Knowledge that Transforms

Between 2001 and 2007, the complexity of commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) increased substantially. The median size of commercial mortgage loan pools tripled and the median number of AAA-rated tranches doubled. I examine whether deal complexity is related to loan performance by analyzing a sample of approximately 40,000 commercial mortgage loans from 334 CMBS deals. I find that loan performance is worse for loans in more complex securitizations. However, neither the price of a deal’s securities nor a deal’s risk retention reflected that complexity correlates with lower loan quality. These findings present a challenge for theories of optimal security design.

The Review of Corporate Finance Studies Volume 2 Number 1 March 2013 - Table of Content Get access The Review of Corporate Finance Studies, Volume 2, Issue 1, March 2013, Page i3, https://doi.org/10.1093/rcfs/cfs013 Published: 14 February 2013

Exports require significant up-front costs in product design, marketing, and distribution. These are intangible, firm-specific investments that are likely difficult to finance externally. We argue that a developed financial system can therefore facilitate exports. We test this prediction and find support for it. First, financial development is associated with more exports in industries in which fixed costs are high as well as to importers that require high costs. Second, trade dynamics are affected by financial development. In countries with better finance, exports are more sensitive to exchange rates. Finally, we predict and document that countries with more developed finance experience more volatile exports.

The consequences of providing public funds to financial institutions remain controversial. We examine the Community Development Financial Institution (CDFI) Fund’s impact on credit union activity, using hitherto little studied U.S. Treasury data. The CDFI Fund grants increase lending at credit unions by 3%. For every dollar awarded, 45 additional cents are loaned out to borrowers in the first year, and up to an additional $1.60 is loaned out within three years. Delinquent loan rates also increase slightly. Our panel results are supported by a broadband regression discontinuity analysis. Politics does not seem to play a role in allocating funding.

We present a model of equilibrium allocation of capital for arbitrage. If asset prices may fall low enough, it is profitable to carry liquid capital to acquire assets in such states. Set against this, keeping capital in liquid form entails costs in terms of foregone profitable investments. This trade-off generates occasional fire sales and limited arbitrage capital as robust phenomena. With learning-by-doing effects, arbitrage capital moves in to acquire assets only if fire sales are steep. However, once arbitrage capital finds it profitable to acquire assets, it requires similar returns elsewhere, inducing contagious fire-sale prices even for unrelated assets.

We study bailouts of banks that suffer from debt overhang problems and have private information about the quality of their assets-in-place and new investment opportunities. Menus of bailout plans are used as a screening device. Constrained optimality involves overcapitalization and nonlinear pricing, with worse types choosing larger bailouts. When investment opportunities follow the assets, we derive an equivalence result between equity injections and asset buyouts. The larger capital outlay under asset buyouts can be offset by borrowing against the assets. If investment opportunities follow the bank, equity injections offer more upside to the bailout agency. This may reduce or enhance efficiency, depending on whether screening intensity is needed mostly on assets-in-place or new investments.

We model a retail financial institution that outsources its advice services to an intermediary, making the two parties jointly responsible for consumers' experience with the products. In this context, courts that enforce state-contingent legal rules are necessary in order to avoid market breakdowns. To maximize social welfare, the government implements a system of penalties that depends on product characteristics and on the firm's relative ability to control quality. This legal system emphasizes reliable advice over transaction pace. Furthermore, the implicit team structure of the firm and its intermediary prevents self-regulation from achieving the same social efficiency.

We study the role of shareholder information during the acquisition of widely held firms. When target shareholders share the same information about the post-takeover value, increasing the precision of information has no effect on the expected acquisition price. However, more precise information aggravates the free-rider problem, allowing shareholders to better discern when it is worthwhile to hold out rather than tender their shares. By contrast, when information is dispersed among shareholders, providing shareholders with superior information induces the raider to offer higher prices, thus increasing shareholder value. However, in this case, neither prices nor tendering decisions aggregate any information.

We analyze corporate fraud in a setting in which managers have superior information but are biased against liquidation because of their private benefits from empire building. This may induce them to misreport information and even bribe auditors when liquidation would be value-increasing. To curb fraud, shareholders optimally design corporate governance by jointly choosing audit quality and managerial compensation. We analyze how country-level rules affect these firm-level choices. Our analysis underscores that different country-level governance provisions have different effects on firm-level governance: Some act as substitutes of internal governance mechanisms, whereas others enhance their effectiveness and therefore complement them.