Knowledge that Transforms

Abstract This paper explores the proposition that the divergence of interest between managers and stockholders has implications for corporate strategy and firm profitability. Stockholders prefer strategies which maximize their wealth. Managers prefer strategies which maximize their utility. It is theorized that in research‐intensive industries, when stockholders dominate, innovation strategies are favored. When managers dominate, diversification strategies are favored. In addition, innovation is argued to be associated with greater firm profitability than diversification. This theory is tested on 94 Fortune 500 firms drawn from research‐intensive industries. The results largely confirm theoretical expectations.

Abstract A corporate reputation is a set of attributes ascribed to a firm, inferred from the firm's past actions. While the intuition behind reputation‐building is hardly new, recent research has formalized the concept. We review this research and then, using examples, illustrate some of the strategic behavioral implications of these formal models.

Abstract This paper compares the perspectives of transaction costs and strategic behavior in explaining the motivation to joint venture. In addition, a theory of joint ventures as an instrument of organizational learning is proposed and developed. Existing studies of joint ventures are examined in light of these theories. Data on the sectoral distribution and stability of joint ventures are presented.

Abstract A sample of 218 mergers made by randomly selected bidders during 1962 to 1983 is classified by changes in the product market opportunities of the bidder firms. Multivariate regression analysis shows that acquisitions which permit the bidder access to new but related markets create the most value with the least variance.

Abstract Innovation may be externally induced; that is, an external threat or challenge such as the accident at the Three Mile Island (TMl) nuclear power plant sets the stage for outside parties such as the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to propose that new practices be adopted. Managers then must make choices about how their organizations will respond. This study shows how prior performance can affect organizational responses and how these responses in turn can affect subsequent performance. Vicious cycles are shown to exist in which poorly performing organizations respond with rule‐bound behavior, a response which only perpetuates their poor performance. Better‐performing organizations, on the other hand, retain their autonomy, a response which reinforces their strong performance.

Abstract In parallel with a theoretical acceptance of the importance of the laws of competition to formulate strategy, the realization is growing that cooperative behavior among firms is at the root of many success stories in today's management. This situation calls for an effort to develop a theoretical framework to study both aspects of firm behavior (cooperative and competitive) as compatible, complementary aspects of a unique reality. Indeed, the cooperative relationships of a firm can be the source of its competitive strength. This paper develops the concept of strategic network, as a tool to understand those cooperative relationships and their role in the strategy of the firm. There are three main tasks of the paper: first, to show that strategic networks are but a ‘mode of organization’; second, to study the economic conditions of existence of a network; finally, to analyze the conditions of existence of a network from the point of view of its internal consistency. In a final section some of the most obvious strategic implications of the framework are outlined.