Abstract I argue that subsidiaries of foreign multinational enterprises (MNEs) enjoy an advantage of foreignness in innovation, that is, they are more innovative than domestic firms. To explain this, I present the subsidy and the incentive arguments. The subsidy argument proposes that subsidiaries are subsidized in their innovation effort by the MNE, which results in subsidiaries having more innovations than domestic firms, because they belong to a foreign MNE. The incentive argument posits that subsidiaries are subject to two sets of unique and converging pressures, one at the MNE level in the corporate factor market and another at the host country level in the consumer market. These pressures drive subsidiaries to become more successful at transforming their research and development investments into innovations. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Abstract Knowledge is too problematic a concept to make the task of building a dynamic knowledge‐based theory of the firm easy. We must also distinguish the theory from the resource‐based and evolutionary views. The paper begins with a multitype epistemology which admits both the pre‐ and subconscious modes of human knowing and, reframing the concept of the cognizing individual, the collective knowledge of social groups. While both Nelson and Winter, and Nonaka and Takeuchi, successfully sketch theories of the dynamic interactions of these types of organizational knowledge, neither indicates how they are to be contained. Callon and Latour suggest knowledge itself is dynamic and contained within actor networks, so moving us from knowledge as a resource toward knowledge as a process. To simplify this approach, we revisit sociotechnical systems theory, adopt three heuristics from the social constructionist literature, and make a distinction between the systemic and component attributes of the actor network. The result is a very different mode of theorizing, less an objective statement about the nature of firms ‘out there’ than a tool to help managers discover their place in the firm as a dynamic knowledge‐based activity system.

Abstract Total Quality Management (TQM) has become, according to one source, ‘as pervasive a part of business thinking as quarterly financial results,’ and yet TQM's role as a strategic resource remains virtually unexamined in strategic management research. Drawing on the resource approach and other theoretical perspectives, this article examines TQM as a potential source of sustainable competitive advantage, reviews existing empirical evidence, and reports findings from a new empirical study of TQM's performance consequences. The findings suggest that most features generally associated with TQM—such as quality training, process improvement, and benchmarking—do not generally produce advantage, but that certain tacit, behavioral, imperfectly imitable features—such as open culture, employee empowerment, and executive commitment—can produce advantage. The author concludes that these tacit resources, and not TQM tools and techniques, drive TQM success, and that organizations that acquire them can outperform competitors with or without the accompanying TQM ideology.

Abstract Strategic managers have been found to use sophisticated tactics to implement strategic plans, but seem to limit their effectiveness by applying them indiscriminately. A contingency framework that uses situational constraints, such as the manager's freedom to act and need for consultation, is developed to select among tactics preferred by practitioners. The framework was tested using 50 episodes of strategic planning. There was a 94 percent success rate when the implementation tactic recommended by the framework was used, and a 29 percent success rate when another (non‐recommended) tactic was applied, suggesting that following the framework's prescriptions may improve the success rate for strategic plan implementation. The implications this research for practicing managers are discussed.

Abstract Do CEOs matter more in some countries than in others? Based on a theoretical consideration of three fundamental national‐level institutions—national values, prevailing firm ownership structures, and board governance arrangements—we argue that CEOs in different countries face systematically different degrees of constraint on their latitudes of action, and hence they differ in how much effect they have on firm performance. To test these ideas, we apply a variance components analysis methodology to 15‐year matched samples of 100 U.S. firms, 100 German firms, and 100 Japanese firms. Results provide strong, robust evidence that the effect of CEOs on firm performance—for good and for ill—is substantially greater in U.S. firms than in German and Japanese firms. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Abstract This paper investigates the contingent value of interorganizational relationships at the time of a young firm's initial public offering (IPO). We compare the signaling value to young firms of having ties with two types of interorganizational partnerships: endorsement relationships such as those with venture capital firms and investment banks, and strategic alliance partnerships. We propose that, under different equity market conditions, potential investors in an issuing firm attend to different types of uncertainty; attention to these different types of uncertainty affects investors' perceptions of the relative value of a young firm's different kinds of endorsements and partnerships and, hence, IPO success. Results from a sample of young biotechnology firms show that ties to prominent venture capital firms are particularly beneficial to IPO success during cold markets, while ties to prominent investment banks are particularly beneficial to IPO success during hot markets; a firm's strategic alliances with major pharmaceutical/health care firms did not have such contingent effects. Implications for understanding the contingent value of interorganizational ties are discussed. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Abstract We examine how ownership configuration affects the determination of CEO pay raises. Based on a sample of 188 firms over a 5‐year period, it was found that pay raises were based on distinctly different factors, depending on the ownership profile of the firm. In management‐controlled firms—where no single major owner exists—results suggest an overarching pay philosophy: maximize CEO pay, subject to demonstration of face legitimacy of that pay. In externally‐controlled firms—where a major (nonmanager) owner exists—results suggest a very different philosophy: minimize CEO pay, subject to the ability to attract/retain a satisfactory CEO.