This paper investigates how competition for scarce corporate resources impacts innovation incentives within multidivisional firms and, consequently, shapes firms’ preferences for fostering or restricting intra-firm competition. In our model, divisions become privately informed about the potential value of new investment opportunities generated through their innovation initiatives. We demonstrate that intra-firm competition unambiguously reduces divisions’ ex ante innovation incentives. However, it benefits ex post resource allocation by enabling the firm to (i) select the most promising project and (ii) limit the rents divisions earn from their private information. Consequently, a firm’s preference to limit or encourage interdivisional competition hinges on balancing ex post allocative efficiency, which favors increased intra-firm competition, against ex ante innovation incentives, which favor reduced competition. Our analysis identifies plausible conditions under which each organizational design—competitive or exclusive innovation—emerges as the optimal choice

Empirical studies on the relationship between shareholder litigation and corporate disclosure obtain mixed results. We develop an economic model to capture the endogeneity between disclosure and litigation. Equilibrium disclosure is determined by two countervailing effects of litigation, a deterrence effect and an insurance effect. We derive four key results. (i) Decreasing litigation risk leads to less disclosure of very bad news, due to a weakening of the deterrence effect, but to more disclosure of weakly bad news, due to a weakening of the insurance effect. (ii) Given a sufficiently large information asymmetry, litigation risk dampens (boosts) overall disclosure of bad news for low (high) litigation risk firms. (iii) Capital markets respond more to the disclosure of bad news than of good news if the deterrence effect is strong, which arises if both insiders’ penalties and litigation risk are high. (iv) In an extension, we highlight real effects of litigation on corporate innovation and establish that innovation first decreases and then increases (strictly decreases) with litigation risk if insiders’ penalties are small (large). We reconcile our findings with results from a large set of U.S.-based empirical studies and make several novel predictions

This paper investigates the effects of a regulatory change in China of the presentation format for research and development (R&D) expense, which mandates public firms to explicitly present R&D expense on their income statements. We predict that this regulation will impact nonstate-owned enterprises (non-SOEs), which care about stock market valuation, more than state-owned enterprises (SOEs). We find that non-SOEs report significantly higher R&D expense post regulation. Furthermore, the R&D increase strengthens for firms facing higher peer pressure to pursue R&D and high-tech firms and weakens for firms with higher institutional investment. The positive valuation implication of R&D diminishes post regulation, suggesting that investors discount the increase in R&D expense. An additional analysis shows that firms’ innovation efficiency decreases post regulation

We identify a novel force behind the benefit of misaligned preferences in corporate governance. Our model entails a CEO who encounters a project and, after gathering information, decides whether to seek the approval of a corporate board. The CEO may be able to choose the properties of the collected information—this may happen if the project is “novel,” i.e., explores a new technology, business concept, or market and directors are less knowledgeable about it. We find that only sufficiently conservative and expansion-cautious directors can discipline the CEO’s empire-building tendency and opportunistic information collection. Such directors, however, underinvest in projects that are not novel. The board that maximizes firm value is either conservative or neutral (has interests aligned with the shareholders) and always overinvests in innovations. Boards with greater expertise are more likely to be conservative, but their bias is less severe. The board’s commitment power and bias are substitutes

We examine the value relevance of accounting-driven losses that result from the immediate expensing of firms’ internally generated intangible investments versus losses occurring irrespective of intangible investments. Contrary to the long-held view that losses are less relevant than profits for valuation, we find that once the accounting bias of intangibles-expensing is undone, earnings of firms reporting intangibles-driven losses are as informative as earnings of profitable firms. Furthermore, contrary to the view that persistent losses decrease earnings relevance, our evidence shows no decrease in the relevance of earnings for firms reporting persistent intangibles-driven losses. We also find that firms reporting intangibles-driven losses subsequently outperform other loss firms and even profitable firms in value creation from investments in technological innovation and human capital. Our evidence further shows that firms reporting intangibles-driven losses have stronger future performance than other firms. Taken together, the results of this study demonstrate the fundamental differences between losses driven by the immediate expensing of internally generated intangible investments and losses reflecting genuine business performance shortfalls. Standard accounting performance measures, however, do not properly reflect these operational differences and their implications