This paper addresses whether events leading to three regulatory accounting principles issued by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board affected the market value of Savings and Loan Associations (S&Ls). The market reaction to these regulations is predicted to be positive since they effectively eased minimum regulatory net worth requirements. A significant market reaction is observed for the regulation that allowed S&Ls to increase regulatory net worth by permitting appraised equity capital. However, results are inconsistent with the alternative hypothesis associated with the regulations permitting deferral of loan losses and net worth certificates

A model of financial intermediation to determine the market value of bank equity, deposits and deposit insurance is developed. The implicit equilibrium interest rate on deposits is derived and analyzed. Three types of risks are considered in the model: interest-rate risk, financial risk and default risk. The effect of different regulatory measures, such as capital adequacy, reserve and liquidity requirements, deposit insurance and interest rate ceilings is analyzed and their impact on the bank behavior is also assessed. Moreover, we investigate the interactions among these measures to determine which are dominant under alternative circumstances, and which are redundant

[In this article, we examine the information content of announcements of increased reserves for loan loss by Citicorp and other banks, and the later write-off announcement made by the Bank of Boston. During 1987, most major U.S. banks, led by Citicorp on 19 May 1987, announced large increases in their loan loss reserves because of problem loans in lesser developed countries (LDC). With substantial flexibility in accounting rules for determining loss exposure, the banks announced varying levels of reserve increases. On 14 December 1987, the Bank of Boston began a second round of activity relating to LDC debt by announcing a $200 million write-off of LDC loans and further increase in loan loss reserves. Financial reporters suggested that these events could be interpreted differently. Because Citicorp was a leading money-center bank, its announcement could be interpreted favorably as a signal of willingness to deal with the LDC debt problem. This interpretation could similarly apply to other banks, especially the more exposed money-center banks. In comparison, the Bank of Boston announcement was portrayed in the press as detrimental to the money-center banks for two reasons. First, unlike a reserve increase, a write-off reduces a bank's capital adequacy ratio. Capital adequacy ratios are used by bank regulators in determining the need for, and the level of, supervisory intervention. Second, the write-off was construed as an effort by regional banks to exploit their relatively limited exposure to LDC loans as a competitive advantage in the domestic banking market. We find evidence consistent with the expectations of the financial press. The strongest stock-price increases associated with both the Citicorp announcement and the subsequent announcements of reserve increases by other banks were found for the banks with the greatest exposure to LDC debt. In contrast, those banks with the greatest exposure to LDC debt and with the largest reserves sustained the largest stock-price decreases at the Bank of Boston write-off announcement. The larger money-center banks sustained, on average, a three-day decline in value of 5 percent around the Bank of Boston announcement date

For generations government regulations and business traditions confined financial activities within national borders. Leaders and borrowers maintained relationships with domestic bankers, who offered little in the way of innovation or advantage. But the abolition of fixed exchange rates, along with hyper-inflation in the 1970s spelled the beginning of the end for this system. By the 1980s the financial game in the UK, Japan and USA was being played ith some important new rules, and by many new players. The old world of relationship banking had given way to financial transactions based upon price and product innovation. Macroeconomic forces and the policies of central bankers have profoundly altered international trade, exchange rates, and the flow of capital around the world. David Meerschwam explains these economic forces, describes the dramatic effects of de-regulation in the major centres of finance, and shows how financial services firms have had to alter their strategies and develop new skills in order to compete