Knowledge that Transforms

Focusing on multidivisional companies, this paper analyzes the hardening of local forecasts at the intersection of business units (BUs) and the corporate finance function. It investigates how BU controllers, accountable to both local management and the corporate finance function, seek to establish themselves as competent and trustworthy forecasters vis‐à‐vis their functional superiors. Drawing on Goffman's dramaturgical sociology, we demonstrate how these encounters constitute episodes in a multiperiod hardening game feeding into the management of forecast quality and anticipatory control. We illustrate how expressive performances of their competence and trustworthiness are vital for BU controllers to manage vertical information flows between the local and the corporate level and for aligning corresponding interests. Convincing performances can reinforce BU controllers' status as stewards of the forecasting process and help to maintain a “truce” between the local and the corporate level, assuring corporate controllers that the unit's future is under control.

In this paper, we introduce the construct of proactive auditing behaviors to the accounting literature and report the first experimental investigation of their antecedents. Regulators and practitioners agree that proactive behaviors are needed to consistently achieve high‐quality audit outcomes, but also that these behaviors are scarce. Drawing on theory from management, accounting, and psychology, we predict that an environmental factor (autonomy) and a dispositional factor (tacit knowledge) interact to increase a range of distinct proactive auditing behaviors. These behaviors involve responding to evidence that has out‐of‐task implications, coordinating with clients to acquire task‐related evidence, and two forms of coaching junior auditors. As predicted, we find that auditors are more proactive when they have both higher autonomy and higher tacit knowledge than when they lack either or both factors. Our theory and findings inform academics, regulators, and practitioners about the types of work environments and policies that can promote auditor proactivity successfully.

We develop a composite firm‐year earnings quality score ( EQSCORE ) that uses signals based on fundamental analysis. We obtain a proprietary data set of 613 reports about aggressive reporting practices over 2004–2009 for 230 unique firms from a research firm (RF). From these reports, we identify red flags of poor earnings quality relating to (1) sales quality, (2) margin quality, (3) cash flow quality, (4) corporate governance, (5) audit, and (6) others. We construct the EQSCORE using 51 signals employed by the RF and a novel approach that imitates the RF's process for discovering earnings quality. The EQSCORE outperforms existing composite models of earnings quality in identifying accounting and auditing enforcement releases and restated firm‐years and predicts future stock returns. The corporate governance–related and audit‐related red flags included in the EQSCORE complement accounting‐based red flags and enhance the ability of the EQSCORE to identify firms with poor earnings quality.

We explore the turnover intentions of creative R&D employees and the role of performance management practices in shaping these considerations. Since the success of a firm's R&D efforts hinges on the innovative ideas of its employees, it is crucial to retain particularly creative individuals. At the same time, however, we argue that this is especially difficult because both the higher outside options of creative employees and their specific individual characteristics make them, on average, more likely to leave their company. Most importantly, we suggest that two widely studied performance management design choices (target difficulty and career tournaments) typically used to motivate effort may influence the loss of creative talent. Using survey data from our unique access to R&D employees of a large manufacturing firm and a complementary experiment among business students, we find evidence that creative employees are, on average, more likely to leave their firm. Consistent with creative employees possessing a stronger learning orientation, we also predict and find that this tendency to leave is mitigated by target difficulty (as difficult targets speak to creative individuals' learning orientation) and exacerbated by the intensity of career tournaments (as they reduce team cohesion and, ultimately, undermine learning opportunities).

We examine the relative importance of audit firm versus partner decision styles in key audit matter (KAM) reporting. Standard setters intended KAMs to increase the usefulness of the audit report by requiring the partner‐led engagement team to disclose engagement‐specific information about the most significant judgments they made during the audit. However, stakeholders expressed widespread concern that audit firms' longstanding efforts toward standardization would result in generic KAMs at the audit firm level and provide partners little opportunity or incentive for engagement‐specific reporting. We evaluate this high‐stakes tension between standard setters' goals for audit reporting and auditors' deep‐rooted practices by leveraging data from the United Kingdom, which has required partner identification since 2009 and expanded audit reports since 2013. We find that clients sharing the same partner receive KAMs that are 10% more textually similar than clients with different partners. In contrast, clients sharing the same audit firm receive KAMs that are just 2% more textually similar than clients with different audit firms. This implies that partner decision styles are more important in influencing KAM outcomes than audit firm styles. Collectively, our results suggest that partners make unique KAM reporting judgments, countering concerns that audit firms' efforts toward standardization will yield boilerplate KAMs. This evidence extends the literature on expanded audit reporting and partner decision styles and provides valuable insights into a contemporary issue in audit regulation with broader implications for understanding dynamics within the profession.

We examine the information asymmetry between local and nonlocal investors with a large dataset of stock message board postings. We document that abnormal relative postings of a firm, that is, unusual changes in the volume of postings from local versus nonlocal investors, capture locals' information advantage. This measure positively predicts firms' short‐term stock returns as well as those of peer firms in the same city. Sentiment analysis shows that posting activities primarily reflect good news, potentially due to social transmission bias and short‐sales constraints. We identify the information driving return predictability through content‐based analysis. Abnormal relative postings also lead analysts' forecast revisions. Overall, investors' interactions on social media contain valuable geography‐based private information.

We examine how disclosure delivery mode—oral versus written—influences investors' reactions to managers' tone language. We hypothesize that listening to disclosures, relative to reading them, causes managers' qualitative word choices to have a greater impact on investors' judgments. We theorize that this effect occurs because oral delivery mode promotes heuristic processing and qualitative tone language is an easy‐to‐process disclosure element. The results from an experiment in a conference call setting are consistent with our hypothesis and suggest a boundary condition. Specifically, the interaction of mode and tone language is significant in a setting where heuristic processing is likely (good earnings news) but not in a setting where investors are likely to scrutinize the disclosure (bad earnings news). Our results inform investors about the potential consequences of how they consume disclosures. Specifically, we show that investors are more susceptible to managers' tone language when listening to disclosures containing good news than when reading them.

We explore how securities litigation affects corporate reputation. Experts remain concerned that nonmeritorious securities class actions—those that will be dismissed or settled for nuisance amounts—cause reputational damage. Although several prior studies show reputational costs for nonmeritorious cases, they generally use indirect measures based on returns or total market losses, which are mechanically associated with securities litigation elements. In contrast, we use a relatively direct reputation measure from Fortune 's “Most Admired Companies” list. We find significant reputational damage after meritorious litigation, with the strongest cases having the largest effects. However, we find no evidence of reputational damage after nonmeritorious litigation. We also find that Fortune 's reputational damage measure is associated with more negative returns around the litigation filing date. We show possible mechanisms for our results, as initial legal filings contain information allowing market participants to assess case merits. Our results imply that reputational damage is primarily due to fraud, which securities litigation helps reveal to the market, rather than litigation itself. Thus, reputational damage is not an issue in over 70% of securities class actions due to the high frequency of nonmeritorious cases.

We investigate the impact of firm‐level political risk on loan contracting. We find that firm‐level political risk is positively associated with bank loan cost and that this effect is stronger for firms experiencing increased operational uncertainty and higher default risks. Firm‐level political risk also leads to more unfavorable non‐pricing loan terms. To alleviate endogeneity concerns, we use an instrumental variable approach and placebo tests. We further find that political connections and relationship‐based borrowing can attenuate the adverse effect of firm‐level political risk on loan contracting.

Stock prices often provide firm managers with new information that can be used in real decisions. Studies generally focus on the ex ante disclosure policy and show that the presence of market feedback crowds out firms' disclosure. We instead examine a manager's ex post biasing incentives and find that market feedback amplifies overreporting bias, but not necessarily underreporting bias, due to three interacting effects. First, the manager biases the report more with feedback since decreased information quality crowds in the speculator's private information acquisition and improves investment efficiency, regardless of the reporting scenario (the information rationing effect). Second, the manager biases more in the overreporting scenario and less in the underreporting scenario, because reporting more favorable information crowds in private information acquisition, as the speculator expects a higher subsequent investment and therefore higher trading profits (the investment scale effect). Third, market feedback influences reporting bias not only through the speculator's information acquisition but also directly through the market maker's pricing function. Specifically, the market maker decreases the price discount, as he expects that the manager may learn correct information from the price and may invest more efficiently. Expecting a lower price penalty in the presence of feedback, the manager biases more in the overreporting scenario and less in the underreporting scenario (the investment correction effect). Overall, our results suggest that granting firms reporting discretion could improve investment efficiency and firm value when managers can learn through price.