This paper investigates the effectiveness of macroprudential policy to contain the systemic risk of European banks between 2000 and 2017. We use a new database (MaPPED) collected by experts at the ECB and national central banks with narrative information on a broad range of instruments which are tracked over their life cycle. Using a dynamic panel framework at a monthly frequency we assess the impact of macroprudential tools and their design on the banks’ systemic risk both in the short and the long run. We furthermore decompose the systemic risk measure in an individual bank risk component and a systemic linkage component. This is of particular interest because microprudential policy focuses on the tail risk of an individual bank while macroprudential policy targets systemic risk by addressing the interlinkages and common exposures across banks. In general, the announcements of macroprudential policy actions have a downward effect on bank systemic risk. On average, all banks benefit from macroprudential tools in terms of their individual risk. We find that credit growth tools and exposure limits exhibit the most pronounced downward effect on the individual risk component. However, we find evidence for a risk-shifting effect which is more pronounced for retail-oriented banks. The effects are heterogeneous across banks with respect to the systemic linkage component. Liquidity tools and measures aimed at increasing the resilience of banks decrease the systemic linkage of banks. Moreover, these tools appear to be most effective for distressed banks. Our results have implications for the optimal design of macroprudential instruments

This paper aims to assess the level of systemic risk of China's financial system along with the main systemic risk contributors over the period from January 2010 to December 2016, a period spanning the deflation of China's property bubble, the banking liquidity crisis, and the stock market crash. To this end we divide the financial system into three sectors, namely: banks, insurance and brokerage industries, and real estate, applying the ΔCoVaR introduced by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016) as the measure for systemic risk. Our findings show that the systemic risk level of China's financial system reacted to the main systemic events covered by our sample period, reaching a major peak during the stock market crash of 2015. We further show, through the Wilcoxon signed rank test, that the systemic risk level of the financial system and sectors significantly increased after the main systemic events. In order to provide a formal systemic risk ranking of the financial sectors, we apply the bootstrap Kolmogorov-Smirnov test as developed by Abadie (2002), finding that the banking sector contributed the most, followed by real estate and subsequently insurance and brokerage industries. Finally, comparing banks systemic risk's determinants between China and the US, the reduced level of competition among banks in China is found to increase banks’ systemic risk, contrary to what is found in the US

Shadow insurance is a regulatory loophole exploited by certain insurance groups to increase risk exposure, potentially destabilising the financial system. In this paper, we evaluate the contribution of shadow insurance to systemic risk of the global financial sector using a sample of 215 international insurance entities covering the 2004–2017 period. We detect shadow insurance by examining every reinsurance agreement on the Schedule S filings. Using both ΔCoVaR and SRISK measures, we find that the practice of shadow insurance is a significant driver of global systemic risk

Abundant references to threats to financial stability likely posed by systemic risk-taking in the euro area investment fund industry in an era of persistent low interest rates have not been accompanied by robust supportive empirical evidence. This is the first study that assesses the effects of euro area conventional and unconventional monetary policy shocks on coherent systemic risk measures applied to the investment fund industry. This research finds evidence of systemic risk-taking notably in the forms of contagion and increased vulnerability. It seems more material following conventional than unconventional monetary policy shocks. There is heterogeneity in the results, as the investment focus is important for assessing investment funds’ contribution to systemic risk. Fund types most affected by significant systemic risk-taking are bond funds, mixed funds and real estate funds. Some evidence of heightened vulnerability in equity funds is also present. Increase in leverage is part of the risk-taking mechanism. A key policy implication is that persistently accommodative monetary policy geared toward preserving price stability may face an intertemporal trade-off with financial stability, making it necessary to coordinate monetary and macroprudential policies

Based on the twin sovereign-banking crisis nexus evolution of the Euro debt crisis era, we address the (volatility) mitigation of credit risk, measured by Credit Default Swap spreads (CDS) in both the banking and sovereign sectors within the Eurozone and the US/UK. Secondly, we highlight the volatility interconnectedness or the risk pass-through between sovereign-bank CDS markets with reference to the core vs. periphery EMU. Moreover, we identify the regime states of crises and recovery periods based on the bivariate CDS dynamic correlation series, categorized as the endogenous EMU sovereign risk coherence index. Finally, we investigate the “efficient” (parity) sovereign credit risk pricing during the post-crisis spillover period identified by the CDS and bond markets. We find heterogeneity between markets in pricing the sovereign risk in the regional tier (core-periphery EMU), emphasized by the absence of long-term association. Cointegration results are country-dependent as well as maturity-dependent. Empirical results reject the “no arbitrage” approach

One of the most dramatic trends in banking since the 1980s has been the secular movement away from core banking and interest generating activities towards enhanced reliance on non-interest-generating activities that focus largely on fees and trading profits. In this paper, we draw on a dataset covering nearly a million quarterly observations on more than 12,000 US banks and find no evidence that this shift in the bank business model harms bank profitability. To the contrary, a higher share of non-traditional bank income is associated with a higher profitability. The increase in profitability does not seem to come at the cost of substantially larger bank-level risk taking, at least not for large banks, which are the banks mostly involved in non-traditional bank business. There is also no conclusive evidence that a larger share of non-traditional income is associated with a larger contribution to systemic risk. The net benefits of non-traditional income increased in the 2000s, when both interest rates and bank margins started to decline. Estimation techniques that mitigate endogeneity concerns resulting from unobserved heterogeneity also show larger net benefits associated with greater bank reliance on generating non-traditional income