Using the Russian banking system as a laboratory, we study the effect of a switch from fixed-rate deposit insurance to a risk-based system with premia tied to insured deposit rates offered by a bank. After the switch, increases in bank risk lead to reduced reliance on insured deposits, private banks without excessive capital stop raising insured deposit rates to fund loan growth, and the cost of insured deposits becomes a predictor of bank failures (beyond the CAMEL variables). Offering insured deposit rates notably above the market becomes a last resort to banks. The results suggest that risk-based deposit insurance schemes discouraging high insured deposit rates may help reduce bank moral hazard and improve financial stability.

Risk-shifting window dressing and a preferred habitat for liquidity have been offered as possible explanations as to why US money market rates are higher before the year-end than afterwards. The two hypotheses differ in the timing of the rate decline at the year-end and the evidence on the timing of the decline supports the preferred habitat hypothesis in US money markets. This paper extends this line of research to the behavior of international short-term interest rates at year-ends and quarter-ends using London interbank offer rates (LIBOR) for 11 different currencies. The results suggest that the behavior of LIBOR for five currencies: the US Dollar, Euro, Japanese Yen, Swiss Franc, and German Mark is consistent with year-end or quarter-end preferred habitats for liquidity. Other currencies do not demonstrate consistently distinct patterns in turn-of-the-year and turn-of-the-quarter yields. None of the results provides any support for risk-shifting window dressing.

The Federal Reserve’s AMLF program was designed to provide liquidity to money market funds (MMFs). Between September 2008 and May 2009, the program made $217 billion in non-recourse loans to depository institutions and bank holding companies to purchase asset-backed commercial paper from MMFs. JP Morgan and State Street dominated the program, accounting for over 90% of all loans made. Our analysis suggests that JP Morgan exhibited more self-dealing behavior than State Street. We find that JP Morgan and State Street earned economically and statistically significant cumulative returns of 2.28% and 2.49% (respectively) over the first seven days of the program after controlling for market returns and heteroscedasticity.