal audit experience are associated with lower real earnings management (REM) but not accruals‐based earnings management. Effects are strongest when managers with internal audit experience have greater power or currently hold financial roles, or when there are a greater number of managers with internal audit experience. The results are robust to including firm fixed effects, using entropy‐balancing and performance‐matching approaches, using a subsample of firm‐years required to have an IAF, using a subsample of firms for which we can measure IAF quality, and measuring internal audit experience at a previous employer. These results point to an important benefit of manager internal audit experience, as research suggests that REM is common, difficult to detect, not always within the scope of financial reporting regulators, and detrimental to future performance.

ABSTRACT Although the FASB and IASB conceptual frameworks identify relevance and faithful representation as the fundamental qualitative characteristics of useful information, prior research suggests that revenue recognition accounting standards that restrict managerial discretion resulted in improved faithful representation but reduced relevance. We use the adoption of Accounting Standards Update (ASU) 2009‐13 and ASU 2009‐14 to examine the effects of increased managerial discretion to accelerate revenue recognition in multiple‐deliverable arrangements; that is, transactions where vendors sell multiple products or services that are delivered at different points in time. We find that increased discretion results in an increase in the relevance of reported revenues without reducing faithful representation. We further examine whether managers' strategic motivations influence the transparency of ASU 2009‐13 and ASU 2009‐14 adoption disclosure. Although firms providing opaque adoption disclosure do not exhibit a decline in the faithful representation of revenues following the standards' adoption, these firms are more likely than firms providing transparent adoption disclosure to accelerate revenue recognition opportunistically following adoption when incentives are high. These results provide important evidence for assessing whether standards that allow greater discretion in revenue recognition affect the usefulness of revenues and also provide evidence that strategic motivations to preserve flexibility in managing earnings influence the transparency of adoption disclosure.

ABSTRACT In this study, we examine whether audit committee accounting expertise helps to promote audit quality by motivating auditors to conduct diligent internal control audits and make appropriate internal control assessments because audit committee accounting expertise safeguards auditors from dismissal following adverse internal control opinions. Among clients with existing and likely internal control material weaknesses (as proxied by future restatements of audited financial statements), we find a greater likelihood of adverse internal control audit opinions when the audit committee has greater accounting expertise (measured by the proportion of accounting experts on the audit committee). Among all clients, we find a lower likelihood of subsequent auditor dismissal following an adverse internal control audit opinion when the audit committee has greater accounting expertise. In further analyses, we find that this lower likelihood of subsequent auditor dismissal occurs when at least two audit committee members possess accounting expertise. We also find some evidence that CFO influence (but not CEO influence) over the audit committee negates the increased likelihood of adverse internal control opinions when internal control material weaknesses likely exist, as well as the decreased likelihood of auditor dismissal following adverse internal control opinions. These findings have important implications for regulators and corporate nominating committees interested in promoting audit committee effectiveness.

ABSTRACT In recent years, public accounting firms have experienced a steady increase in the proportion of their revenues generated from consulting services. Although growth in consulting revenue following the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act (SOX) has been generated primarily from services provided to nonaudit clients, regulators have expressed concerns about the potential implications of this increase for audit quality. In contrast, accounting firms assert that the expertise developed by their consulting professionals helps them to provide better quality audits. We examine the relation between the proportion of accounting firm consulting revenue to total revenue and audit quality and investor perceptions of audit quality. Because SOX drastically altered the source of consulting revenues for public accounting firms, we also separately examine these relations in the pre‐ and post‐SOX eras. We find evidence suggesting that before SOX, higher proportions of audit firm consulting revenues negatively impacted both audit quality and investor perceptions of audit quality. However, we do not find a statistically significant association between audit firm consulting revenues and either audit quality or investor perceptions of audit quality following SOX. Our analyses suggest that even if these relations exist following SOX, the potential economic magnitude of the effect is small.