THE EXISTENCE of increasing returns to scale in production poses a number of difficult problems. In general equilibrium theory the problems are obvious. Standard results on the competitive equilibrium guarantee that when an equilibrium exists it is contained in the core of an economy. When the competitive equilibrium fails to exist, as is likely under increasing returns, the core may provide a useful equilibrium concept of its own. However, very little is known about the existence of a core except under conditions of constant returns to scale. One of the objectives of the present paper is to demonstrate the existence of the core in a general economy in which certain types of increasing returns are present. The second objective of this paper concerns partial equilibrium analysis. When it is asserted that a particular industry is an increasing returns industry it is not at all obvious what is being said, particularly when the industry produces more than one output. One aspect of increasing returns is the property of scale economies, which exist if by multiplying all inputs by a factor A > 1 it is possible to increase all outputs by at least a factor of A. A more primitive concept of increasing returns behavior is the concept of subadditivity of a cost function (or superadditivity of the production possibility set). Presumably the properties of subadditivity and economies of scale are both assumed of a given industry when it is said to have increasing returns. One particular problem involving increasing returns which has generated much recent research is the question of sustainability or supportability of natural monopoly.2 For this problem the existence of a core is of great interest, but at present, a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for a core to exist in a completely general model is not known. This paper is an attempt to advance the theory of natural monopoly, and of increasing returns industries in general, by considering a more general model of equilibrium than has previously been used. Thus, the paper is both a very general model of an essentially partial equilibrium problem and a rather specialized model of general economic equilibrium. In the next section, the basic model will be developed and its interpretation for both general and partial equilibrium will be discussed in greater detail.

Information systems, C-V-P analysis, Cost-Volume-profit Analysis, Decision making

The properties and characteristics of financial ratios have received considerable attention in recent years with interest primarily focused on determining the predictive ability of financial ratios and related financial data. Principal areas of investigation have included the prediction of corporate bond ratings [13, 20, 23, 34], and the anticipation of financial impairment [1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 18, 19, 29, 32, 33, 35]. Related studies have examined the characteristics of merged firms [25, 28], the differencesin financial ratio averages among industries [9, 10], whether firms seek to adjust their financial ratios toward industry averages [15], the relationship between accounting-determined and market-determined risk measures [4, 8, 24], and the influence of financial ratios on analysts' judgments about impending bankruptcy [14, 17]. The general conclusion to emerge from these various research efforts is that a number of financial ratios have predictive and descriptive utility when properly employed.

Charles W. Noland, Assessing Hedonic Indexes for Housing, The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 14, No. 4, Proceedings of 14th Annual Conference of the Western Finance Association, June 21-23, 1979 (Nov., 1979), pp. 783-800

Lemma W. Senbet, International Capital Market Equilibrium and the Multinational Firm Financing and Investment Policies, The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 14, No. 3 (Sep., 1979), pp. 455-480

[This paper considers a problem faced by players who are involved in a sequence of games: not necessarily the same games, not necessarily with the same opponents, and not necessarily under conditions of complete information. The players are assumed to act in response to stationary Markovian hypotheses which they form about the actions of their opponents. Conditions are explored which require that these hypotheses be correct on average and that the players actions be optimal in response to their hypotheses.]

Note: ME = Median, M = Mean, S.D. = Standard Deviation of the distributions of the estimated parameters, respectively. The parentheses contain the corresponding statistics for the distributions of the t-values, JEP S = as; ?lEP X/X = ax */logsoe = elasticity of EP with respect to X at X, where X = any explanatory variable in equation (I) other than size (S); X = mean value of X; e = 2.718. a Details of the regression results may be obtained from the author upon request.