We model the interplay between trade in the interbank market and creditor runs on financial institutions. We show that the feedback between them can amplify a small shock into "interbank market freezing" with "liquidity evaporating." Credit crunches of the interbank market drive up the interbank rate. For an individual institution, a higher interbank rate — meaning a higher funding cost — results in more severe coordination problems among creditors in debt rollover decisions. Creditors thus behave more conservatively and run more often. Facing an increased chance of creditor runs, institutions demand more and supply less liquidity, tightening the interbank market.

We develop a tractable model of systemic bank runs. The market‐based banking system features a two‐layer structure: banks with heterogeneous fundamentals face potential runs by their creditors while they trade short‐term funding in the asset (interbank) market in response to creditor withdrawals. The possibility of a run on a particular bank depends on its assets' interim liquidation value, and this value depends endogenously in turn on the status of other banks in the asset market. The within‐bank coordination problem among creditors and the cross‐bank price externality feed into each other. A small shock can be amplified into a systemic crisis.

During a financial crisis, when investors are most in need of liquidity and accurate prices, hedge funds cut their arbitrage positions and hoard cash. The paper explains this phenomenon. We argue that the fragile nature of the capital structure of hedge funds, combined with low market liquidity, creates a risk of coordination in redemptions among hedge fund investors that severely limits hedge funds' arbitrage capabilities. We present a model of hedge funds' optimal asset allocation in the presence of coordination risk among investors. We show that hedge fund managers behave conservatively and even abstain from participating in the market once coordination risk is factored into their investment decisions. The model suggests a new source of limits to arbitrage.

We model the interplay between trade in the interbank market and creditor runs on financial institutions. We show that the feedback between them can amplify a small shock into “interbank market freezing” with “liquidity evaporating.” Credit crunches of the interbank market drive up the interbank rate. For an individual institution, a higher interbank rate — meaning a higher funding cost — results in more severe coordination problems among creditors in debt rollover decisions. Creditors thus behave more conservatively and run more often. Facing an increased chance of creditor runs, institutions demand more and supply less liquidity, tightening the interbank market.

We model the interaction of financial market transparency and different accounting regimes. This paper provides a theoretical rationale for the recently proposed shift in accounting standards from historic cost accounting to marking to market. The paper shows that marking to market can provide investors with an early warning mechanism while historical cost gives management a “veil” under which they can potentially mask a firm's true economic performance. The model provides new explanations for several empirical findings and has some novel implications. We show that greater opacity in financial markets leads to more frequent and more severe crashes in asset prices (under a historic‐cost‐accounting regime). Moreover, our model indicates that historic cost accounting can make the financial market more rather than less volatile, which runs counter to conventional wisdom. The mechanism shown in the model also sheds light on the cause of many financial scandals in recent years.

We present a rational expectations model of credit-driven crises, providing a new perspective to explain why credit booms can lead to severe financial crises and aftermath slow economic recoveries. In our model economy, banks can operate in two types of business. They are sequentially aware of the deterioration of fundamentals of the speculative business and decide whether to continue credit extension in that business or liquidate capital and move into the traditional business. However, because individual banks face uncertainty about how many of their peers have been aware, they rationally choose to extend credit in the speculative business for a longer time than is socially optimal, leading to an over-delayed crisis and consequently more banks being caught by the crisis. This in turn renders the financial crisis more severe and the subsequent economic recovery slower. Extending to a standard textbook macroeconomic growth setting, our model also generates rich dynamics of economic booms, slowdowns, crashes, and recoveries.

This paper studies how financial information frictions can generate sentiment-driven fluctuations in asset prices and self-fulfilling business cycles. In our model economy, exuberant financial market sentiments of high output and high demand for capital increase the price of capital, which signals strong fundamentals of the economy to the real side and consequently leads to an actual boom in real output and employment. The model further derives implications for asymmetric nonlinear asset prices and for economic contagion and co-movement across countries. In the extension to the dynamic overlapping generations (OLG) setting, our model demonstrates that sentiment shocks can generate persistent output, employment, and business cycle fluctuations, and it offers some new implications for asset prices over business cycles.

We investigate the link between exchange-traded funds and real investment. Cross-sectionally, higher ETF ownership is associated with an increased sensitivity of real investment to Tobin’s q and a heightened ability of stock returns to forecast future earnings. Inclusion of stocks in industry ETFs enhances investment-q sensitivity and implies greater incorporation of earnings information into prices prior to public releases. Greater nonmarket ETF ownership leads to increased (reduced) reliance of real investment on own (peers’) stock prices. Overall, the evidence is consistent with ETFs positively affecting real investment efficiency via greater flows of information.

We develop a model of informational interdependence between financial markets and the real economy, linking economic uncertainty to information production and aggregate economic activities in general equilibrium. The mutual learning between financial markets and the real economy creates a strategic complementarity in their information production, leading to self‐fulfilling surges in economic uncertainties. In a dynamic setting, our model characterizes self‐fulfilling uncertainty traps with two steady‐state equilibria and a two‐stage economic crisis in transitional dynamics.