This paper uses an intermediation model to study the efficiency and welfare implications of both banks' minimum required capital–asset ratio and the regulation that limits, and in some countries forbids, banks' investments in the equity of nonfinancial firms. There are two sources of moral hazard in the model: one between the bank and the provider of deposit insurance, and the other between the bank and an entrepreneur who demands funds to finance an investment project. Among other things, the paper shows that capital regulation improves the bank's stability and can also be Pareto-improving. Equity regulation is never Pareto-improving and does not increase the bank's stability

Shared systems in the credit card mode may offer electronic money such as stored value (“smart”) cards, e-cash, and cybermoney. In such consolidations bank partners potentially may come from far outside the customary regulated banking fraternity. While some cyberbanks have been granted official status with its responsibilities, other nonbank cyberbanks have absconded with deposits amidst fraudulent claims. Electronic money is distributed typically in complex tiers, with backup reserves often held by nonbank third parties. The regulatory rules which apply to the mixed systems are therefore uneven and unclear. Banking regulators and the Antitrust Division wrestle with the ensuing dilemmas

This paper proposes a theory to analyze the specialization of banking activities based upon the different functions that banks perform when rendering a variety of financial services. The functional difference in the services performed by banks is based upon two dimensions: the degree of information asymmetry involved in providing the service, and the degree of verifiability of the value of the service rendered. This has implications for the length of banking relationships and also determines whether banks develop the right degree of skill specialization and resource intensity for the existing task mix. Costly overspecialization occurs in certain deal type transactions and underspecialization occurs in relationship type transactions. The paper examines how bank-client relationships are structured and proposes an explanation for phenomena such as bank syndication. First-mover advantages and monopoly skills are also shown to be natural outcomes of the model. The analysis has implications for banking regulation, such as for the Glass–Steagall Act, in the sense that it analyzes the effects of this specialization, first enacted within the spirit of the Act

In this paper we model the dynamic portfolio choice problem facing banks, calibrate the model using empirical data from the banking industry for 1984–1993, and assess quantitatively the impact of recent regulatory developments related to bank capital. The model implies a U-shaped relationship between capital and risk-taking: As a bank's capital increases it first takes less risk, then more risk. A deposit insurance premium surcharge on undercapitalized banks induces them to take more risk. An increased capital requirement, whether flat or risk-based, tends to induce more risk-taking by ex-ante well-capitalized banks that comply with the new standard. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: G20, G28

This paper identifies five ways in which U.S. financial-services firms have defeated functional and geographic limitations that Congress and state legislatures designed into their charters. Far from waiting patiently for exclusionary statutes to change, firms have gambled on winning ex post permissions by engaging in aggressive cross-industry and interstate acquisitions and by exploiting technologically created loopholes in longstanding rules and regulation. The paper emphasizes the pressure exerted on bank regulators by cross-industry megamergers and by loophole-like opportunities available to federally chartered thrift institutions

For nearly two decades banks in the US have consolidated in record numbers – in terms of both frequency and the size of the merging institutions. Rhoades (1996) (S.A. Rhoades, 1996. Bank Mergers and Industrywide Structure, 1980–1994. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Staff Study 169) hypothesizes that the main motivations were increased potential for geographic expansion created by changes in state laws regulating branching and a more favorable antitrust climate. To look for evidence of economic incentives to exploit these improved opportunities for consolidation, we examine how consolidation affects expected profit, the riskiness of profit, profit efficiency, market value, market-value efficiencies, and the risk of insolvency. Our estimates of expected profit, profit risk, and profit efficiency are based on a structural model of leveraged portfolio production that was estimated for a sample of highest-level US bank holding companies by Hughes et al. (1996) (Hughes et al., 1996. Efficient banking under interstate branching, Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 28, 1045–1071.) Here, we also estimate two additional measures that gauge efficiency in terms of the market values of assets and of equity. Our findings suggest that the economic benefits of consolidation are strongest for those banks engaged in interstate expansion and, in particular, interstate expansion that diversifies banks’ macroeconomic risk. Not only do these banks experience clear gains in their financial performance, but society also benefits from the enhanced bank safety that follows from this type of consolidation

We propose a simple model that is suitable for evaluating alternative bank capital regulatory proposals for market risk. Our model formalizes the conflict between bank objectives and regulatory goals. Banks' decisions represent a tension between their desire to exploit the deposit-insurance put option and their desire to preserve franchise value. Regulators seek to balance the social value of deposits in mediating transactions against the deadweight costs of failure resolution. Our social welfare criterion is standard: a weighted average agents' utilities. We demonstrate that banks do not incrementally alter their portfolio risk as the economic environment changes. Rather, banks either choose the minimal feasible risk or the maximal feasible risk. This pattern, in turn, drives regulatory decisions: The first goal of the regulator is to induce banks to choose the minimal risk level. For all nontrivial cases, unregulated banks fail to choose the first-best allocations. Traditional ex-ante capital requirements can induce banks to choose the socially-optimal level of portfolio risk, but the required capital is often inefficiently high. In contrast, variants of the Federal Reserve Board's precommitment proposal imply far smaller efficiency losses, and achieve allocations at or nearthe first-best for most reasonable model specifications. The ex-post penalties required for the optimal implementation of precommitment are not excessively large. The welfare gains from precommitment are even higher when the precommitment penalty function is precluded from sending banks into default. We conclude that state-contingent regulatory mechanisms, of which the precommitment approach is an example, offer the possibility of substantial gains in regulatory efficiency, relative to traditional state non-contingent regulation

This paper exploits the 1990 change in capital adequacy regulations to construct more powerful tests of capital and earnings management effects on bank loan loss provisions. We find strong support for the hypothesis that loan loss provisions are used for capital management. We do not find evidence of earnings management via loan loss provisions. We also document the reasons for the conflicting results on these effects observed in prior studies. Additionally, we find that loan loss provisions are negatively related to both future earnings changes and contemporaneous stock returns contrary to the signaling results documented in prior work

This paper addresses the question of appropriate policy prescription in face of rapid consolidation of the financial service sector both in the US and globally. Regulators must act even as the legislation that is in place offers little guidance on how they should proceed in this broader financial market. Appropriate action can only come from a proper analysis of the current situation. The context must be understood, the causes of this merger wave must be evaluated, and the implications on both market structure and customer service must be considered. Only then can the implications for optimal or even reasonable policy be outlined. The prescription must fit the situation. These remarks will review these topics in an effort to answer the question, “What’s a policymaker to do

This paper argues that although financial consolidation creates some dangers because it is leading to larger institutions who might expose the US financial system to increased systemic risk, these dangers can be handled by vigilant supervision and a government safety net with an appropriate amount of constructive ambiguity. Financial consolidation also opens up opportunities to dramatically reduce the scope of deposit insurance and limit it to narrow bank accounts, thus substantially reducing the moral hazard created by the government safety net. Reducing the scope of deposit insurance, however, does not eliminate the need for a government safety net, and thus there is still a strong need for adequate prudential supervision of the financial system. Moving to a world in which we have larger, nationwide, diversified financial institutions and in which deposit insurance plays a very limited role, should improve the efficiency of the financial system. However, it is no panacea: the job of financial regulators and supervisors will continue to be highly challenging in the future