Financial regulation is harmonized across countries even though countries vary in their ability to bail-out their banking sector in the event of a crisis. This article addresses the question of whether countries with different fiscal capacity should optimally have different bank regulation, implemented—among other tools—through capital requirements—a question so far ignored by the theoretical banking literature. I show that countries with larger fiscal capacity should have lower ex ante minimum bank capital requirements, in an environment with endogenously incomplete markets and overinvestment due to “Too-Big-To-Fail” moral hazard and pecuniary externalities. I also show that, in addition to a minimum bank capital requirement, regulators in countries with strong “Too-Big-To-Fail” moral hazard should impose a limit on the liabilities pledged by financial institutions in a crisis state. This implies limits on put options/credit default swap contracts. Finally, I argue that the type of regulatory instrument used is crucial as to whether larger fiscal capacity implies more- or less-stringent bank regulation.

ABSTRACT Conventional wisdom holds that lowering a home country's interest rate relative to another's will depreciate the domestic currency. We document that, at business‐cycle frequencies, U.S. forward guidance monetary policy easings had the opposite effect during the Great Recession. We attribute this effect to calendar‐based forward guidance that signaled economic weakness, resulting in a “flight‐to‐safety” effect and lower expected U.S. inflation. We also document cross‐currency heterogeneity: a surprise U.S. rate cut induced a larger appreciation of the dollar against currencies that typically depreciate more when the world economy is contracting. We build a model that can reconcile these findings.

We disprove the exchange rate macroeconomic disconnect puzzle by showing that macroeconomic news can explain most variation in exchange rates at monthly and quarterly frequencies, accounting for up to 91 percent of the quarterly exchange rate variation during US recessions and 65 percent over all periods. The main driver of the reconnect is exchange rates responding to past news—a result inconsistent with the theory of uncovered interest rate parity under full information rational expectations (UIP-FIRE). We discuss theoretical models that can explain this surprising result, including models featuring currency risk premia, regulatory or institutional frictions, or deviation from FIRE.