We consider a model in which the threat of bank liquidations by creditors as well as equity-based compensation incentives both discipline bankers, but with different consequences. Greater use of equity leads to lower ex-ante bank liquidity, whereas greater use of debt leads to a higher probability of inefficient bank liquidation. The bank's privately-optimal capital structure trades off these two costs. With uncertainty about aggregate risk, bank creditors learn from other banks’ liquidation decisions. Such inference can lead to contagious liquidations, some of which are inefficient; this is a negative externality that is ignored in privately-optimal bank capital structures. Thus, under plausible conditions, banks choose excessive leverage relative to the socially optimal level, providing a rationale for bank capital regulation. While a blanket regulatory forbearance policy can eliminate contagion, it also eliminates all market discipline. However, a regulator generating its own information about aggregate risk, rather than relying on market signals, can restore efficiency and market discipline by intervening selectively.

This paper develops a theory of how risk is assessed and priced through the business cycle by developing an intuitive model in which there is uncertainty about whether outcomes depend on the risk-management skills of banks or are just based on luck, in the spirit of Piketty’s (1995) model of “left-wing” and “right-wing” dynasties. Periods of sustained banking profitability cause all agents to rationally elevate their estimates of bankers’ skills, despite the uncertainty about what is driving outcomes. Everybody consequently becomes sanguine about bank risk, credit spreads decline, and banks choose increasingly risky assets. Conditional on subsequently observing unexpectedly high defaults, beliefs can endogenously shift to put more weight on outcomes being luck-driven, and this causes credit spreads to widen and may be enough to trigger a crisis. Regulatory implications of the analysis are extracted.

Deregulation significantly affects firms’ debt decisions. Prior to deregulation, regulated firms depend more on long-term and public debt but reduce this dependence considerably during deregulation. Cross-sectional analysis shows that the lower use of long-term and public debt results from changing firm sensitivities to determinants of debt decisions triggered by deregulation. Consistent with credit and liquidity risk theories of debt maturity, the concave relation between firm quality and debt maturity is attenuated among regulated firms. Inconsistent with these theories, the convex relation between firm quality and public debt issues exists only among regulated firms. I find limited support for other theories.

We investigate Project Finance as a private response to inefficiencies created by weak legal protection of outside investors. We offer a new illustration that law matters by demonstrating that for large investment projects, Project Finance provides a contractual and organizational substitute for investor protection laws. Project Finance accomplishes this by making cash flows verifiable through two mechanisms: (i) contractual arrangements made possible by structuring the project within a single, discrete entity legally separate from the sponsor; and (ii) private enforcement of these contracts through a network of project accounts that ensures lender control of project cash flows. Comparing bank loans for Project Finance with regular corporate loans for large investments, we show that Project Finance is more likely in countries with weaker laws against insider stealing and weaker creditor rights in bankruptcy. We identify the predicted effects using difference-in-difference and triple-difference tests that exploit exogenous country-level legal changes and inter-industry differences in free cash flow and tangibility of assets.

Although managers’ green investments have no impact on future cash flows in our experimental markets, investors respond favorably when managers make and disclose an investment and highlight the societal benefits rather than the cost to the company. Managers anticipate investors’ reaction and therefore often disclose their investment and the associated societal benefits. Managers and other shareholders benefit from investors’ reaction, but the investment cost always exceeds this benefit, demonstrating that managers make green investments because they value the societal benefits. Collectively, our findings show that both investors and managers tradeoff wealth for societal benefits and help explain managers’ corporate social responsibilty disclosures.

Skeptical that research to date does not warrant confidence in the relationship between natural resources and the maintenance of material well-being, the authors consider the conventional explanations for how resource stringencies have been avoided and what has been learned during the past decade. They then point out what has been missed by formal economic modeling and why it may be important in understanding the implications of resource scarcity. 19 references.

We examine auditor switching conditional on the compatibility of clients and their auditors using a unique text‐based measure of similarity of financial disclosures. We find clustering of clients within an audit firm based on this measure. We find that clients with the lowest similarity scores are significantly more likely (9.4%–10.6%) to switch auditors, and will change to an audit firm to which they are more similar. Regarding the effect on audit quality, we find that discretionary accruals are lower when similarity is higher. However, accounting restatements are more likely when text disclosures that are unaudited—business description, and management discussion and analysis (MD&A)—are more similar. We find no such similarity effect for the audited footnotes. Finally, we find that firms that are more similar are less likely to receive a going concern opinion (GCO), but the GCO reporting decision is more accurate. It is unclear if this reflects higher or lower audit quality since firms that are candidates for a GCO are intrinsically different from the average firm in an auditor's portfolio due to their financial distress. One implication of these results is that auditors might have greater involvement in the quality of the text disclosures that are currently not audited.

Since 2012, all European Union countries have required disclosure of large short positions. This reduces short interest, bid-ask spreads, and the informativeness of prices. After specific disclosures, short-run abnormal returns are insignificantly negative, but 90-day cumulative abnormal returns are a statistically significant −5.23%. We find disclosures are likely to be followed by other disclosures, especially when the initial discloser is large or centrally located. However, there is no subsequent increase in short interest, and prices do not subsequently reverse. These results indicate that large short sellers are well informed, and that disclosures are not being used to coordinate manipulative attacks.

We study trading dynamics in an asset market where the quality of assets is private information and finding a counterparty takes time. When trading ceases in equilibrium as a response to an adverse shock to asset quality, a government can resurrect trading by buying up lemons which involves a financial loss. The optimal policy is centred around an announcement effect where trading starts already before the intervention for two reasons. First, delaying the intervention allows selling pressure to build up thereby improving the average quality of assets for sale. Secondly, intervening at a higher price increases the return from buying an asset of unknown quality. It is optimal to intervene immediately at the lowest price when the market is sufficiently important. For less important markets, when the shock to quality and search frictions are small, it is optimal to rely on the announcement effect. Here delaying the intervention and fostering the effect by intervening at the highest price tend to be complements.