This paper studies bargaining power allocation and stable matching between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs with double-sided moral hazard in venture capital markets. We find that the optimal bargaining power allocation is determined by the output elasticities of effort by the two parties; the higher the output elasticity for one's effort, the greater her bargaining power. We show that efficient and stable matching follows the principle of positive assortative matching, suggesting that strong entrepreneurs/VCs match with strong partners, and weak ones match with weak counterparts. Using a large sample from the Chinese venture capital market, we empirically confirm that entrepreneurs and VCs with similar standing in their peer groups are more likely to match.

We use data from a large survey of Chinese firms to investigate whether local government efforts to facilitate market development improve firm efficiency. Both government provision of information about products, markets, and innovation and government assistance in arranging loans are positively associated with firm efficiency, and those private firms with weak access to and knowledge of financial, input, and product markets benefit most from such assistance. These patterns are robust across multiple estimation approaches. Our examination of the determinants of local government facilitation also suggests that it gravitates toward promoting efficiency, though there are also indications that rent-seeking may play a role. Our evidence is consistent with the notion that government facilitation can help some firms overcome market failures in the early stages of a country's private sector development. Though causality is difficult to establish, we argue that changing fiscal dynamics that forced local governments to become increasingly self-reliant in generating revenue, and a government promotion system based on local economic performance, were key motivating factors for market facilitation by local government officials.

Employing a sample of 4655 U.S. public firms from 1993 to 2017, we document robust evidence that firms with more registered trademarks have a lower cost of equity. We further show that the equity financing cost is lower for firms with better-protected trademarks in difference-in-differences estimation based on the enactment of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act in 1996. In addition, our analysis reveals that the effect of trademarks on the cost of equity is achieved through the informational channel, the disciplinary channel, and the stabilizing cash flow channel. These results suggest that trademarks play an important role in alleviating the equity financing cost, thus clarifying the underlying mechanism that brand equity creates value.