Abstract. I examine how an internal auditor, called the firm, designs a control system for a strategic employee who conditions his thefts on the amount and types of controls. Society sets minimum testing amounts and fines for detected theft, whereas the firm determines the employee's wages and the amount of monitoring above the minimum. The results fall into three separate cases. When society's minimum testing standards and fines are sufficiently high, the employee never steals in any period. In this case, the firm performs the minimum amount of testing and pays the lowest feasible wage. In the remaining two cases, the testing standard and fines are too low to prevent theft by themselves. In these two cases the firm's control system determines whether there will be theft in the first period. I show that if the firm chooses to prevent all first‐period theft, then it uses only one type of control. She offers a wage premium and monitors the minimum amount. The wage premium substitutes for a tine large enough to prevent all theft. If the firm designs controls that do not prevent all theft, then the firm also uses only one control. In contrast to the no‐theft case, the firm pays the lowest feasible wage and monitors above the minimum. This choice reflects the increasing returns to scale of monitoring in preventing theft.

Abstract Building on the work of Bernard and Thomas 1990, we develop a model to infer the degree to which the information in an earnings announcement is incorporated into investors' expectations for the subsequent earnings announcement at any point in time between the two announcements. We are unable to reject the null hypothesis that investors' earnings expectations are based on a seasonal random walk and reflect none of the implications of the immediately prior earnings announcement up to 15 trading days after that announcement. By mid‐quarter, expectations are significantly more sophisticated than a seasonal random walk. Two trading days before the next earnings announcement, as much as one half of the information in the prior earnings announcement is reflected in earnings expectations. We also find that the dissemination of information, albeit predictable information, speeds the incorporation of prior earnings information into earnings expectations. Our results suggest that as information about future earnings that could have been discerned from the earlier announcements (because past earnings surprises predict future ones) is disseminated in a more transparent form, investors revise their earnings expectations to reflect this information. Thus, the investors' expectations appear to incorporate more and more of the serial correlation in earnings surprises as the quarter progresses, even though they do not consider per se the serial correlation in earnings surprises in forming their expectations.

Abstract. A newly issued AICPA auditing standard focuses attention on analytical procedures. Regression analysis has been shown to be a useful audit tool and is used to a limited extent in practice. This study compares a univariate regression‐based decision rule with that of exponential smoothing. The effect on the regression‐based decision method when additional input information is included to develop a multivariate model is also evaluated. Comparisons are accomplished by seeding various error patterns into the audit period data and evaluating the results of the various models. The results indicate that the regression‐based decision model was at least as efficient and effective as the exponential smoothing‐based model. Additional input information into the univariate regression model to develop a multivariate model did improve auditor decisions for some types of accounts but did not significantly affect the number of incorrect rejections and/or acceptances for other types. The multivariate model did improve the achieved precision of the univariate model but still did not reach desired levels. Résumé. Dans un Auditing Standards Procedures qu'il publiait récemment, l'AICPA se penche sur les procédés analytiques. L'analyse de régression s'est révélée un instrument de vérification utile et son emploi dans la pratique est modéré, Les auteurs comparent une règle de décision fondée sur une régression comportant une seule variable aléatoire avec celle du lissage exponentiel. L'incidence d'un supplément d'information à l'entrée sur la méthode de décision fondée sur la régression permet de mettre au point un modèle à plusieurs variables aléatoires, que les auteurs évaluent également. Les comparaisons sont réalisées en introduisant divers scénarios d'erreur dans les données de la période soumise à la vérification. Les résultats de l'étude indiquent que le modèle de décision fondé sur la régression est au moins aussi efficient et efficace que le modèle fondé sur le lissage exponentiel. L'introduction d'un supplément d'information dans le modèle de régression à une seule variable aléatoire de manière à créer un modèle à plusieurs variables aléatoires a de fait amélioré les décisions du vérificateur pour certains types de comptes, mais n'a pas eu d'incidence significative sur le nombre d'erreurs de première et de seconde espèces pour d'autres types de comptes. La performance du modèle à plusieurs variables aléatoires est de fait supérieure à celle du modèle à une seule variable aléatoire, sans toutefois permettre d'obtenir les niveaux de précision souhaités.

Abstract This paper uses stock market data to investigate the popular claim that investors are misled by the “pro forma” earnings numbers conspicuously featured in the press releases of some U.S. firms. We first document the frequency and magnitude of pro forma earnings in press releases issued during June through August 2000, and describe the 433 firms that engaged in this financial disclosure strategy. Our test period predates public expressions of concern by trade associations and regulators that pro forma earnings may mislead investors and the subsequent issuance of guidelines and rules on the disclosure of pro forma earnings numbers. We use two complementary approaches to determine whether the share prices that investors assign to pro forma firms are systematically higher than the prices assigned to other firms. Our market‐multiples tests for differences in price levels find some evidence suggesting that pro forma firms may be priced higher than firms that do not use the disclosure strategy. This apparent overpricing is not, however, related to the pro forma earnings numbers themselves. Our narrow‐window stock returns tests reveal no evidence of a stock return premium for pro forma firms at the quarterly earnings announcement date. Collectively, the results cast doubt on the notion that investors are, on average, misled by pro forma earnings disclosures despite the widespread concern expressed in the financial press and by regulators.

Abstract This paper presents evidence that the positive association between firm size and price leads of earnings is not solely a function of private search incentives for firm‐specific information. Specifically, we find that small‐firm prices also lag large‐firm prices with respect to industry‐wide information. Our empirical analysis extends Collins, Kothari, and Rayburn 1987 and Freeman 1987, who document that security‐price leads of earnings are positively associated with market capitalization. In particular, we examine the association between firm size and the timing of security returns for two components of annual earnings changes: the average change for a firm's industry and the firm's idiosyncratic change. We find that large firms' prices have a longer lead than small firms' prices with respect to both components. Large firms' early lead on industry‐wide earnings suggests that returns of large firms predict returns of same‐industry small firms. To test this implication, we construct a portfolio of long (short) positions in small firms when the prior month's returns of large firms in their industry are above (below) average for large firms in other industries. This zero investment portfolio earns 4.5 percent over 12 months.

Abstract. Accounting research contains two distinct approaches to the interaction between accounting management and the independent auditor. Game theory suggests that the auditor's testing strategy will affect the manager's reporting strategy and that the two strategies form an equilibrium. The game‐theoretic approach views the auditor as active, in that the auditor acknowledges the effect that his or her testing strategy has on the manager's reporting. In contrast, in the decision‐theoretic approach, the auditor tests reports, but ignores the effect that such testing might have on the manager's reporting behavior. Essentially, the decision‐theoretic approach views the auditor as passive, taking the reporting strategy as given when designing tests. We use United Kingdom data to estimate both models and test their validity using nested hypothesis tests. Our results demonstrate that the active, game‐theoretic model better describes the auditor‐manager interaction. This is the first empirical validation of the game‐theoretic model using archival accounting data.

Abstract. Issues surrounding the allocation of sunk capacity costs to products are among the oldest in managerial accounting. On the one hand, such costs are generally deemed to be irrelevant, but on the other hand, actual accounting systems commonly make these allocations. This paper examines a decision maker who incurs costs to acquire capacity and then uses an opportunity cost to allocate that capacity among a sequence of product proposals. Under specified circumstances, the sunk cost of capacity is shown to approximate the optimal opportunity cost of capacity. As the number of product proposals grows, the expected opportunity loss from using a simple sunk cost based capacity allocation rule goes to zero. The model is extended to consider different types of products and a multiperiod setting. Résumé. Les questions qui entourent la répartition des coûts irrécupérables relatifs à la capacité entre les différents produits comptent parmi les plus vieux problèmes en comptabilité de gestion. D'une part, ces coûts sont généralement réputés n'être pas pertinents, tandis que d'autre part, en réalité, les systèmes de comptabilité assurent couramment ces répartitions. Les auteurs examinent le cas d'un décideur qui engage des frais pour acquérir une certaine capacité et utilise ensuite un coût d'option pour répartir cette capacité entre une série de projets de fabrication de produits. Dans des circonstances données, les auteurs démontrent que les coûts irrécupérables de la capacité acquise se rapprochent du coût d'option optimal de cette capacité. À mesure que croît le nombre de projets de fabrication de produits, la perte d'option prévue, si l'on utilise une règle de répartition simple de la capacité fondée sur les coûts irrécupérables, se rapproche de zéro. Le modèle est élargi de façon à englober différents types de produits et plusieurs périodes.

Abstract. This paper develops and analyzes a signaling model in which a firm discloses privately held information to investors via a forecast. The forecast is constrained by the extent to which the accounting system reflects the private information, and the extent to which estimates regarding the private information are available from other sources, such as financial analysts. The market assesses the credibility of the forecast in setting the price of the firm's stock. A partially separating equilibrium is presented. The implications of the equilibrium are consistent with empirical regularities concerning the market's reaction to management forecasts. In particular, a majority of management forecasts contain good news, forecasts containing bad news are more credible than forecasts containing good news, and stock price reactions are stronger for firms that are not followed by financial analysts. Analysis of investor returns suggests that although a more effective accounting system reduces the variance of returns, it also skews them to the left. Thus, the largest losses are from investments in firms with the most effective accounting systems. Résumé. L'auteur élabore et analyse un modèle indicateur dans lequel une entreprise communique aux investisseurs, par le truchement d'une prévision, l'information qu'elle détient à titre privilégiée. La prévision est sous contrainte dans la mesure où le système comptable reflète l'information privilégiée et les estimations relatives à l'information privilégiée peuvent être obtenues auprès d'autres sources, comme celle des analystes financiers. Le marché évalue la crédibilité de la prévision en fixant le cours de l'action de l'entreprise. L'auteur présente un équilibre partiellement intercalaire. Les conséquences de cet équilibre sont conformes à celles régulièrement observées dans les études empiriques relatives à la réaction du marché aux prévisions de la direction. On note en particulier que la majorité des prévisions de la direction renferment de l'information positive, que les prévisions qui renferment de l'information négative sont plus crédibles que les prévisions contenant de l'information positive et que les réactions touchant le cours de l'action sont plus fortes pour les entreprises qui ne sont pas suivies par des analystes financiers. L'analyse des rendements obtenus par les investisseurs laisse croire que même si un système comptable plus efficace réduit la variance des rendements, il les rend asymétriques vers la gauche. Les pertes les plus importantes sont donc liées aux investissements dans des entreprises ayant les systèmes comptables les plus efficaces.

Abstract Recent research finds that analysts' cash flow forecasts have meaningful financial reporting ramifications, but, to date, the identified effects are unlikely to yield meaningful cash flow benefits. This study examines whether analysts' cash flow forecasts encourage managers to enhance the firm's cash flow position through tax avoidance activities. We evaluate the change in cash tax avoidance after analysts begin issuing cash flow forecasts relative to a propensity score matched control sample of firms without cash flow forecasts. Consistent with analysts' cash flow forecasts encouraging tax avoidance that enhances the firm's cash flow health, we find a negative association between cash tax payments and analysts' cash flow coverage. Additional analysis suggests this association is driven primarily by strategies to permanently avoid rather than to temporarily defer tax payments and that increased cash tax avoidance activity represents a nontrivial component of the overall increase in reported operating cash flows after the initiation of analysts' cash flow coverage.