Knowledge that Transforms

[In a model of takeovers under asymmetric information, we identify a separating equilibrium in which the value of the bidder firm is revealed by the mix of cash and securities used as payment for the target. The model predicts that the revealed bidder value is monotonically increasing and convex in the fraction of the total offer that consists of cash. We examine the model restrictions using data from Canada, where mixed offers are both relatively frequent and free of the confounding tax-related options characterizing mixed offers in the United States. We find that the average announcement-month bidder abnormal return in mixed offers is large and significant. However, maximum likelihood estimates of parameters in both linear and nonlinear cross-sectional regressions fail to support the model predictions.]

[We test whether banks' investment and financing policies can be explained by tax status. We document changes in bank holdings of municipal bonds in response to changes in tax rules relating to deductibility of interest expense. We also document an association between banks' marginal tax rates and their investment and financing decisions, which is consistent with the existence of tax clienteles. However, banks do not sort themselves perfectly into investment and financing clienteles because of adjustment costs. We posit specific types of transaction-cost impediments to tax planning, and document that banks apparently trade off these costs against tax-planning benefits.]

[A binomial approximation to a diffusion is defined as "computationally simple" if the number of nodes grows at most linearly in the number of time intervals. It is shown how to construct computationally simple binomial processes that converge weakly to commonly employed diffusions in financial models. The convergence of the sequence of bond and European option prices from these processes to the corresponding values in the diffusion limit is also demonstrated. Numerical examples from the constant elasticity of variance stock price and the Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross (1985) discount bond price are provided.]

[Event studies often include cross-sectional regressions of announcement effects on exogenous variables. If the event is voluntary and investors are rational, then standard OLS and GLS estimators are inconsistent. Consistent ML estimators are constructed for a cross-sectional model of horizontal mergers relating announcement effects to exogenous characteristics of firms and industries. The OLS and ML estimates differ dramatically for bidders but not for targets. The evidence suggests that managers of bidders, but not targets, have valuable private information about the potential synergies from proposed mergers.]

[This study investigates experimental financial markets in which firms possess more information than do potential investors. Firms were given opportunities to undertake positive net present value projects which they could either forgo or finance by selling equity. Auctions were conducted among the investors for the right to finance the projects. When the theoretical equilibrium was unique, theory predicted well. When theory permitted pooling, separation, and semiseparation, only the more efficient pooling equilibrium was observed. The domination of the pooling equilibrium was robust to different experimental experiences by participants. When available, signals were used by good firms to distinguish themselves from bad.]

[New evidence is provided on the determinants of stock-return variances. First, when the Tokyo Stock Exchange is open on Saturday, the weekend variance increases; weekly variance is unaffected, however, despite an increase in weekly volume. Second, the listing of U.S. stocks in Tokyo substantially increases the number of trading hours, but Tokyo volume is negligible for these U.S. stocks and their 24-hour variance is unaffected. The overall results are consistent with the predictions of private-information-based rational trading models, but inconsistent with both the irrational trading noise and public-information hypotheses.]

[We investigate product-market competition when managers maximize shareholder value rather than their expected discounted value of profits. If shareholders are imperfectly informed about future profitability, shareholder-value maximization can lead to either more or less aggressive product-market strategies. Lower rivals' profits lead investors to believe that the firm's costs are low relative to those of its rivals and that the industry's prospects are poor. If the former (latter) inference dominates, each firm tries to lower (raise) its rivals' profits to increase its own stock price. We also consider implications for corporate financial structure.]

[The role of the medium of exchange in competition among bidders and its effect on returns to stockholders in corporate takeovers are investigated. Consistent with recent empirical evidence, our model shows that stockholders of both acquiring and target firms obtain higher returns when a takeover is financed with cash rather than equity, and that returns to target shareholders increase with competition. The model predicts that the fraction of synergy captured by the target decreases with the level of synergy. Finally, it is shown that, as competition increases, the cash component of the offer as well as the proportion of cash offered increases.]