Abstract We examine the effects of an order cancellation fee on limit order flow and execution quality in the PHLX options market. The cancellation fee on professional order flow effectively reduces the rate at which limit orders are canceled. Whereas the cancellation fee discourages the submission of nonmarketable orders, it encourages the submission of marketable orders. Consequently, nonmarketable order fill rates increase; marketable order fill speeds decrease; and bid-ask spreads widen. We also find slight increases in both dollar volume and market share. (JEL G11, G14, G18) Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.

We use the 2016 U.S. SEC tick size pilot to examine the effects of an increase in the minimum price variation on limit order book liquidity in NASDAQ-listed stocks on the NASDAQ exchange. For treatment stocks with an average pre-pilot quoted spread less than 0.05, the tick size increase is binding and leads to a significant decrease in liquidity in the limit order book. Specifically, the implied cost to trade at and away from the best bid and offer prices increases and the limit order book becomes less resilient – the amount of time required for a deviation in liquidity to return to its long-run mean. For treatment stocks with an average pre-pilot quoted spread of at least 0.05, the tick size increase is non-binding and leads to either a slight decrease, or no change in limit order book liquidity.

Prior research argues that the process of intermediation is opaque and produces uncertainty about the riskiness of banks, which may adversely affect the efficiency of bank stock prices. Using the Hou and Moskowitz (2005) measure of price delay, which captures the inefficiency of stock prices, we test for, and find evidence supporting the idea that opacity is positively associated with price delay. Bank stocks have markedly higher delay than similar non-bank stocks. This higher level of delay is driven, in part, by market-based measures of informational opacity as well as the asset composition of the bank's balance sheet. Combined, our findings suggest that bank opacity reduces the efficiency of financial markets.