We propose a “debt view” to explain the dominant international role of the dollar. Within a simple capital-structure model with debt-currency choice, we show that the “dominant currency” is the one that (1) depreciates in global downturns over horizons of typical debt maturity and (2) has the steepest nominal yield curve. Empirically, we show the dollar fits this description better than other major currencies. The debt view can explain dollar-debt-issuance patterns over the past two decades. It also offers insights into the future of the dominance of the dollar in the aftermath of the COVID-19 crisis.

We build a model of endogenous, innovation-driven growth in which innovative firms have costly access to outside financing and hoard cash reserves to maintain financial flexibility. We show that financing frictions slow down Schumpeterian creative destruction by discouraging entry. As a result, financing frictions importantly affect the composition of growth, by reducing the contribution of entrants but spurring the contribution of incumbents. We investigate the net impact of these countervailing effects on the equilibrium growth rate and welfare.

An overlapping generations model with investors having heterogeneous investment horizons leads to a two-factor asset pricing model. The risk premiums are determined by the exposure to the market (myopic betas) and the future return on the efficient portfolio (non-myopic betas), which is identified nonparametrically from equilibrium. Non-myopic betas are priced in the cross-section of stocks, producing increasing and economically significant risk-return relation. In the model with funding constraints, low non-myopic beta stocks deliver higher risk-adjusted returns. Empirically, a betting against non-myopic beta portfolio generates superior performance relative to common factor models and is negatively correlated with the market betting against beta portfolio.

We study survival, price impact, and portfolio impact in heterogeneous economies. We show that, under the equilibrium risk-neutral measure, long-run price impact is in fact equivalent to survival, whereas long-run portfolio impact is equivalent to survival under an agent-specific, wealth-forward measure. These results allow us to show that price impact and portfolio impact are two independent concepts: a nonsurviving agent with no long-run price impact can have a significant long-run impact on other agents' optimal portfolios.

We study optimal securitization in the presence of an initial moral hazard. A financial intermediary creates and then sells to outside investors defaultable assets, whose default risk is determined by the unobservable costly effort exerted by the intermediary. We calculate the optimal contract for any given effort level and show the natural emergence of extreme punishment for defaults, under which investors stop paying the intermediary after the first default. With securitization contracts optimally designed, we find securitization improves the intermediary's screening incentives. Furthermore, the equilibrium effort level and the surplus converge to their first best levels with sufficiently many assets.