Using data from the independent social choice investment advisory firm Kinder, Lydenberg, Domini (KLD), we construct a stakeholder welfare score measuring the extent to which firms meet the expectation of their non-shareholder stakeholders (such as employees, customers, communities, and environment), and find it to be associated with positive valuation effects: an increase of 1 in the stakeholder welfare score leads to an increase of 0.587 in Tobin’s Q. Furthermore, the valuation effects vary across stakeholders and the aforementioned positive effects are driven by firms’ performance on employee relations and environmental issues. These results suggest that stakeholder welfare (in particular, employee welfare and environmental performance) represents intangibles (such as reputation or human capital) crucial for shareholder value creation rather than private benefits managers pursue for their own social or economic needs.

We examine whether mutual funds and hedge funds herd after each other and the associated impacts on stock prices. We find strong evidence that mutual funds herd into or out of stocks following the herd of hedge funds: mutual funds’ herding measure is positively related to last quarter’s hedge fund herding. In contrast, hedge funds do not follow mutual funds. Mutual funds’ following of hedge funds leads to a sharp price reversal in the next quarter, whereas hedge fund herding itself does not destabilize prices. Further, a mutual fund’s following intensity increases with its past performance. The top 30% of mutual funds most active in following hedge funds do so persistently and drastically increase their herding subsequent to intense herding by hedge funds. They are also the group driving the above price reversals. Overall, our evidence is consistent with the reputational incentives of mutual fund herding and the associated price destabilization effects.

We consider an incumbent who wishes to sell equity to outsiders at an IPO to implement his firm’s project. He may be talented (lower cost of effort, comparative advantage in project-implementation) or untalented. The project may have high (intrinsically more valuable, but showing less signs of success in the near-term) or low near-term uncertainty. Under a single class share structure, the incumbent has a greater chance of losing control to potential rivals if he undertakes the project with high near-term uncertainty, since outsiders may vote for the rival if they believe the project is not progressing well. A dual class share structure allows the incumbent to have enough votes to prevail against any rival, but may be misused by untalented incumbents to dissipate value. Our results help to explain firms’ choices between dual class and single class IPOs and the post-IPO operating performance of dual class versus single class firms.