Knowledge that Transforms

Using data collected from 21 interviews with audit committee members (ACMs) of Canadian reporting issuers, this study examines the ways in which ACMs understand and enact the additional responsibilities placed on them by regulators in the post–Sarbanes‐Oxley Act era. Adopting a social constructivist approach to knowledge and expertise, the study shows that despite the financial literacy requirements for ACMs, financial expertise is far from being uniformly understood by ACMs. Indeed, ACMs perceive expertise in many different ways, which leads them to engage in a wide variety of practices to fulfill their responsibilities on audit committees (ACs). The analysis of the data makes it possible to identify three oversight styles— observing , inspecting , and storytelling —that illustrate the differences in how ACMs understand their role, prepare for AC meetings, invest time in this preparation, and develop lines of questioning. These findings provide empirical insights into both the substantive and symbolic roles of ACs and illustrate the role of knowledge and ignorance in shaping ACMs' understanding of their oversight role. This study also raises questions about the soundness of having ACs oversee multiple different processes. By highlighting that ACMs do not comprehend and enact their role uniformly, this study reveals the important nuances in ACMs' oversight approaches.

We examine how public enforcement and private enforcement interact to contain self‐dealing activities in emerging markets. Using data from China, we find that firms receiving comment letters concerning related party transactions (RPTs) from stock exchanges significantly reduce their RPTs in subsequent years. We further find that (1) the subsequent reduction in RPTs is more pronounced when independent directors have higher career or reputation concerns and (2) independent directors are more likely to dissent or resign if their firms do not significantly reduce RPTs after receiving RPT comment letters, especially if they have high reputation concerns. Our study sheds light on a within‐firm mechanism through which public enforcement takes effect. Our empirical findings also illustrate how “sunshine enforcement”—maintaining timely transparency of the enforcement process—can significantly enhance the effectiveness of regulatory programs.

Extant management accounting research has conceptualized the interplay between trust, distrust, and open‐book accounting (OBA) as a relationship‐level phenomenon, largely ignoring that inter‐organizational relationships are often complex entities that comprise multiple arenas of exchange where (dis)trust and OBA can interact in different—and potentially contradictory—ways. To address this theoretical oversight, we draw on relational exchange theory to propose that (dis)trust largely forms within OBA domains where different forms of data are exchanged for different purposes. Trust and distrust may thereby coexist within a relationship. We also propose that (dis)trust spills over to influence the conditions for OBA in other domains. Consequently, trust and distrust not only take shape in cumulative processes within OBA domains but also diffuse between domains in a relationship. Empirical observations from a longitudinal case study of a retail buyer's attempts to introduce OBA in three vendor relationships lead us to suggest that competence‐trust spillover is determined largely by domain similarity, while goodwill‐trust spillover relies to a greater extent on staff mobility between OBA domains. Overall, the negative effects of distrust spillover on the implementation of OBA appear greater than the positive effects of trust spillover. Our study shows that, by analyzing the domain‐specific nature of trust and distrust, future research can increase our understanding of the relationship between data characteristics and (dis)trust, as well as explain how trust and distrust interact to determine conditions for data exchange between organizations.

In 2017, the PCAOB began requiring audit firm tenure disclosure within the audit report for SEC registrant clients. Many commenters raised the concern that prominent disclosure of firm tenure would lead investors to inappropriately infer a negative relation between audit quality and long tenure. This is particularly troubling given that empirical evidence generally does not support this concern. In our first experiment, we predict and find that disclosing an audit firm's long tenure within the audit report increases investors' perceptions that the audit firm's independence was impaired while conducting the audit. However, we also identify an intervention that mitigates the effects of disclosing long tenure—an accompanying disclosure in the audit report of the firm's adherence to the SEC's mandatory partner rotation requirement. We find that such a disclosure moderates the effect of long tenure disclosure such that in the absence (presence) of a partner rotation disclosure, investors do (do not) perceive increased independence impairment when long firm tenure is disclosed. In a second experiment, we predict and find that long firm tenure disclosure reduces investors' preference to invest in an otherwise quantitatively optimal investment and that this relation is driven, in part, by perceptions of independence impairment. Again, this result is attenuated by partner rotation disclosure. Our results should be useful to regulators in understanding the effects of their disclosure mandate and to audit firms in understanding a practical way in which they might mitigate the implications of such effects.

The objective of this research is to better understand experts' contributions to the prospective evaluation of a new audit standard—in this case, key audit matter (KAM) reporting. To this end, we assisted the Canadian Auditing and Assurance Standards Board by leading its consultation of 22 expert financial statement users. The methodology employed to observe our participants' opinions and cognitive processes involves thought protocol and interviews. By analyzing the rhetorical base of experts' prospective analysis, we show that our participants' arguments are often laden with postulates and lack data points, leading to generalizations. Sounder arguments entail more nuanced views but lead to uncertainties. We therefore highlight a tension between the rhetorical content of experts' insights and the calculative rationality of a cost‐benefit analysis. We also find that experts with less cognitive flexibility are less likely to be supportive of the adoption of a standard implying a change of habits in the way they process information. This tension and cognitive bias generate a significant interpretive challenge to determine a clear and dominant stance in the consultation. We discuss the implications of these findings for the legitimacy of prospective evaluations and the conduct of cost‐benefit consultations with experts. We also contribute to the literature on KAMs by substantiating concerns about the value of extended auditor reports to users.

Since the passage of the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act of 2002, many notable frauds have been tied to ineffective audit committee (AC) oversight. As a result, AC oversight is of continuing interest, and regulators continue to debate this issue, garnering a growing body of research focused on the role played by the AC. But little theoretical research exists to guide analytical and empirical researchers investigating AC oversight. The purpose of this study is to provide theoretical guidance by examining AC oversight in a strategic setting. We focus on the AC's role in overseeing internal controls (ICs) and the impact of whether the AC relies on management in designing the controls. We characterize how the nature of control risk changes and how IC strength is associated with the amount of managerial fraud, expected probability of fraud detection (which, on average, equates to audit effort), and audit quality (assessed as 1 − audit risk) across two settings defined by the degree of AC oversight. As one example that highlights the need for theoretical guidance, we consider the literature's presumption that IC strength is negatively associated with audit effort. We find that this association may be positive or negative as IC changes, where the association varies with the degree of direct AC oversight and the change in payoff parameters.

Many companies use color codes in their internal performance reports to highlight how current performance compares to performance in a previous period. We examine whether the use of color coding affects managers' decision‐making in a resource allocation task. We argue that managers' decision accuracy will be lower if they receive noisier feedback, but that this detrimental effect of noise can be mitigated through color coding. Using two experiments, we find evidence consistent with our theory. Managers who receive reports in which performance increases are color‐coded green and performance decreases are color‐coded red are less affected by noise than managers who receive feedback reports without color coding. Supplemental analyses suggest that color coding induces managers to process feedback in a more holistic manner, which reduces the adverse effect of noise on managers' learning processes. Our findings have several important implications for research and practice.

I examine whether a strategic focus on data analytics is associated with improvements in firms' internal information quality. Using textual analysis of firm disclosures to identify a data analytics strategy, I first document that firm, leadership, and operating environment characteristics are all important determinants of the decision to adopt a data analytics strategy. I next use operating and financial reporting outcomes to infer whether a data analytics strategy improves internal information quality. I find that a data analytics strategy is associated with enhanced operating efficiency, as adopting firms invest and utilize existing resources more efficiently. I also find that a data analytics strategy is associated with more accurate management forecasts. These results, collectively, are consistent with a data analytics strategy improving firms' internal information quality. Lastly, I corroborate and extend my findings with job postings data, and the results suggest that firm leadership signals their support for data analytics initiatives through disclosure.

Auditor changes are significant corporate events marking disruptions in the auditor‐client relationship. Prior studies have primarily examined the impact of such changes on audit quality and investment decisions of market participants. We study the effect of auditor changes on the voluntary disclosure of forward‐looking information. Managers may choose to reduce disclosure due to the possible adverse effect of the disruptions on disclosure credibility. Alternatively, shareholders may demand increased disclosure to intensify monitoring, as the auditor change signals potential issues between the company and the auditor. Employing multiple identification strategies, we find that firms are less likely to issue management earnings forecasts (MEFs) following auditor changes. We also find that governance quality mitigates the negative impact of auditor changes on the issuance of MEFs. Additionally, auditor changes are associated with lower market reactions to forecast releases. The overall evidence is consistent with the notion of reduced forecast credibility. Lastly, we conduct cross‐sectional analyses on characteristics of the auditor changes and find evidence consistent with signaling and anticipated successor audit quality to be underlying mechanisms for the association between auditor changes and MEFs. Our study provides the first large sample evidence that auditor changes have a disruptive effect on the voluntary disclosure of forward‐looking information.

We investigate whether credit default swap (CDS) trading results in managers learning new information through stock prices that is relevant to their investment and forecasting decisions. We argue that the CDS market structure, the sophistication of CDS market participants, and the cleanness of CDS spreads as a signal of default risk together produce and convey information that is new to managers of firms referenced in CDS contracts. We consider two measures for managerial learning: (1) the sensitivity of managerial investments to share prices and (2) the sensitivity of changes in management forecast accuracy to stock returns. We find that both sensitivity measures increase significantly when firms are referenced in any traded CDS contracts, indicating that CDS trading improves managerial learning. We also find that the improvement in managerial learning is more pronounced for firms that are subject to higher uncertainty in industry‐specific and economy‐wide prospects, consistent with the view that CDS market participants have informational advantages with respect to the industry‐level and macroeconomic environments. We further find that the improvement in managerial learning is more evident for firms with higher credit risk. Our findings provide large‐sample evidence on a positive consequence of CDS trading in the context of managers' ability to learn from outside investors.