Knowledge that Transforms

We examine how changes in foreign labor regulations affect U.S. multinationals’ operating strategies. We show that firms with integrated operations in countries where labor regulations become tighter tend to establish arm’s-length relations with local business partners in that nation. The substitution between integrated and arm’s-length operations is stronger toward joint ventures than suppliers and weaker in the presence of financial constraints. Our findings are consistent with the idea that when firms find it harder to terminate their workers in integrated operations, they change to an operating model where it is easier to replace or discontinue business partners instead of employees.

We introduce a test to assess mutual funds’ “conditional” performance that is based on updated information and corrects data snooping bias. Our method, named the functional false discovery rate “plus” ( $ fFDR^+ $ ), incorporates fund characteristics in estimating fund performance free of data snooping bias. Simulations suggest that the $ fFDR^+ $ controls well the ratio of false discoveries and gains considerable power over prior methods that do not account for extra information. Portfolios of funds selected by the $ fFDR^+ $ outperform other tests not accounting for information updating, highlighting the importance of evaluating mutual funds from a conditional perspective.

Using a hand-collected sample of 18,269 equity analysts from 42 countries over the period of 2004 to 2019, we establish an intriguing negative association between a country’s institutional/economic development and its female share of equity analysts. We show that, in individualistic countries only, there is no gender gap in analyst forecast accuracy. We further show that female analysts are more skilled and more likely to drop out when underperforming in individualistic countries compared to peers in collectivistic countries. The evidence supports our hypothesis that the national cultural value of individualism encourages women to make career choices consistent with their general aversion to competition.

We examine whether the heterogeneity of expectations is associated with idiosyncratic variations in experience. Combining household survey data and administrative data from the Netherlands, we find that given market development, households’ expectations about house price changes vary with their individual experience. This association is related to the use of information conveyed by experience, which varies in terms of informativeness, recency, and household sophistication. Finally, we find that individual experience also explains how far house price expectations deviate from realized house prices and that it may affect household behavior. Our findings elucidate the role that individual experience plays in expectation formation.

We investigate whether bank loan financing from 1994 to 2018 conveys valuable private information using a sample of over 10,000 bank loan announcements identified from 8-K filings. We show that the positive announcement effect is persistent and closely related to the information revealed in loan characteristics: The effect is stronger when deals have higher materiality, more favorable pricing, larger lead bank shares, and higher syndicate concentration. The effect is also stronger when lenders have higher credit quality and when credit market conditions are worse. The insignificant wealth effect documented in several early studies is potentially driven by small sample size.

We show that attention constraints on decision-makers create barriers to financial inclusion. Using administrative data on retail loan-screening processes, we find that attention-constrained loan officers exert less effort reviewing applicants of lower socioeconomic status (SES) and reject them more frequently. More importantly, when externally imposed increases in loan officers’ workloads tighten attention constraints, loan officers are even more prone to quickly reject low-SES applicants but quickly accept very high-SES applicants without careful review. Such selective attention allocation further widens the approval rate gap between high- and low-SES applicants—a unique prediction of this attention-based mechanism.

We identify a new mechanism of opportunistic insider trading linked to attention-driven mispricing. Insiders are more likely to sell their company’s stock during periods of heightened retail attention and more inclined to buy when attention diminishes. The results are particularly pronounced for lottery-type stocks and firms with substantial retail ownership. We demonstrate that our findings—which relate to indicators of mispricing, retail order imbalances, and Robinhood herding episodes—extend to seasoned equity issuances and cannot be solely explained by firm fundamentals. Attention-based insider trading is less likely to result in SEC enforcement actions and persists across different regulatory regimes.

This paper studies the impact of limited attention on investment decisions by venture capitalists (VCs). I find that startups funded by VCs during VCs’ IPO engagements tend to underperform: These startups are 9% less likely to go public or become acquired and have lower exit multiples. The effects of VCs’ busyness cluster around the active phase of the IPO engagement and are more pronounced in cases of higher workload intensity or higher information asymmetry. Overall, this performance gap induced by attention constraints provides new evidence on VCs’ ability to identify investment opportunities at the initial screening stage.

We demonstrate that investment income taxes incentivize capital allocation to the ecofriendly green sector away from the non-ecofriendly brown sector in a stylized economy. This tax reduces the arrival intensity of climate disasters, delivers the socially optimal allocation, and can be jointly implemented with a carbon tax, expanding policymakers’ toolkit to reduce climate disasters. Extending the model with heterogeneous investors, we show that investment income taxes can obtain support from a political majority and thereby relax political constraints faced by a carbon tax alone.

We highlight an important but overlooked characteristic of financial fragility: “Fragile” stocks command higher liquidity. This reduces their sensitivity to corporate actions with price impact and affects the firms’ incentives to engage in such actions. We show that fragile firms have lower share repurchases, issue more equity, and invest more. We establish causality by relating changes in corporate actions to exogenous changes in fragility induced by mergers of asset managers. Our results suggest that financial fragility has direct but unexpected real implications for corporate actions.