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Credit Risk Sharing and Credit Market Regulation

The Review of Corporate Finance Studies 2025 14(2), 305-371
I show how aggregate risk influences credit default swap (CDS) markets and CDS regulation in an analytically tractable general equilibrium framework. For low aggregate risk, the equilibrium with unregulated CDS markets is efficient with bondholders being fully insured. A general efficient allocation can be implemented via transfers alone. For intermediate aggregate risk, a margin requirement on CDS sellers is also necessary to implement the general efficient allocation. If aggregate risk is sufficiently high, unregulated CDS markets break down. A margin requirement on CDS sellers restores equilibrium and efficiency, but it must be maximally stringent and accompanied by constraints on CDS purchases by buyers.

Search, product market competition and CEO pay

Journal of Corporate Finance 2021 69, 101981
We develop a market equilibrium model to show how search frictions in the CEO market, agency conflicts and product market characteristics interact to affect CEO market tightness, firm size and CEO incentive pay. The theory generates novel implications that link firms' product markets with CEO markets. Different determinants of competition—the entry cost, product substitutability, and market size—have contrasting effects on CEO market tightness, CEO pay and firm size. We also derive new predictions for the impact of product market risk on firm size and CEO incentive compensation. We show empirical support for several cross-sectional hypotheses derived from the theory for how CEO pay, CEO incentives, firm size and market tightness vary with product market characteristics.

The Intertemporal Exercise and Valuation of Employee Options

The Accounting Review 2004 79(3), 705-743
We propose a multiperiod model to value employee options allowing for the possibility that a risk-averse employee strategically exercises her options over time rather than at a single date. Our results describing the representative employee's option exercise behavior are broadly consistent with existing empirical evidence. The value of options to the employee and their effective cost to the firm are significantly different from the predictions of a constrained model that assumes “single date” strategic option exercise. The constrained model substantially underestimates the cost of options to the firm when, ceteris paribus, the employee's relative risk aversion and/or the time to maturity and/or the stock volatility exceed respective thresholds. Hence, the incorporation of “multiple-date” exercise has important economic and accounting consequences.

CEO talent, CEO compensation, and product market competition

Journal of Financial Economics 2017 125(1), 48-71
We develop a structural industry equilibrium model to show how competitive chief executive officer (CEO)-firm matching and product markets jointly determine firm value and CEO pay. We analytically derive testable implications for the effects of product market characteristics on firm size, CEO pay, and CEO impact on firm value. CEO talent matters more in more competitive markets with greater product substitutabilities. Our CEO impact estimates are much higher than those obtained by previous structural approaches that abstract away from CEO market segmentation. The estimates differ across industries primarily due to variation in product market competition, rather than variation in the CEO talent distribution.

Investment under Uncertainty, Heterogeneous Beliefs, and Agency Conflicts

Review of Financial Studies 2010 23(4), 1360-1404
We develop a structural model to investigate the effects of asymmetric beliefs and agency conflicts on dynamic principal--agent relationships. Optimism has a first-order effect on incentives, investments, and output, which could reconcile the private equity puzzle. Asymmetric beliefs cause optimal contracts to have features consistent with observed venture capital and research and development (R&D) contracts. We derive testable implications for the effects of project characteristics on contractual features. We calibrate our model to data on pharmaceutical R&D projects and show that optimism indeed significantly influences project values. Permanent and transitory components of risk have opposing effects on project values and durations. The Author 2009. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: [email protected], Oxford University Press.

Agency Conflicts, Bank Capital Regulation, and Marking-to-Market

The Accounting Review 2019 94(6), 365-384
We show how shareholder-debtholder agency conflicts interact with strategic reporting under asymmetric information to influence bank regulation. Relative to a benchmark unregulated economy, higher capital requirements mitigate inefficient asset substitution, but potentially exacerbate underinvestment due to debt overhang. The optimal regulatory policy balances distortions created by agency conflicts and asymmetric information while incorporating the social benefit of bank debt. Asymmetric information and strategic reporting only impact regulation for intermediate social debt benefit levels. For lower social debt benefits in this interval, regulatory capital requirements are insensitive to accounting reports, so bank balance sheets need not be marked to market to implement the optimal regulatory policy. For higher social debt benefits, however, capital requirements are sensitive to accounting reports, thereby necessitating mark-to-market accounting to implement bank regulation. Mark-to-market accounting is essential when bank leverage levels are high, and is more likely to be necessary as banks' asset risk or specificity increases.

Corporate Governance and Innovation: Theory and Evidence

Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 2014 49(4), 957-1003
We develop a theory to show how external and internal corporate governance mechanisms affect innovation. We predict a U-shaped relation between innovation and external takeover pressure, which arises from the interaction between expected takeover premia and private benefits of control. Using ex ante and ex post innovation measures, we find strong empirical support for the predicted relation. We exploit the variation in takeover pressure created by the passage of antitakeover laws across different states. Innovation is fostered either by an unhindered market for corporate control or by antitakeover laws that are severe enough to effectively deter takeovers.