Equity valuation effects of decisions by corporations to shift assets to master limited partnerships (MLPs) are examined for the period 1982–1987. Positive average abnormal returns are found for (1) total conversions of corporations to MLPs (5.89%), (2) rollouts of subsets of assets by distribution of MLP equity claims to parent-firm shareholders (6.41%), and (3) rollouts of subsets of assets by public sale of MLP equity claims (2.41%). The positive effects are consistent with tax advantages, reduction in free cash flow, and information signaling. The positive effects for rollouts of subsets of assets are also consistent with reductions in information asymmetry and improvements in asset management.

We examine listing applications by firms to the London Stock Exchange between 1891 and 1911. The exchange rejected 82 (13.1%) of the 628 applicants to its main board. Accepted applicants were twice as likely to pay dividends (and to pay twice as much) and had longer firm lives than rejected applicants. Rejected applicants were more likely to file for liquidation than successful applicants. These results remain even after we control for the primary benefits of the listing itself: liquidity and future capital inflows. In this era, the London Stock Exchange could screen applicants for listing.