Abstract We consider a repeated interaction between a long-run player and a sequence of short-run players, in which the long-run player may either be rational or may be a mechanical type who plays the same (possibly mixed) action in every stage game. We depart from the classical model in assuming that the short-run players make inferences by analogical reasoning, meaning that they correctly identify the average strategy of each type of long-run player, but do not recognize how this play varies across histories. Concentrating on 2 × 2 games, we provide a characterization of equilibrium payoffs, establishing a payoff bound for the rational long-run player that can be strictly larger than the familiar “Stackelberg” bound. We also provide a characterization of equilibrium behavior, showing that play begins with either a reputation-building or a reputation-spending stage (depending on parameters), followed by a reputation-manipulation stage.

This paper examines the patterns of postentry employment growth and failure for over 200,000 plants that entered the U. S. manufacturing sector in the 1967–1977 period. The postentry patterns of growth and failure vary significantly with observable employer characteristics. Plant failure rates decline with size and age as do the growth rates of nonfailing plants. The expected growth rate of a plant, which depends on the net effect of these two forces, declines with size for plants owned by single-plant firms but increases with size for plants owned by multiplant firms.