Counterparty risk is an important determinant of corporate credit spreads. However, there are only a few techniques available to isolate it from other factors. In this paper we describe a model of financial networks that is suitable for the construction of proxies for counterparty risk. Using data on North American supplier–customer network of public companies, we find that, for each supplier, counterparties’ leverage and option implied volatilities are significant determinants of corporate credit spreads in the period after the 2008–2009 U.S. recession. Our findings are robust after controlling for several idiosyncratic, industry, and market factors.

Raising capital on wholesale debt markets is an important source of funding for banks and non-banking institutions throughout the world. We investigate the determinants of wholesale funding costs for the Global Systematically Important Banks (G-SIBs) using credit default swaps, the proxy for the cost of wholesale debt funding. Using 25 G-SIBs which are heavily reliant on debt capital markets across multiple currencies, this paper investigates whether the default risk of the interbank lending system, i.e., LIBOR-OIS spread is a new global macroeconomic factor in determining G-SIBs’ CDS spreads. Based on time-fixed effects and bank-fixed effects, we find default risk from the US banking system seems to play a greater role in explaining the wholesale funding costs of the G-SIBs than that of their home-country equivalent default risk. Overall, the findings make an important contribution to domestic and international debt funding markets and provide an insight for financial intermediaries, regulators, and monetary-policy makers.

Child marriage remains common even where female schooling and employment opportunities have grown. We experimentally evaluate a financial incentive to delay marriage alongside a girls' empowerment program in Bangladesh. While girls eligible for two years of incentive are 19 percent less likely to marry underage, the empowerment program failed to decrease adolescent marriage. We show that these results are consistent with a signaling model in which bride type is imperfectly observed but preferred types (socially conservative girls) have lower returns to delaying marriage. Consistent with our theoretical prediction, we observe substantial spillovers of the incentive on untreated nonpreferred types.