To commemorate the 100th anniversary of The Accounting Review, I was asked to provide my forecast of the future of tax research in accounting. In sum, my opinion is that the future is bright and full of opportunities for tax scholars. Governments are altering corporate income tax laws in fundamental ways and questions about how these changes affect investment, investment location, income shifting, corporate capital structure, and financial reporting will be very important aspects to study. New and newly used taxes, such as tariffs and endowment taxes, will allow for novel paths of inquiry and accountants should contribute. The use of AI by tax authorities and taxpayers could alter both tax enforcement and tax planning. The increasing access to administrative data, the use of field experiments and field studies, and employing survey methods to obtain data should expand the settings available to study and improve identification.

There are past and proposed tax law changes that contain provisions that affect financial reporting. These include calls for book-tax conformity, proposals to increase the links between financial accounting and taxable incomes, and actions by Congress that make direct alterations to U.S. GAAP. I submit that these tax law changes potentially threaten financial reporting quality. I discuss my concerns about why such provisions have not attracted attention from accountants to the extent they should and make a case for more awareness and more research going forward.

I investigate the role of book-tax differences in indicating the persistence of earnings, accruals, and cash flows for one-period-ahead earnings. I also examine whether the level of book-tax differences influences investors' assessments of future earnings persistence. I find that firm-years with large book-tax differences have earnings that are less persistent than firm-years with small book-tax differences. Further, the evidence is consistent with investors interpreting large positive book-tax differences (book income greater than taxable income) as a “red flag” and reducing their expectation of future earnings persistence for these firm-years. I then investigate potential sources of the lower persistence for firm-years with large book-tax differences. I find that special items contribute in part to the results but that firm-years with large booktax differences continue to have lower persistence in earnings after controlling for the effect of the special items.

We analyze survey responses from nearly 600 corporate tax executives to investigate firms' incentives and disincentives for tax planning. While many researchers hypothesize that reputational concerns affect the degree to which managers engage in tax planning, this hypothesis is difficult to test with archival data. Our survey allows us to investigate reputational influences and, indeed, we find that reputational concerns are important—69 percent of executives rate reputation as important and the factor ranks second in order of importance among all factors explaining why firms do not adopt a potential tax planning strategy. We also find that financial accounting incentives play a role. For example, 84 percent of publicly traded firms respond that top management at their company cares at least as much about the GAAP ETR as they do about cash taxes paid and 57 percent of public firms say that increasing earnings per share is an important outcome from a tax planning strategy. JEL Classifications: D83; G31, M41. Data Availability: Survey responses are confidential. Other data are available from public sources identified in the paper.

We analyze a sample of firms accused of fraudulently overstating their earnings and examine the extent, if any, to which they paid additional income taxes on the allegedly fraudulent earnings. Based on restatements of current tax expense adjusted for the tax benefits of stock options, the evidence indicates that many firms included the overstated financial accounting income on their tax returns, thus overpaying their taxes in the process of inflating their accounting earnings. We estimate that the median firm sacrificed eight cents in additional income taxes per dollar of inflated pretax earnings. In aggregate, we estimate that the firms in our sample paid $320 million in taxes on overstated earnings of about $3.36 billion. These results indicate how far managers of firms are willing to go when allegedly inflating earnings.

We hypothesize that prior evidence of target shareholder capital gains tax liabilities affecting acquisition features is driven by the tax liabilities of the target firm CEO. To test this, we estimate CEOs' capital gains tax liabilities for a large sample of acquisitions and examine the effects of such liabilities on acquisition outcomes. Results indicate that the previously documented positive relations between shareholder-level capital gains tax rates and (1) the likelihood of a nontaxable acquisition (Ayers, Lefanowicz, and Robinson 2004), and (2) acquisition premiums (Ayers, Lefanowicz, and Robinson 2003) are largely driven by CEO tax effects. We also find evidence consistent with (1) CEOs' tax incentives leading to potential agency conflicts under certain conditions, and (2) acquisition structure or premium being adjusted in response to CEOs' taxes depending on the alternatives available to the acquirer. Our study contributes to our understanding of what and whose taxes affect acquisition structure and value.

We investigate the relation between tax avoidance and tax uncertainty, where tax uncertainty is the amount of unrecognized tax benefits recorded over the same time period as the tax avoidance. On average, we find that tax avoiders, i.e., firms with relatively low cash effective tax rates, bear significantly greater tax uncertainty than firms that have higher cash effective tax rates. We find that the relation between tax avoidance and tax uncertainty is stronger for firms with frequent patent filings and tax haven subsidiaries, proxies for intangible-related transfer pricing strategies. The findings have implications for several puzzling results in the literature.

This study investigates whether individual top executives have incremental effects on their firms’ tax avoidance that cannot be explained by characteristics of the firm. To identify executive effects on firms’ effective tax rates, we construct a data set that tracks the movement of 908 executives across firms over time. Results indicate that individual executives play a significant role in determining the level of tax avoidance that firms undertake. The economic magnitude of the executive effects on tax avoidance is large. Moving between the top and bottom quartiles of executives results in approximately an 11 percent swing in GAAP effective tax rates; thus, executive effects appear to be an important determinant in firms’ tax avoidance.

We develop and describe a new measure of long-run corporate tax avoidance that is based on the ability to pay a low amount of cash taxes per dollar of pre-tax earnings over long time periods. We label this measure the “long-run cash effective tax rate.” We use the long-run cash effective tax rate to examine (1) the extent to which some firms are able to avoid taxes over periods as long as ten years, and (2) how predictive one-year tax rates are for long-run tax avoidance. In our sample of 2,077 firms, we find there is considerable cross-sectional variation in tax avoidance. For example, approximately one-fourth of our sample firms are able to maintain long-run cash effective tax rates below 20 percent, compared to a sample mean tax rate of approximately 30 percent. We also find that annual cash effective tax rates are not very good predictors of long-run cash effective tax rates and, thus, are not accurate proxies for long-run tax avoidance. While there is some evidence of persistence in annual cash effective tax rates, the persistence is asymmetric. Low annual cash effective tax rates are more persistent than are high annual cash effective tax rates. An initial examination of characteristics of firms successful at keeping their cash effective tax rates low over long periods shows that they are well spread across industries but with some clustering.

We study whether innovation box tax incentives, which reduce tax rates on innovation-related income, are associated with increased fixed asset investment and employment. Using a stacked cohort difference-in-differences design on an entropy-balanced sample of European multinationals, we find innovation box regimes are associated with higher levels of capital expenditures, relative to noninnovation box jurisdictions. We do not find discernible effects on total employment or total compensation. However, the data suggest that companies in innovation box countries have a more highly compensated workforce following innovation box implementation, particularly among patent-owning observations in countries with more restrictive innovation box regimes and greater tax benefits. Our study contributes to the literature on, and policy evaluation of, innovation box regimes by examining the extent to which these incentives result in tangible investment and employment and by identifying how different characteristics of innovation box regimes impact these outcomes.