Knowledge that Transforms

Despite the use of VaR as a means to control risk, regulations that constrain VaR can have an effect opposite of their intent: to increase risk taking by firms that are doing poorly. Hence VaR constraint regulations can have a destabilizing effect on the financial system. A VaR constraint on the probability that future firm equity value will be less than a floor is a constraint on the probability-of-ruin when the floor is zero. The marginal price of risk with this constraint is coherent and also additive. For a wide class of distributions, the firm—when it is doing poorly—may pay a premium for a lottery that will increase the risk of its portfolio and the opposite when the firm is doing well.

We analyse the role of house prices in the monetary policy transmission mechanism in Norway, Sweden and the UK, using structural VARs. A solution is proposed to the endogeneity problem of identifying shocks to interest rates and house prices by using a combination of short-run and long-run (neutrality) restrictions. By allowing the interest rate and house prices to react simultaneously to news, we find the role of house prices in the monetary transmission mechanism to increase considerably. In particular, house prices react immediately and strongly to a monetary policy shock. Furthermore, the fall in house prices enhances the negative response in output and consumer price inflation that has traditionally been found in the conventional literature. Moreover, we find that the interest rate responds systematically to a change in house prices. However, the strength and timing of response varies between the countries, suggesting that housing may play a different role in the monetary policy setting.

This study shows how the misconception of the option value of deposit insurance by Merton (1977) and its later misuse by Keeley and Furlong (1990), among others, have led some literature supporting the adoption of binding non-risk-based capital requirements to derive incorrect conclusions about their efficacy. This study further shows that what Merton defines as the option value of deposit insurance is actually a component of a bank's limited liability option under a third-party deposit guarantee. As such, it is already included in the value of the bank's equity capital, and the flawed definition makes the Keeley–Furlong model internally incoherent.

We find evidence of a bank lending channel operating in the euro area via bank risk. Financial innovation and the wider use of new ways of transferring credit risk have tended to diminish the informational content of standard bank balance sheet indicators. We show that bank risk conditions, as perceived by financial market investors, need to be considered, together with the other indicators (i.e., size, liquidity and capitalization), traditionally used in the bank lending channel literature to assess banks’ ability and willingness to supply new loans. Using a large sample of European banks, we find that banks characterized by lower expected default frequency are able to offer a larger amount of credit and to better insulate their loan supply from monetary policy changes.

We survey the theories on why banks promise to pay par on demand and examine evidence on the conditions under which banks have promised to pay the par value of deposits and banknotes on demand when holding only fractional reserves. The theoretical literature is divided into four strands: liquidity provision; asymmetric information; legal restrictions; and a medium of exchange. We assume that it is not zero cost to make a promise to redeem a liability at par value on demand. If so, then the conditions in the theories that result in par redemption are possible explanations why banks promise to pay par on demand. If the explanation based on customers’ demand for liquidity is correct, payment of deposits at par will be promised when banks hold assets that are illiquid in the short run. If the asymmetric-information explanation based on the difficulty of valuing assets is correct, the marketability of banks’ assets determines whether banks promise to pay par. If the legal restrictions explanation of par redemption is correct, banks will not promise to pay par if they are not required to do so. If the transaction explanation is correct, banks will promise to pay par if the deposits are used in transactions. We examine the history of banking in several countries in different eras: fourth century Athens, medieval Italy, Tokugawa Japan, and free banking and money market mutual funds in the United States. Each of the theories explains some of the observed banking arrangements and none explains all of them.

This paper provides a theory of debt and hedging based on human capital. We distinguish human capital from physical capital in two ways: (1) human capital is inalienable and can exercise a one-sided option to leave the firm and (2) human capital is not perfectly replaceable. We show that a firm may reach the first best solution while issuing debt or equity to outsiders provided that either the insiders receive a senior claim or that the firm hedges. We then show that given asymmetric information concerning costs the only viable solution has the firm issuing debt to outsiders and hedging.

It is a widely held perception, although empirically contentious, that credit rationing is an important phenomenon in the UK small business sector. In response to this perception the UK government initiated a loan guarantee scheme (SFLGS) in 1981. In this paper we use a unique dataset comprised of small firms facing a very real, and binding, credit constraint, to question whether a corrective scheme such as the SFLGS has, in practice, alleviated such constraints by promoting access to debt finance for small credit constrained firms. The results broadly support the view that the SFLGS has fulfilled its primary objective.

This paper develops a new methodology for allowing researchers outside central banks to test the extent of payment system risk, and applies this methodology to an investigation of the impact that the introduction of real time gross settlement (RTGS) had on systemic risk in the Australian payments system. System-specific ratios are first developed to extract bilateral payment obligations from aggregate payments data in the Australian RTGS system. This synthetic data is then used to generate a deferred net settlement (DNS) system of similar dimensions to those the Australian system would have had, had RTGS not been introduced. Standard default simulation methodology is then applied to test the levels of systemic risk in both this system and the corresponding RTGS system to ascertain the degree to which the introduction of RTGS is likely to have reduced the level of risk. We find that while the level of systemic risk is likely to have been reduced in the Australian case, the size of the effect is small, a finding consistent with the results of payments system studies in other countries.