This paper examines risk-taking incentives in banks under different accounting regimes in presence of capital regulation. In the model the bank jointly determines the capital issuance and investment policy. Given an exogenous minimum capital requirement, lower-of-cost-or-market accounting is the most effective regime that induces the bank to issue more excess equity capital above the minimum required level and implement less risky investment policy. However, the disciplining role of lower-of-cost-or-market accounting may discourage the bank from exerting project discovery effort ex-ante. From the regulator’s perspective, the accounting regime that maximizes the social welfare is determined by a tradeoff between the social cost of capital regulation and the efficiency of the bank’s project discovery efforts. When the former effect dominates, the regulator prefers lower-of-cost-or-market accounting; when the latter effect dominates, the regulator may prefer other regimes

We analyze the limits of regulating bank CEO compensation to reduce risk shifting in the presence of an active board that retains the right to approve new investment strategies. Compensation regulation prevents overinvestment in strategies that increase risk, but it is ineffective in preventing underinvestment in strategies that reduce risk. The regulator optimally combines compensation and capital regulations. In contrast, if the board delegates the choice of strategy to the CEO, compensation regulation is sufficient to prevent both types of risk shifting. Compensation regulation increases shareholders’ incentives to implement an active board, which reduces the effectiveness of compensation regulation

We examine the effect of the full set of bank capital regulations (capital stringency) on loan growth, using bank-level data for a maximum of 125 countries over the period 1998–2011. Contrary to standard theoretical considerations, we find that overall capital stringency only has a weak negative effect on loan growth. In fact, this effect is completely offset if banks hold moderately high levels of capital. Interestingly, the components of capital stringency that have the strongest negative effect on loan growth are those related to the prevention of banks to use as capital borrowed funds and assets other than cash or government securities. In contrast, compliance with Basel guidelines in using Basel- and credit-risk weights has a much less potent effect on loan growth

Our analysis of how banks’ responses to asset price changes can result in procyclical leverage reveals that, for banks with a binding regulatory leverage constraint, absent differences in regulatory risk weights across assets, procyclical leverage does not occur. For banks without a binding constraint, fair value and bank regulation both can contribute to procyclical leverage. Empirical findings based on a large sample of U.S. commercial banks reveal that bank regulation explains procyclical leverage for banks relatively close to the regulatory leverage constraint and contributes to procyclical leverage for those that are not. We also show that fair value accounting does not contribute to procyclical leverage

This paper examines empirically the determinants of bank interest margins in Central America and the Caribbean over the period 1998–2014. A particular focus is set on the impact of differences in the regulatory environment and market structure across countries in explaining the interest margins of individual banks. Our results suggest that bank market power, operating costs, credit risk, and liquid asset holdings increase the margin between loan and deposit rates, while increased income diversification and GDP growth are associated with lower loan-deposit spreads. When considering information on banking regulation, we find strong evidence to support our main hypothesis that improvements in market quality and liberalization have a significant effect on interest margins. More specifically, reductions in entry requirements to banking, higher involvement of foreign banks, and increased financial statement transparency are associated with significant reductions in interest margins

In January 2006, federal regulators issued guidance requiring banks with specific high concentrations of commercial real estate (CRE) loans to tighten managerial controls. This paper shows that banks with concentrations in excess of the thresholds set in the guidance subsequently experienced slower growth in their CRE portfolios than can be explained by changes in bank or economic conditions. Moreover, banks above the CRE thresholds tended to have slower commercial and industrial loan growth but faster household loan growth following issuance of the guidance. The results highlight the potentially broad influence that portfolio-based macroprudential regulation might have on bank behavior

Views on the role played by banks in the economy have evolved greatly over the last 125 years, as have arguments on the need, as well as the best way, to regulate them. Some of the key insights in the debate have been published in the Journal of Political Economy. In what follows, we will outline the main contributions to the debate in recent years, with an emphasis on work done at the University of Chicago or published in the JPE. We want to emphasize work that has relevance today, but despite this caveat, we will probably end up doing injustice to work published long ago. We begin with a framework for organizing the theories of intermediation. We then draw out the implications for what the theories say about regulation and note that in many respects the motivation for regulation has been only loosely tied to the theory of intermediation. We close with some open questions for regulators and economists interested in banking. We do not survey the research that has followed up on work published in the JPE, nor will we attempt to provide a detailed overview of the entire academic literature on banking. For that, we refer the reader to the excellent work by Gorton and Winton (2003) and Freixas and Rochet (2008

We study the effect of bank governance on risk-taking in commercial lending. Banks with more effective boards are less likely to lend to riskier borrowers. This effect is restricted to periods of distress in the banking industry and is stronger at banks with board-level credit committees. Banks with more effective boards are less likely to lend to riskier borrowers right after the Russian default, which exogenously imposed distress conditions on U.S. banks. Thus, value-maximizing banks appear to ration credit to riskier borrowers precisely when such firms might be credit-constrained, suggesting that bank governance regulations may have potential unintended consequences

This study examines the relationship between funding liquidity and bank risk taking. Using quarterly data for U.S. bank holding companies from 1986 to 2014, we find evidence that banks having lower funding liquidity risk as proxied by higher deposit ratios, take more risk. A reduction in banks’ funding liquidity risk increases bank risk as evidenced by higher risk-weighted assets, greater liquidity creation and lower Z-scores. However, our results show that bank size and capital buffers usually limit banks from taking more risk when they have lower funding liquidity risk. Moreover, during the Global Financial Crisis banks with lower funding liquidity risk took less risk. The findings of this study have implications for bank regulators advocating greater liquidity and capital requirements for banks under Basel III

Bank capital is the cornerstone of bank regulation and is considered a key determinant of a bank's ability to withstand economic shocks. In the area of bank capital regulation, the general view is that more bank capital is better, irrespective of who provides it. In this paper, we investigate whether the investment horizon of bank capital providers matters for bank performance during the recent financial crisis. We observe that banks with more short-term investor ownership have worse stock returns during the crisis. Further exploration suggests that this is partially because banks with higher short-term investor ownership took more risk prior to the crisis but mainly because they experienced higher selling pressure during the crisis. Our results confirm the economic benefit of bank capital in helping banks to perform better during crises. However, when we decompose bank capital by the nature of its providers, we show that more capital is associated with worse performance when it is provided by short-term institutional investors