ABSTRACT I examine whether contracts that require customers to privately share with suppliers forecasts of their future demand for the supplier’s products (“demand forecast contracts,” or “DF contracts”) affect the supplier’s reliance on an alternative information source—stock prices—when making investment decisions. If suppliers find these forecasts a more direct signal of future demand than stock prices, they may reduce their reliance on stock prices to guide investments. Using hand-collected data, I find that suppliers’ investments become significantly less sensitive to stock prices after entering a DF contract for the first time. This effect is stronger when forecasts are more credible, demand more uncertain, and investments more irreversible. Supplier performance, measured by return on assets and cash flow from operations, improves post-DF. Overall, these findings suggest that when a relatively direct information source about future demand becomes available, managers reduce their reliance on stock prices in making real decisions. Data Availability: Data are available from public sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: G10; G30; G31; L14; M40; M41.

We study the influence of political partisanship in SEC investigations and AAER enforcement actions against financial misconduct. We find that the SEC is more likely to launch an investigation against a firm that is misaligned with the agency’s political ideology than other firms. The likelihood of an AAER appears unaffected by political misalignment, but once named in an AAER, a misaligned firm faces harsher penalties than other firms. We find evidence that collectively points to potential misallocation of scarce enforcement resources due to partisanship: conditional on investigation, misaligned firms are less likely to receive an enforcement action, and conditional on misreporting, non-misaligned firms are less likely to be investigated.

We hypothesize that companies in the same product market avoid sharing the same audit partner when they are concerned about possible information spillovers. Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that product market rivals are less likely to share the same partner when they perceive that information spillovers are more costly. While concerns about information spillovers significantly reduce the likelihood of product market rivals sharing the same audit partner, we find that such concerns do not deter them from sharing the same audit office. Lastly, when companies are unconcerned with information spillovers, our results suggest that partner sharing can be beneficial because it can result in lower audit fees and fewer accounting misstatements.

ABSTRACT We use the staggered adoption of the Universal Demand Laws (UD Laws) to examine the effect of an exogenous reduction in shareholders' ability to litigate on the extent of accounting conservatism. On average, we find an increase in reporting conservatism post-UD. The increased conservatism is concentrated in firms that contemplate equity issuance, with a high proportion of monitoring investors, and high corporate governance quality. In contrast, firms with specific short-term incentives for aggressive accounting—such as those narrowly beating benchmarks, those with abnormal insider trading, and those likely to violate debt covenants—weakly governed firms, and firms with high ex ante litigation risk decrease reporting conservatism after UD. Our results suggest that the relation between the litigation environment and reporting conservatism is complex and dependent on specific characteristics and unique circumstances of the firms.