Knowledge that Transforms

There is a large latent workforce in developing countries that consists of hundreds of millions of women who prefer to have paid work and yet are out of the labor force. Often, available job opportunities are incompatible with traditional gender roles that encourage women to stay at home. In a randomized experiment with 1,670 households, we partner with a jobs platform to offer short-term data work to women who are out of the labor force. We find three main results. First, flexible work-from-home jobs are highly effective at bringing women into paid work. Job flexibility more than triples take-up from 15% for an office job to 48% for a job that women can do from home while multitasking with childcare. Second, these jobs can act as a stepping stone to less flexible work. Trying paid work from home increases take-up of less flexible jobs two to three months later among women without previous work experience. “Gateway jobs” are especially important for women from more traditional households: their labor supply is more likely to be marginal to flexibility, and in turn, work experience shifts their attitudes to become less traditional. Third, from the labor demand side, remote work comes with trade-offs in worker performance. Working from the office increases accuracy by 3% and speed by 18%. However, these performance drawbacks of work-from-home arrangements may be outweighed by the increase in available workers.

We measure which economic topics are top of mind using quarterly German household and firm panels from 2020 to 2024, a period that spans the post-pandemic inflation surge and the subsequent disinflation. With these data, we study potential determinants and consequences of having inflation top of mind. In line with goal-directed attention, the likelihood that inflation is top of mind rises with proxies for its true payoff relevance. At the same time, prior experiences predict whether respondents have inflation and energy prices top of mind conditional on a large set of controls for payoff relevance, and this relationship strengthens when the environment becomes more inflationary. Having inflation top of mind predicts stronger increases in information acquisition and inflation expectations over the shock period. At odds with goal-optimality, having inflation top of mind is associated with expectations further away from multiple ex-ante benchmarks. Finally, both key determinants of having inflation top of mind—payoff relevance and prior experiences—are associated with stronger shifts of expectations away from these benchmarks over the shock period.

This paper provides the first comprehensive global evidence on people’s fairness and efficiency preferences, beliefs about the sources of inequality and the efficiency cost of redistribution, and policy attitudes toward redistribution. Using a globally harmonized consequential experiment with more than 65,000 individuals across 60 countries, we show that the source of inequality plays a substantially larger role for inequality acceptance than the efficiency cost of redistribution. At the global level, implemented inequality increases by 85 percent when inequality is caused by merit rather than luck, compared to a 14 percent increase when redistribution entails a 50 percent efficiency cost. We document substantial heterogeneity in fairness views and beliefs both within and across societies. The meritocratic fairness view is most prominent in many richer Western societies, while libertarian and egalitarian fairness views are widespread in many other parts of the world. Globally, people are more likely to believe that inequality reflects luck rather than merit, while beliefs in large efficiency costs of redistribution are relatively weak. Fairness preferences and beliefs are strongly associated with redistribution attitudes and actual redistribution through taxes and transfers across countries. Our findings illustrate how the interaction between fairness views and beliefs may shape redistribution across societies, highlighting the importance of jointly understanding preferences and beliefs in the political economy of redistribution.

We study the history and geography of wealth accumulation in the United States using newly collected historical property tax records from the early 1800s onward. These records come from the administration of the General Property Tax–a tax that aspired to cover all types of property. We construct wealth series at the state, county, and national levels. At the state level, we use annual assessed values of wealth from state-level reports drawn from multiple sources. Because assessed values may differ from market values, we also require assessment ratios, defined as the ratio of assessed to market wealth. We obtain state-level assessment ratios from decadal U.S. Census wealth data (drawn from various Census reports, including those on “Wealth, Debt, and Taxation”), in which the Census carried out detailed valuation work, complemented with information on changes in assessment practices from the state reports, to build higher-frequency series of assessment ratios. The result is long-run annual wealth series for states from 1850 (or earlier, depending on the state) to 1935. We obtain national wealth series by aggregating these state series. At the county level, we use assessed values (or market values where available) from the U.S. Census wealth data for each decade, and apply either state-level or county-level assessment ratios, where available, to obtain market values of wealth for each decade from 1850 to 1930. We use these data to show, first, that the United States experienced extraordinary wealth accumulation after the Civil War and until the Great Depression. Second, spatial inequality in the United States has been large and highly persistent since the mid-1800s. We also examine the determinants of long-term wealth growth and find, among other results, that counties with a higher share of enslaved property before the Civil War or with higher wealth inequality experienced lower subsequent long-run wealth growth.

We study the causal impacts of income on a rich array of employment outcomes, leveraging an experiment in which 1,000 low-income individuals were randomized into receiving $1,000 per month unconditionally for three years, with a control group of 2,000 participants receiving $50/month. We gather detailed survey data, administrative records, and data from a mobile phone app. The transfer caused total individual income excluding the transfers to fall by about $1,900/year relative to the control group and a 4.2 percentage point decrease in labor market participation. Participants reduced their work hours as a result of the transfers by 1-2 hours/week and participants’ partners reduced their work hours by a comparable amount. Among other categories of time use, the greatest increase generated by the transfer was in time spent on leisure. Despite asking detailed questions about amenities, we find no impact on quality of employment, and our confidence intervals can rule out even small improvements. Treated participants broadly increase expenditures, led by spending on non-durable goods and services, with smaller increases in spending on durable goods and human capital. We observe no significant effects on degree attainment, though the magnitudes of the estimated effects generally appear larger among younger participants. Measures of subjective well-being are higher among treated participants in the first year of the transfers but then revert to control group levels. Overall, our results suggest a moderate labor supply effect that does not appear offset by other productive activities.

We study worker noncompete clauses in a large field experiment with two finance firms. Across ~14,000 job offers to freelance recruiters on short-term contracts, we randomize wages and the presence, salience, and duration of noncompetes (all contracts also included a nondisclosure agreement). Removing a noncompete increases mobility between competing employers by 36–52% and raises workers’ total earnings from the two firms by 12–17%. We find no evidence—rejecting even small effects—that removing noncompetes generates secret leakage. We also find no evidence that workers choose noncompete jobs for higher pay. Many workers appear unaware of noncompetes before firms’ post-employment communication. The results align with a model of inattention and uncertainty about enforcement.

This paper constructs the first global dataset on inter-sectoral capital service expenditures. I use this data to disaggregate capital services and intermediate inputs in a dynamic multi-sector trade model. Steady state allocations and responses to shocks are determined by a capital-augmented global input-output matrix. Two properties of the measured network deliver larger long-run consumption gains from globalization than existing estimates, as well as larger gains in more capital-intensive countries. First, more trade-exposed sectors supply capital to more consumption-influential producers. Second, heterogeneity in the network reallocates sectoral expenditures towards producers with larger declines in capital rental prices. These reallocations raise capital incomes and lower consumption price indices.

Information often spreads and influences beliefs regardless of its reliability. We show that this occurs in part because indicators of reliability tend to be lost in the process of word-of-mouth transmission. We conduct controlled experiments where participants listen to economic forecasts and pass them on through voice messages. Other participants listen either to original or transmitted audio recordings and report incentivized beliefs. Across various transmitter incentive schemes, a claim’s reliability is lost in transmission much more than the claim itself. Reliable and unreliable information, once filtered through transmission, impact listener beliefs similarly. Mechanism experiments show that reliability is lost not because it is perceived as less relevant or harder to transmit, but because it is less likely to come to mind during transmission. Evidence from our experiments, a large corpus of everyday conversations, and economic TV news shows that contextual cues can bring reliability to mind and induce its transmission, but situations in which people share information seldom contain such cues.

Investors’ return expectations are pivotal in stock markets, but the reasoning behind these expectations is not well understood. This paper explores economic agents’ mental models of what drives returns. We survey the general population, retail investors, financial professionals, and academic experts to investigate how they forecast and explain future returns in scenarios with stale news about future company earnings. We find that investors strongly disagree in their forecasts and reasoning. Most academic experts view markets as efficient. By contrast, most households express a perspective we call “expected earnings reasoning”: they directly equate higher expected earnings with higher expected returns. Professionals are split between market efficiency, mispricing, and expected earnings reasoning. In detailed experiments, we dissect why households adopt expected earnings reasoning. We show that it arises from inattention to how stock-price changes affect investor costs — that is, how much investors must pay to acquire a claim to future cash flows — because the typical format and context of investment problems obscure these cost implications. Our results help connect a series of previously documented anomalies in expectation and trading data and highlight the importance of selective attention and context in shaping reasoning and belief formation.

Women continue to be underrepresented in corporate leadership positions. This article studies the role of social connections in women’s career advancement. We investigate whether access to a larger share of female peers in business school affects the gender gap in senior managerial positions. Merging administrative data from a top 10 U.S. business school with public LinkedIn profiles, we first document that female MBAs are 24% less likely than male MBAs to enter senior management within 15 years of graduation. Next we use the exogenous assignment of students into sections to show that a larger proportion of female MBA section peers increases the likelihood of entering senior management for women but not for men. This effect is driven by female-friendly firms, such as those with more generous maternity leave policies and greater work-schedule flexibility. A larger proportion of female MBA peers induces women to transition to these firms where they attain senior management roles. A survey of female MBA alumnae reveals three key mechanisms: (i) information sharing, especially related to gender-specific advice, (ii) higher ambitions and self-confidence, and (iii) increasing support from male MBA peers. These findings highlight the role of social connections in reducing the gender gap in senior management positions.