When shares are traded infrequently, beta estimates are often severely biased. This paper reviews the problems introduced by infrequent trading, and presents a method for measuring beta when share price data suffer from this problem. The method is used with monthly returns for a one-in-three random sample of all U.K. Stock Exchange shares from 1955 to 1974. Most of the bias in conventional beta estimates is eliminated when the proposed estimators are used in their place.
This note argues that though Dave Mayers and Edward Rice were able to show that the CAPM could be used to detect superior investors in a world of asymmetric information, their demonstration does not resurrect the CAPM as a practical tool for performance measurement. To employ the Mayers-Rice model, an investment advisor would first have to determine that the CAPM holds for uninformed investors. As a means of avoiding the problem of testing the CAPM, a performance measure based only on returns is outlined. The measure is robust in that it would correctly designate superior investors in context of the CAPM, the arbitrage pricing model and many other equilibrium models of security pricing.
This paper examines the hypothesis that investors will sort themselves out into tax-induced ‘financial leverage clienteless’ in which the common stocks of highly levered firms will be held by individuals with low personal tax rates, while the shares of firms with little or no leverage will be held by individuals with high personal tax rates. Although the idea of financial leverage clienteless has appeared in the literature before, the immediate motivation for this investigation is a recent paper by Merton Miller. In that paper he argues that under the current U.S. tax structure, personal taxes will offset corporate taxes such that in equilibrium the value of any individual firm will be independent of its use of debt financing. We extend his analysis to show specifically the way in which financial leverage clienteles would come about in his assumed tax environment. We then conduct some direct empirical tests of the leverage clientele hypothesis. These tests can also be viewed as indirect tests of Miller's new proposition on the irrelevance of capital structures. The results of the tests are mixed: The relationship between corporate leverage policies and investors' tax rates is statistically significant, but its magnitude is less than would be predicted by the theory.
This paper presents a theory for pricing options on options, or compound options. The method can be generalized to value many corporate liabilities. The compound call option formula derived herein considers a call option on stock which is itself an option on the assets of the firm. This perspective incorporates leverage effects into option pricing and consequently the variance of the rate of return on the stock is not constant as Black-Scholes assumed, but is instead a function of the level of the stock price. The Black-Scholes formula is shown to be a special case of the compound option formula. This new model for puts and calls corrects some important biases of the Black-Scholes model.
This paper derives a single-beta asset pricing model in a multi-good, continuous-time model with uncertain consumption-goods prices and uncertain investment opportunities. When no riskless asset exists, a zero-beta pricing model is derived. Asset betas are measured relative to changes in the aggregate real consumption rate, rather than relative to the market. In a single-good model, an individual's asset portfolio results in an optimal consumption rate that has the maximum possible correlation with changes in aggregate consumption. If the capital markets are unconstrained Pareto-optimal, then changes in all individuals' optimal consumption rates are shown to be perfectly correlated.
This paper derives an after tax version of the Capital Asset Pricing Model. The model accounts for a progressive tax scheme and for wealth and income related constraints on borrowing. The equilibrium relationship indicates that before-tax expected rates of return are linearly related to systematic risk and to dividend yield. The sample estimates of the variances of observed betas are used to arrive at maximum likelihood estimators of the coefficients. The results indicate that, unlike prior studies, there is a strong positive relationship between dividend yield and expected return for NYSE stocks. Evidence is also presented for a clientele effect.
Mayers and Rice do not resolve the basic problem in portfolio performance evaluation with the securities market line, the ambiguity introduced by being obliged to choose a market index. Other performance evaluation techniques exist and possess some superior qualities. The Mayers-Rice discussion of my critique of the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) fails to recognize the CAPM's unusual testing implications and ignores the existence of alternative asset pricing theories. Residual analysis should give approximately correct estimates of the abnormal returns caused by specific events if it is conducted with the market model.
This paper presents a simple discrete-time model for valuing options. The fundamental economic principles of option pricing by arbitrage methods are particularly clear in this setting. Its development requires only elementary mathematics, yet it contains as a special limiting case the celebrated Black-Scholes model, which has previously been derived only by much more difficult methods. The basic model readily lends itself to generalization in many ways. Moreover, by its very construction, it gives rise to a simple and efficient numerical procedure for valuing options for which premature exercise may be optimal.
Whereas frictionless exchange markets provide a high degree of liquidity for financial assets, investments in real assets and productive capacity may be very costly to modify, and thus effectively irreversible in the short-run. This paper addresses the problem of an investor (individual or enterprise) who must allocate a limited resource to productive investments over time. Investment opportunities arrive in a random sequence and are irreversible in the short-run: thus investment decisions are made under uncertainty as to future opportunities (which may have to be foregone). The analysis demonstrates that a rational investor will demand a higher return on long-lasting opportunities than on those which are instantaneously reversible. The liquidity premium increases with the average duration of the non-liquid investments.