We re-examine the negative association between leverage and returns while also focusing on the role of boards of directors. To do so, we utilize the unique setting of real estate investment trusts (REITs), their high leverage, and the volatility that the industry experienced during the recent financial crisis. We find that during the financial crisis REIT board activity increased, especially among firms with high leverage. We also find that board activity helps mitigate the previously reported negative effect of leverage on returns during this time period. Post-crisis, we find evidence suggesting that firms with more active boards reduce their leverage if their pre-crisis leverage was high. Further, firms with more active boards have better post-crisis returns. Our findings are robust to using different measures of activity that take into account director experience in real estate and finance.

We document that firms run by female executives are associated with a significantly greater value for their cash holdings. In these firms, the marginal value of one dollar is 1.39, while the comparable value is 0.90 for male managed firms. Further, the marginal value of cash holdings for firms run by female CEOs (CFOs) is 1.56 (1.47) compared to 0.94 (0.91) for firms with male CEOs (CFOs). The significant difference in the value of cash holdings may be attributed to the gender-based female executives’ traits that permeate a myriad of corporate decisions with superior outcomes that cumulatively manifest in the market assigning a higher value to cash holdings by these firms. The effect is more pronounced in firms with any of the following characteristics: financially unconstrained, cash distributing, weak governance, low institutional investors’ monitoring, and low audit quality. Adding another new dimension to the literature, we show that corporate culture is a potential determinant of the value of cash holdings. Specifically, we document that female led firms are associated with a more salubrious corporate environment manifesting in a greater value assigned to corporate cash holdings. Our results are robust to a battery of robustness tests.

This study examines the effect of policy uncertainty on corporate debt maturity structure. We find that elevated levels of policy uncertainty lead firms to shorten debt maturity, indicating that firms become more cautious to committing to long-term debt obligations and is suggestive of increased risk aversion during high policy uncertainty periods. However, not all firms react similarly. In contrast to Myers' (1977) prediction, high growth firms lengthen debt maturity during high policy uncertainty periods. The evidence regarding the relationship between debt maturity and credit quality is not non-monotonic as firms with highest and lowest credit quality diverge in terms of debt maturity when policy uncertainty is elevated. Further, larger firms increase their debt maturity, while financially-constrained firms and firms with greater exposure to domicile political environment obtain short-term debt. The results are robust to a battery of tests including the use of instrument variable and placebo analysis.

Gender diversity in the C-suite and the boardroom have taken on greater importance in recent years. We establish a gender-based behavioral dimension to corporate debt maturity choice. Female executives choose a significantly shorter debt maturity structure compared to their male counterparts. However, their influence on debt maturity is inversely related to the proportion of their incentive compensation. Additionally, we find a substitution effect that moderates the relationship between executive gender and debt maturity structure as board gender diversity increases. Further, we find that firms led by females benefit from higher corporate credit ratings thus showing that the greater ethical sensitivities of female top executives compensate for the refinancing risk commonly associated with shorter-term debt. Transitions from male-to-female executive(s) result in shortening of debt maturity over the post-transition period. Our results survive a battery of robustness tests, including endogeneity, and contribute at the confluence of gender-based governance and corporate financial decision-making literatures.

This study establishes a relation between corporate culture and debt maturity choice. Specifically, superior corporate culture is associated with the choice of shorter-term debt, supporting the notion that superior culture reduces managerial agency problems resulting in managers being more receptive to external monitoring through the choice of shorter-term debt. The culture subcomponents of integrity, teamwork, and innovation are found to have a meaningful influence on the debt maturity structure choice. The relation between culture and debt maturity is more pronounced in firms with higher managerial stock ownership and those that are financially constrained, but is weakened in firms with a greater CEO sensitivity to stock prices. Additionally, firms with superior culture are shown to have higher long-term credit ratings. These findings contribute at the confluence of corporate culture and debt financing literatures. A battery of robustness tests, including addressing endogeneity concerns, validate the findings.