Knowledge that Transforms

We examine whether the use of eXtensible Business Reporting Language (XBRL) for financial reporting (i.e., interactive data submissions) reduces earnings management during the period of XBRL implementation by the SEC. Using a sample of mandated XBRL filers, we compare the magnitude of absolute discretionary accruals in the XBRL adoption quarters with that in the non‐adopting quarters. We also take advantage of staggered (three‐stage phase‐in) XBRL implementations to perform difference‐in‐differences analyses. Our results show that absolute discretionary accruals decrease significantly from the pre‐ to the post‐XBRL period, suggesting that XBRL adoption constrains earnings management via discretionary accrual choices. Our analyses further reveal that the use of standardized official XBRL elements significantly reduces the levels of discretionary accruals, while the use of customized extension elements does not, suggesting that the former discourages accrual‐based earnings management, while the latter does not. Our results are robust to a variety of sensitivity checks.

This paper investigates whether maintaining a reputation for consistently beating analysts' earnings expectations can motivate executives to move from “within GAAP” earnings management to “outside of GAAP” earnings manipulation. We analyze firms subject to SEC enforcement actions and find that these firms consistently beat analysts' quarterly earnings forecasts in the three years prior to the manipulation period and continue to do so by smaller “beats” during the manipulation period. We find that manipulating firms beat expectations around 86 percent of the time in the 12 quarters prior to the manipulation period (versus 75 percent for control firms) and that manipulation often ends with a miss in expectations. We document that executives of manipulating firms face strong stock market and CEO pressure to perform. Prior to the manipulation period, these firms have high analyst optimism, growing institutional interest, and high market valuations, along with powerful CEOs. Further, we find that maintaining a reputation for beating expectations is more important than CEO overconfidence and is incremental to CEO equity incentives for explaining manipulation. Our results suggest that pressure to maintain a reputation for beating analysts' expectations can encourage aggressive accounting and, ultimately, earnings manipulation.

Before completing merger and acquisition (M&A) transactions, acquiring firms conduct due diligence. This process provides acquiring firms with a more informed assessment of the expected costs, benefits, and risks of an acquisition and offers one last opportunity to renegotiate or terminate an M&A transaction. However, acquiring firms must trade off the costs and benefits of performing additional due diligence versus completing the acquisition. Based on an analysis of the time to negotiate the acquisition agreement and complete the transaction, I predict and find that competitive pressures, short‐term financial reporting incentives, and agency problems are associated with less due diligence. I also find that less due diligence is associated with lower post‐acquisition profitability, a higher probability of acquisition‐related goodwill impairments, and lower quality fair value estimates for the acquired assets and liabilities. These findings highlight due diligence as an important factor explaining cross‐sectional variation in post‐acquisition performance and financial reporting for business combinations.

We investigate the effect of executives and directors with prior banking crisis experience on bank outcomes around the global financial crisis (GFC). Executives and directors with previous experience leading banks through a bank crisis may have been uniquely able to understand the risks, recognize the warnings signs early, and thus respond more effectively to the GFC. Controlling for other executive, director, and bank‐level characteristics, we examine whether bank performance, risk taking, and accounting quality in the period immediately before and during the GFC are affected by having executives or directors who previously served as bank executives or directors during the 1980s/1990s banking crisis (80s/90s crisis). Overall, we find that banks led by these crisis‐experienced executives and directors exhibit stronger performance, lower risk taking, and higher accounting quality in the period around the GFC. These effects are strongest among bank leaders for whom the 80s/90s crisis was most salient. Results are robust to propensity‐matched samples and other analyses performed to rule out alternative explanations. Our results suggest these individuals were able to learn from prior crisis experience.

We examine the stock price impact of corporate site visits using a unique data set of site visits to listed firms in China. Our main findings are as follows. First, the market reaction around corporate site visits is statistically and economically significant and is stronger for group visits, visits conducted by mutual fund managers, visits covering accounting and finance topics, visits to firms with poor information environments, and visits to manufacturing firms. Second, the stock returns around site visits are positively associated with firms’ future performance. Third, the changes in visiting funds’ holdings are more predictive of firms’ future performance than those of nonvisiting funds. Overall, this study contributes to the literature by providing evidence that site visits are important venues for investors to collect information about firms and make informed trades.

I examine whether political influence as a response to voters’ interest in employment levels is reflected in the enforcement actions of the SEC. I find that large employers are less likely to experience SEC enforcement actions. Next, I examine whether variations in politicians’ sensitivity to employment levels result in variations in enforcement against large employers. I find that large employers are less likely to face enforcement actions during presidential elections if they are based in politically important states. Large employers also face fewer enforcement actions if they are based in high‐unemployment states during elections of senators who serve on SEC oversight committees. Large employers based in high‐unemployment districts enjoy lower enforcement if their members of Congress serve on SEC oversight committees. The findings suggest that voters’ interests are reflected in SEC enforcement.

This paper provides new evidence on whether and how boards solve costly ex post settling up to recover CEO cash compensation for unrealized gains that fail to materialize. Our analyses are motivated by the likely expanding role for ex post settling up as the risk of compensating executives for unrealized gains that may never materialize increases in a more intangibles‐based economy, as well as by the conflicting evidence of prior research. We provide evidence consistent with ex post settling up by (i) using alternative truncation methods to derive observations most likely to fall within the theoretically motivated incentive zone; (ii) replicating and reconciling the conflicting results of prior research that supports (Leone et al. 2006) and fails to support (Shaw and Zhang 2010) ex post settling up; (iii) using Incentive Lab data with contract‐specific information, allowing strong identification of observations in the incentive zone; and (iv) documenting predictable cross‐sectional variation, with ex post settling up being more pronounced for firms with stronger corporate governance, less conservative accounting earnings, and a larger proportion of total pay in the form of cash compensation. Overall, we conclude that evidence is strong in support of the ex post settling up hypothesis.

Firms’ reluctance at times to publicly disclose financial information is often attributed to concern that the information may be used against them by self‐interested outside parties. These outside parties may interact with the firm in the horizontal realm (e.g., retail competitors) or in the vertical arena (e.g., wholesale suppliers). This article is built on the premise that fully understanding the strategic consequences of disclosure requires joint consideration of horizontal and vertical relationships. When both rivals and suppliers are accounted for, we demonstrate that (i) lower intra‐industry correlation in product demand favors disclosure, with the precise correlation‐cutoff dependent on the firm's use of input suppliers; and (ii) the more a firm relies on input suppliers with pricing power, the less attractive is disclosure.

This study investigates whether task interdependence in teams alters the effectiveness of managerial discretion in motivating team performance. Teams are particularly useful when employees' tasks are interdependent—that is, when the degree to which the increase in team performance resulting from a team member's effort depends on the effort and skills of the other team members. The reason is that the more interdependent tasks are, the more employees need to coordinate their actions and help one another to achieve their objectives. Prior research analyzing settings where task interdependence is absent suggests that providing managers with discretion over team bonus allocation can improve team performance relative to equal team bonus allocations because it strengthens the link between contributions to team output and rewards. Economic theory suggests that managerial discretion will also improve team performance when task interdependence is present and information is efficiently used. However, we use behavioral theory to predict that managerial discretion is less effective in the presence of task interdependence, because managers do not fully incorporate all relevant information into bonus decisions and because managerial discretion hurts coordination and helping, which is particularly problematic under task interdependence. We find that while discretion over compensation has a positive effect on team performance relative to equal bonus allocation when task interdependence is absent, it has a negative effect when task interdependence is present. Additional analyses provide support for our underlying theory. Results of our study contribute to both theory and practice by suggesting that, ironically, managerial discretion may be most useful when the potential benefits of employing teams are lowest and least useful when the potential benefits are highest. Our results help explain why firms often grant managers only partial or no discretion over team members' compensation.