In recent years, firms have increasingly come under scrutiny from environmental, social, and governance (ESG) rating agencies which systematically assess and publicize ESG-related information to diverse stakeholders. This study aims to investigate whether firms exhibit a heightened incentive to avoid ESG-related regulatory violations once they come under the coverage of ESG rating agencies. Analyzing data spanning from 2000 to 2018 and considering the coverage provided by four prominent ESG rating agencies to U.S. firms, we leverage the staggered initiation and intensity of this coverage. Our findings reveal a negative correlation between ESG violations and the commencement and extent of coverage by ESG rating agencies. This relationship is particularly pronounced for firms characterized by lower levels of corporate monitoring as indicated by fewer analysts providing coverage, limited media attention, weaker ESG commitments, and less disparate ESG ratings. Taken together, our study sheds light on the monitoring role of ESG rating agencies, illustrating their significance in incentivizing managers to mitigate ESG violations

We investigate the portfolio frontier and risk premia in equilibrium when institutional investors aim to minimize the tracking error variance and to attain a certain ESG score (ESG mandate). Provided that a negative ESG premium is priced by the market, we show that an ESG mandate can reduce the mean–variance inefficiency of the portfolio frontier when the asset manager targets a limited over-performance return with respect to the benchmark. In equilibrium, with mean–variance investors and asset managers endowed with an ESG mandate, a negative ESG premium arises if the mandate is binding for asset managers. The negative ESG premium is due to the ESG constraint (institutional investors over-invest in virtuous ESG stocks). We find empirical evidence of such a negative premium in the US market

This study finds that credit default swap (CDS) trading positively affects a firm's environmental, social, and governance (ESG) performance. This effect is more prominent in ESG strengths than ESG concerns. The proposed empirical connection remains valid across endogeneity-controlling methodologies, model specifications, and ESG performance measures. The effect is stronger for firms with stronger bank relationships, higher debt dependence, and more restrictive covenants. Furthermore, improvement in ESG performance is more pronounced for firms with more free cash flow, lower institutional ownership, and higher financial constraints. Our findings reveal the real effects of CDS trading on firm ESG performance

We analytically compare two dominant methodologies for the construction of an ESG factor: the time-series (ratings used to sort stocks) and cross-sectional (ratings used to weight stocks) approaches. Differences in ESG rating and exposure to other firm characteristics imply an ex ante expected return spread between the two factors. We construct a cross-sectional factor (i) featuring a targeted rating, thus allowing comparability with other factors, (ii) neutralizing exposure to other firm characteristics, and (iii) not harming diversification through stock screening. Using ratings from several data vendors, we document strong variations of the factor alpha in the time series and across vendors. The conditional alpha is negatively related to the level of media attention for ESG and positively related to variations in media attention

This paper develops and tests an equilibrium model of active fund management with ESG considerations. Heterogeneous sustainability preferences lead fund managers to intensify information acquisition on assets across the ESG spectrum, broadening the scope of active management. This information channel enhances price informativeness, lowers discount rates, and increases portfolio deviation from benchmarks. The model predicts a negative and concave ESG-expected return relation, stronger for green assets and weaker for brown assets. Using data on U.S. mutual funds and stocks from 2007–2021, we find supporting evidence based on price informativeness and the implied cost of equity capital

We study the impact of corporate social responsibility (CSR) on firm misvaluation in the US. Our results indicate that a firms Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) profile significantly affects valuation: an improvement of a firms CSR leads to a higher ratio of actual to true firm value. Analyzing the relation between ESG and misvaluation separately, we find that ESG expands existing overvaluation whereas it reduces undervalued firms’ deviation from the true value. We argue that both valuation effects are attributable to the worldwide trend of sustainable investing. Further analyses reveal a moderating role of market sentiment towards sustainability in the ESG-misvaluation relationship. Our findings suggest that firms CSR is indeed perceived as valuable by shareholders and supports stakeholder theorys view in considering CSR as beneficial

Sustainable investing is characterized by considerations of both financial returns and ESG (Environmental, Social and Governance) impacts. We investigate how information about these two aspects, individually and in combination, affects investors’ decision to invest sustainably and their satisfaction with the information they received. We also test whether different ESG preference elicitation modes affect these investment decisions and investors’ satisfaction. We conduct an incentivized online experiment with two samples, experienced retail investors and a representative sample of the Austrian population in terms of age and gender (N = 2,254 in total). We find that both financial return information and ESG impact information stimulate ESG investment. Providing both types of information does not have a greater effect than presenting either one alone. Finally, we find no effect on satisfaction and the ESG preference elicitation mode significantly affects neither investment decisions nor satisfaction

We provide a detailed holdings-based analysis of investment decisions made by U.S. equity SRI funds. Besides incorporating conventional fundamental factors, such as earnings growth, leverage, dividend yield, stock return and volatility, SRI funds adjust portfolio weights by considering companies’ relative ESG performance. This holds for all categories of passively and actively managed funds, while for active funds ESG scores have a higher economic impact for value rather than growth funds. The timing of inclusion of companies in active SRI funds or their exclusion is driven primarily by fundamentals rather than by ESG performance. We find that both active SRI and matched conventional funds integrate ESG information as well as financial criteria in their investment decisions, but SRI portfolios exhibit higher average sustainability scores. Finally, we posit that SRI screening criteria effectively guide investment decisions, positive screening resulting in higher active portfolio weights of best performers in a corresponding ESG pillar

We study whether and how a country's environmental, social, and governance (ESG) performance relates to its sovereign borrowing costs in international capital markets. We hypothesize that good ESG performance plays an economic role: It signals a country's commitment to sustainability and long-term orientation and is a buffer against negative shocks, leading to lower sovereign bond yield spreads. Using a sample of 20 OECD countries over the period 1996–2012, we show that countries with good ESG performance are associated with lower default risk and lower sovereign bond yield spreads. Moreover, we show that the social and governance dimensions have a significant negative association with sovereign bond yield spreads, whereas the environmental dimension does not

We examine how firms estimate CEO-employee pay ratios in response to the CEO pay ratio rule, the first mandated pay inequality disclosure for U.S. firms. Our findings reveal that firms disclose lower pay ratios when they use more complex methods to identify the median employee. The relation between the estimation method and the disclosed pay ratio is stronger for firms headquartered in states with a greater societal aversion to income inequality and is weaker when CEO pay in the prior year is lower. Firms’ estimation choices do not merely represent selection bias or potentially omitted variables such as firm size, industry, compensation design complexity, or workforce composition – including the presence of foreign, temporary, seasonal, or highly paid employees. Although firms that use more complex methods to identify the median employee disclose lower pay ratios, we find no evidence of real changes in pay inequality among these firms. Our results suggest that some firms use estimation discretion to appear to conform to stakeholders’ preferences instead of taking real actions. These practices call into question the informativeness of CEO pay ratio disclosures, highlighting a potential cost of granting discretion in mandatory ESG disclosures