We study the relationship between mutual fund management's direct experience with extreme environment events and the fund's voting behavior on environmental issues. We find that higher air pollution in a fund's home county increases its propensity to vote in support of shareholders' environmental proposals. The effect is weakened by fund manager turnovers, and managers' affiliation with the Republican Party. Conversely, the effect is stronger for more highly contested environmental proposals. Overall, our results suggest that mutual fund management's direct experience with extreme environment events plays a significant role in motivating the fund's environmental engagements.

Firms in the same networks tend to have similar corporate governance practices. However, disentangling peer effects, where governance practices propagate from one firm to another, from selection effects, where firms with similar preferences self-select into linked groups, is difficult to do. Studying board-interlocked firms, we utilize the staggered adoption of universal demand laws across states to identify and estimate causal peer effects in governance policies. We find support for the existence of peer effects in the adoption of antitakeover provisions. The impact of universal demand laws on the governance experience of interlocking directors likely explains these effects.