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Risk aversion, uncertain information, and market efficiency

Journal of Financial Economics 1988 22(2), 355-385
This paper develops and tests the uncertain information hypothesis as a means of explaining the response of rational, risk-averse investors to the arrival of unanticipated information. The theory predicts that following news of a dramatic financial event, both the risk and expected return of the affected companies increase systematically, and that prices react more strongly to bad news than good. An empirical investigation of over 9000 marketwide and firm-specific events produces results consistent with these predictions. We conclude that the market reacts to uncertain information in an efficient, if not instantaneous, manner.

Of Tournaments and Temptations: An Analysis of Managerial Incentives in the Mutual Fund Industry.

Journal of Finance 1996 51(1), 85-110
The authors test the hypothesis that, when their compensation is linked to relative performance, managers of investment portfolios likely to end up as 'losers' will manipulate fund risk differently than those managing portfolios likely to be 'winners.' An empirical investigation of the performance of 334 growth-oriented mutual funds during 1976 to 1991 demonstrates that mid-year losers tend to increase fund volatility in the latter part of an annual assessment period to a greater extent than mid-year winners. Furthermore, the authors show that this effect became stronger as industry growth and investor awareness of fund performance increased over time.

Of Tournaments and Temptations: An Analysis of Managerial Incentives in the Mutual Fund Industry

Journal of Finance 1996
We test the hypothesis that when their compensation is linked to relative performance, managers of investment portfolios likely to end up as will manipulate fund risk differently than those managing portfolios likely to be An empirical investigation of the performance of 334 growth-oriented mutual funds during 1976 to 1991 demonstrates that mid-year losers tend to increase fund volatility in the latter part of an annual assessment period to a greater extent than mid-year winners. Further, we show that this effect became stronger as industry growth and investor awareness of fund performance increased over time.

Of Tournaments and Temptations: An Analysis of Managerial Incentives in the Mutual Fund Industry

Journal of Finance 1996 51(1), 85-110
We test the hypothesis that when their compensation is linked to relative performance, managers of investment portfolios likely to end up as “losers” will manipulate fund risk differently than those managing portfolios likely to be “winners.” An empirical investigation of the performance of 334 growth‐oriented mutual funds during 1976 to 1991 demonstrates that mid‐year losers tend to increase fund volatility in the latter part of an annual assessment period to a greater extent than mid‐year winners. Furthermore, we show that this effect became stronger as industry growth and investor awareness of fund performance increased over time.