The paper uses a signalling equilibrium to explain the market's reaction to the announcement of a firm's financing decision. In our model, a firm can issue one of the following securities: convertible debt with a different conversion ratio, straight debt, and stock. We identify conditions under which the conversion ratio of a convertible debt issue serves as a credible signal of a firm's private information, given the continuous distribution of attributes (information) across firms. In this signalling equilibrium, we find that the lower the expected future earnings, the higher the conversion ratio of a convertible debt issue. At the limit, firms that expect the highest earnings will use straight debt financing, and firms that expect the lowest earnings will use equity financing. Based on the signalling equilibrium, we predict that at announcement of a convertible debt issue, negative abnormal common stock return increases in absolute value with the conversion ratio.

This paper develops a signalling model of call of convertible securities (bonds or preferred stock) in the presence of corporate taxes and asymmetric information about future earnings. In equilibrium, managers with relatively unfavorable information call to force convertible holders to convert to common stock (in spite of the loss of corporate tax benefits if the convertibles are bonds), while those with relatively favorable information do not call. The model predicts that the announcement period common stock returns are more negative at the call of convertible bond than at the call of convertible preferred stock. Furthermore, we predict that when the importance of the tax deductibility of interest differs among firms, so does the stock price reaction to the announcement of convertible debt call. Specifically, the loss of equity value at the announcement decreases with the amount of non-debt tax shield that the calling firm owns, decreases with the book value of convertible debt called, and increases with corporate taxes.

This paper explores a transmission mechanism of an exogenous shock to domestic financial markets by investigating the potential signaling role of the Monetary Stabilization Bond (MSB) spread together with several financial variables in Korea. The MSB spread widened and became more volatile during the crisis period after the variance change point at the end of 2007, when the causality relationships between the key variables became apparent. The empirical results illustrate that a foreign shock, which directly leads to rapid short-term capital flow and foreign exchange rate fluctuation, is likely to have a significant contagion effect on domestic financial markets in the case where it has a sizable negative impact on national foreign reserve holdings. The MSB is a monetary policy instrument for foreign exchange reserve management, and the daily observable MSB spread is a timelier signal in this transmission channel.

Using the quarterly Compustat files, we present empirical findings that business capital investment is significantly higher in the fourth quarter than in other quarters. Even after controlling for business capital investment determinants, we find that the fourth quarter capital investment is significantly larger but less sensitive to investment opportunities than other quarters' capital investment. This phenomenon is more evident for firms with larger cash holdings than for firms with smaller cash holdings, for larger firms than for smaller firms, and for diversified firms than for stand-alone firms. Our findings suggest a high level of agency costs in corporate investment decisions.

On average, significant positive abnormal returns are associated with Eurobond issues during the period 1975–1985. The cross-sectional and time-series distributions of the abnormal returns are consistent with the hypothesis that impediments to the adjustment of asset supplies to new demand conditions are large enough to create profitable financing opportunities for firms. Our analysis demonstrates how profitable financing opportunities can persist on the Eurobond market and when they are most likely to arise.

[This article investigates the long-term equity performance of Japanese firms issuing convertible debt and equity. We find that issuing firms perform poorly (except for equity rights issues) compared to nonissuing firms even though the stock-price reaction to convertible debt and equity issues is not negative for Japanese firms. This underperformance is strongest for firms issuing public convertible debt. In contrast to the United States, poor performance is not concentrated in smaller firms and in firms with a high market-to-book ratio. Simple behavioral explanations advanced for the new issue puzzle in the United States do not seem consistent with the Japanese experience.]

We add a round of pre-play communication to a finite two-player game played by a population of players.Pre-play communication is cheap talk in the sense that it does not directly enter the payoffs.The paper characterizes the set of strategies that are stable with respect to a stochastic dynamic adaptive process.Periodically players have an opportunity to change their strategy with a strategy that is more successful against the current population.Any strategy that weakly improves upon the current poorest performer in the population enters with positive probability.When there is no conflict of interest between the players, only the efficient outcome is stable with respect to these dynamics.For general games the set of stable payoffs is typically large.Every efficient payoff recurs infinitely often.

This paper investigates the ability of the pecking-order model, the agency model, and the timing model to explain firms' decisions whether to issue debt or equity, the shock price reaction to their decisions and their actions afterward. We find strong support for the agency model. Firms often depart from the pecking order because of agency considerations. We fail to find support for the timing model.

Financial classification issues, and particularly the financial distress problem, continue to be subject to vigorous investigation. The corporate credit granting process has not received as much attention in the literature. This paper examines the relative effectiveness of parametric, nonparametric and judgemental classification procedures on a sample of corporate credit data. The judgemental model is based on the Analytic Hierarchy Process. Evidence indicates that (nonparametric) recursive partitioning methods provide greater information than simultaneous partitioning procedures. The judgemental model is found to perform as well as statistical models. A complementary relationship is proposed between the statistical and the judgemental models as an effective paradigm for granting credit.