We show that high-cost debt exacerbates financial constraints by affecting lenders’ perception of credit risk. Using data from a high-cost lender in the UK, we show that high-cost credit reduces applicants’ credit score and future bank credit even though it does not affect future debt repayment. These effects are not present among borrowers who are already tagged as high risk at application, consistent with high-cost credit affecting lenders’ beliefs about borrowers’ creditworthiness. The results highlight a novel channel through which high-cost credit can harm consumers’ financial health: a self-reinforcing stigma of high risk.

Abstract This article tests for bias in consumer lending using administrative data from a high-cost lender in the U.K. We motivate our analysis using a new principal-agent model of bias where loan examiners are incentivized to maximize a short-term outcome, not long-term profits, leading to bias against illiquid applicants at the margin of loan decisions. We identify the profitability of marginal applicants using the quasi-random assignment of loan examiners, finding significant bias against immigrant and older applicants when using the firm’s preferred measure of long-run profits but not when using the short-run measure used to evaluate examiner performance. In this case, market incentives based on characteristics that vary across groups lead to inefficient group-based bias.