I. Dr. Kuznets' methodological scepticism, 40. — II. Lederer, Loewe, and Carrel on equilibrium economics; the empiricorealist as circular reasoner, 42. — III. The equilibrium concept and economic dynamics, 55. — IV. Rosenstein-Rodan "discovers" orthodox economic theory, 63. — V. Business cycles and the Laws of Chance, 67. — VI. The program of Empirico-Realism provides neither a synthesis nor a call to economic theorists to abandon their evil courses, 81. — VII. The real problem of economic dynamics, 86.

The final settlement; commanding position of the Conference Committee. — Higher duties on agricultural commodities, such as sugar, wheat, cotton, 3. — Hides, wool, meat, and dairy products, 7. — Minor agricultural products, 9. — Manufactured articles, cottons, woolens, silks, 13 — The general trend, 16. — The Tariff Commission retained, with no marked changes in its powers, 19.

I. The principle of equalizing costs professes to extend no favors, 175; in actual legislation, there is a scramble for favors, 177.—II. The Tariff Commission was established in 1916 as a body for inquiry and report, 178.—The great changes, in the flexible provisions of 1922, 179.—III. The Session of 1929–30, 180.—The make-up and procedure of the House and Senate Committees, 181.—The revolt of the insurgents, 184.—IV. The principle of merely equalizing costs ignored; aid to depressed industries (such as sugar) the dominant note, 186.—The farmers' representatives press for aid in other ways than by increased tariff rates, 189.—V. The Tariff Commission again; its unsatisfactory working after 1922, 191.—VI. Possibilities of the future, 194.—Tariff Boards in other English-speaking countries; the combination of power and responsibility in a Minister, 196.—Nothing of the kind in the United States, 197. — The President's position, 198.—Possibilities suggested by the methods elsewhere; Cabinet members and Congress, 199.—VII. No far-reaching changes to be expected, 200.—Maintenance and improvement of the present system the only practicable policy, 201.

Introduction: "fair return on fair valuation" of properties of natural monopolies an economically unsound policy, since it affords unsatisfactory control of investment, 263.—I. Adherence to this policy based upon misinterpretation of monopoly as essentially a phenomenon of distribution, 265.—II. Two approaches to monopoly control, 267.—III. Superiority of "regulated-investment" to "regulated-return" in control of under-invested simple monopoly, 273.—IV. Superiority of "regulated-investment" in control of over-invested simple monopoly, 277.—V. Discrimination as between different services supplied by a given monopoly reducible to same formula as that pertinent to simple monopoly, 282.

R ARELY if ever has there appeared more widespread interest in employment and other measures of wage earners' economic status than in this depression of I930. Rather belatedly, employment is being looked upon with keen interest, not in its industrial and its social aspects alone, but especially in its relation to commercial problems the flow of money income and of commodity purchasing power, and the prospects for recovery in the wage-earner market for consumers' goods, especially those produced by mass methods. For some years past, a high level of gold wages, coupled with a relatively low cost of subsistence, had maintained the standard of real or commodity buying power at well-nigh unprecedented heights. This in turn helped to foster and further the consumption of mass-produced goods the production of which, under rising standards of industrial efficiency, had made possible the very existence of this high-wage era. But the benefits of all this (like many other human blessings) were not fully appreciated by some of the parties having most at stake the trade interests -until these benefits began to be taken away by the ruthless hand of business depression. In various published forms, including several issues of this REVIEW,I scattered over the last nine years, we have attempted to lay a technical groundwork, comprising a descriptive statement of the statistical operations performed, together with an analytical discussion of the technical problems involved, in the development of various indexes reflecting cyclical movements in labor conditions. We hope that this fundamental work has been done with sufficient thoroughness to justify our devoting comparatively little attention to technical matters in the present article. Therefore we confine ourselves to a portrayal of the leading economic facts on the subject, statistically measured, of course, but accompanied by no more discussion of statistical methodology than is necessary.

W HEN the economist of the future compiles the business annals of the past decade, he will find the key to our prolonged and unprecedented prosperity in the stimulus provided by two great industries building construction and automobile manufacturing. Originally gaining momentum because of a long pent-up demand and then feeding upon the demand caused by the new wealth for which their own activities were primarily responsible, creating a market for the products of the iron and steel and other basic industries and providing employment directly or indirectlyin everyhamlet throughout the country, these two industries have constituted both the prime mover and the chief support of our recent prosperity. For the time being, however, this fruitful partnership in prosperity seems to have been dissolved. During 1929, while the building industry lost ground, slackening its pace some 12 or 13 per cent as compared with 1928, the automobile industry put on an astonishing burst of speed and left all its old records far behind. Today the overproduced condition in the motor industry is regarded by many as perhaps the sorest spot in the entire business situation, whereas the construction industry is now looked upon as the industry which will save us from business collapse, cushioning the decline in business activity and stimulating the forces of recovery. Will construction be able to play this role effectively? This is the crucial question which any forecaster of the new year's business must answer. In this brief summary we can only touch upon the three important favorable factors, (i) the readjustment which has already taken place in the building industry, (2) the stimulus of easy money, and (3) the prompt and aggressive mobilization, under the inspiration of President Hoover, of the campaign to use construction as a balance wheel of industry. The stimulating effect of these three forces will be somewhat retarded by (i) the loss of savings and paper profits in the stock market debacle, (2) the present condition of the savings banks, the building and loan associations and certain other lending institutions, and (3) the fact that supply and demand conditions in some branches of the building industry have not been entirely readjusted. The industry will be affected also of course by the general business situation, being retarded by continuing recession or stimulated by sustained activity, whichever may develop. The level of building costs will be a comparatively unimportant factor, though such influence as it exerts should be favorable, as lower prices for certain building materials, probable increased efficiency of labor in a depressed labor market, and lower money rates should tend toward lower construction costs. In the first place, it is clear that the substantial decline in building volume which took place during 1929 and which, in so far as residential building is concerned, extended over a much longer period has been extremely fortunate. This slowing down has enabled the industry to correct many of the excesses which had developed in the last six or seven years of unprecedented construction activity, but, coinciding as it did with unusual activity in the automobile and many other industries, its depressing effect upon general business was largely counteracted. The readjustment whichwe are nowexperiencing in general business, may be sharp enough; it would be more acute and more protracted had it not been for the year's start gained by the construction industry. However, though it has already made much progress, the building industry has by no means completed its readjustment process. In certain localities there still exists an overproduction of certain kinds of building facilities which must be largely absorbed before these types of construction can resume their usual activity. The extent to which the various classes of building activity will be affected during 1930 by existing surpluses of space will be discussed in a later section of this paper. The second favorable factor, easy money, will undoubtedly exert a powerful influence making for the resumption of normal activities in the industry. Comparison of building volume with bond yields, commercial paper rates, or other indexes of the cost of money over the past ten years reveals a high inverse correlation. Cheap

THE year I929 carried to a culmination a number of money market movements. Money rates reached high levels and declined. The gold movement, stock prices, brokers' loans, and Federal Reserve policy all changed their direction of movement. The turning point in each case came in the autumn of the year within the span of a relatively few weeks. While the central event of this period of change was a severe decline in stock prices, it would be over-simplifying the picture to ascribe all of the other changes to this stock market reversal. A number of the other changes in fact preceded the stock market change. An orderly account of the year in the money market requires a sequential description of various phases of the market.

Reviews the book "Problems in Auditing," by Arthur W. Hanson.