Knowledge that Transforms

We construct a novel panel of insider ownership for roughly 600 U.S. bank holding companies from 2003 to 2014 to test whether ownership structure shaped recapitalizations around the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). Insider ownership shows no discrete shift around the GFC. Using a difference-in-differences design with BHC and time fixed effects, we find that, after Q3 2008, banks with higher pre-crisis insider stakes issued significantly less common equity than otherwise similar peers. This effect is more pronounced where insiders enjoy greater private benefits of control, as proxied by insider lending and earnings opacity—consistent with dilution reluctance as the mechanism. The findings hold in propensity score matched regressions and when employing instrumental variables for insider ownership. These results reveal that ownership structure affects banks’ equity issuances in crises, underscoring the importance of accounting for ownership structure in bank stress tests and capital-regulation frameworks.

• How does product market competition affect corporate environmental footprint? • We examine restructuring of U.S. electric utilities, the number one emissions-intensive sector. • Cost-cutting actions are the key driver of changes in operations and emissions of electric plants. • Cost-cutting actions lower environmental footprint when plant technology allows greener production. • Without such technology, competition worsens environmental outcomes. Banks face pressure to integrate a wider range of risks into lending decisions, including both traditional product-market risks and the increasingly important environmental risk. Yet how these two types of risk interact remains unclear. We show that production technology is pivotal in shaping the impact of product-market competition on environmental risk. Focusing on the restructuring of the US electric utility industry, which introduced product-market competition into a highly polluting sector, we find that technological capacity is key. When technology enables cost-saving production decisions that also improve environmental performance, competition reduces environmental footprint. Otherwise, it exacerbates it. These findings suggest that lenders must assess not only individual risk factors of borrowers but also their potential interactions, with firms’ technological capacity playing a crucial role.

We assess issues related to borrower beliefs and mortgage performance using new individual panel data that simultaneously cover borrower expectations, forbearance status during the COVID-19 pandemic, and a wide array of demographic characteristics. First, we establish the determinants of borrower expectations, with local experiences and those of social networks playing important roles. We then show that households who, at origination, were optimistic about future house price appreciation or pessimistic about the possibility of future unemployment were more likely to enter forbearance in 2020. However, by early 2021, appreciation-optimistic borrowers who were in forbearance were likely to have cured or prepaid their loan, while those who expected unemployment were likely to still be in forbearance. We offer three channels by which expectations affect forbearance behavior: choices of initial loan terms, associations with actual future events, and factors related to belief formation that are also plausibly associated with forbearance. Our findings highlight the crucial role borrower expectations play in both leverage choices and mortgage performance.

We examine how banks manage carbon transition risk by selling loans given to polluting borrowers to less regulated shadow banks in securitization markets. Exploiting the election of Donald Trump as an exogenous shock that reduces carbon transition risk, we find that banks engage in regulatory arbitrage and use brown loan securitization to manage their exposure to carbon transition risk. Banks are more likely to securitize brown loans when carbon transition risk is high but keep these loans on their balance sheets when the risk is reduced. In addition, securitization enables banks to offer lower interest rates to polluting borrowers but does not affect the supply of green loans. Our findings are more pronounced among banks with low levels of capitalization, domestic banks, and banks that do not display green lending preferences. We discuss how securitization can weaken the effectiveness of bank climate policies.

Utilizing a unique and novel setting of disclosure mandate threshold under Regulation AB (Reg AB), we investigate the relationship between disclosure and trust in asset securitization. Post-Reg AB enactment, we observe a significant bunching of originators just below the disclosure threshold. Less trustworthy originators are more likely to adjust their portfolio sizes to remain below this threshold, particularly when loan originators and deal sponsors are unaffiliated, which are cases in which disclosure plays a greater role in reducing information asymmetry. Additionally, these originators are more likely to misrepresent loan quality. Our findings reveal a strong relationship between disclosure and trust—trustworthy originators disclose more and originate higher-quality loans, while less trustworthy originators disclose less and produce lower-quality loans.

This paper is based on a panel discussion at the international bank conference on Frontier Risks, Financial Innovation and Prudential Regulation of Banks in Gothenburg, Sweden, June 2–4, 2024. The panelists were Deborah Lucas, Jan Pieter Krahnen, and Magnus Olsson, with Ted Lindblom moderating. This paper contains the panel presentations, along with a unifying discussion by Paolo Fulghieri and Anjan Thakor. The main themes in the paper focus on how society should balance costs and benefits in designing the prudential regulation of banks. Optimal regulation should take into account how banks and markets interact, the dangers of both under-regulation that spawns excessive risk-taking and over-regulation that depresses value-enhancing innovation in financial services, the somewhat fragmented nature of national-sovereignty-constrained European banking and financial markets regulation relative to bank regulation in the US, and how prudential regulation can be improved by more explicitly dealing with interest rate risk.

Following the global financial crisis, banks lengthened the average maturity of their assets relative to that of their liabilities, principally by increasing their investments in mortgage-related assets. Whether such maturity transformation exposes banks to interest rate risk depends, in part, on the effectiveness of bank deposits as a hedge against interest rate shocks. In this paper we provide evidence that interest pass-through rates on deposits vary significantly with interest rates, which reduces the effectiveness of deposits as a hedge when interest rates increase. The dynamic nature of the deposit betas explains, in part, why the duration of bank equity varies with interest rates and why interest rate risk models need to account for how pass-through rates vary with interest rates.

Loan modifications can ease borrowers’ financial burdens and mitigate loan losses. However, the threat of future strategic renegotiation may cause lenders to tighten ex-ante credit provision. We evaluate this trade-off in a dynamic model of loan underwriting with frictional renegotiation and calibrate it using loan-level CRE data from banks and CMBS. We find that modification frictions can rationalize a number of empirical facts regarding how CRE loan underwriting and performance differ across lenders. Key to this result, high frictions to modifying CMBS loans reduce renegotiation, increase debt capacity, and cause high-leverage-demand borrowers to select into the CMBS market. Consequently, easing CMBS modification frictions reduces welfare by restricting the menu of LTVs available in the market.

We challenge the existing relationship lending literature on how banks manage their relationships with corporate borrowers during crises. We test theories of intertemporal smoothing during the closure period of the COVID-19 crisis when borrowers are in great need of relationship benefits. We find that relationship borrowers receive worse rather than more favorable loan contract terms than others during this period. These and other results provide novel evidence on the functioning of relationship lending during a pandemic and contrast existing evidence gleaned from banking and financial crises.