This paper investigates whether greater competition increases or decreases individual bank and banking system risk. Using a new text‐based measure of competition, and an instrumental variables analysis that exploits exogenous variation in bank deregulation, we provide robust evidence that greater competition increases both individual bank risk and a bank's contribution to system‐wide risk. Specifically, we find that higher competition is associated with lower underwriting standards, less timely loan loss recognition, and a shift toward noninterest revenue. Further, we find that higher competition is associated with higher stand‐alone risk of individual banks, greater sensitivity of a bank's downside equity risk to system‐wide distress, and a greater contribution by individual banks to downside risk of the banking sector.

This study examines whether audit firms hire former PCAOB employees in response to negative PCAOB inspection reports, and whether such hiring leads to reductions in future inspection deficiencies and an increase in audit quality. We find that the number of PCAOB employees hired by large audit firms is positively related to the number of deficiencies reported in their prior inspection reports, and that the number of deficiencies reported in firms' future inspection reports is negatively associated with the number of former PCAOB employees hired. However, we find no significant association between the number of former PCAOB employees that a firm hires and improvement in audit quality. These findings suggest that former PCAOB personnel possess valuable knowledge about how to perform and document audit procedures to satisfy PCAOB reviewers, but that this expertise does not necessarily have direct implications for the accuracy and reliability of clients' financial reports.

We examine firm disclosure choice during the initial public offering (IPO) roadshow presentation to understand the informativeness of a management presentation designed to attract investors. Although firms submit a comprehensive registration filing during the IPO, managers also prepare a roadshow presentation, which is shorter and typically allows managers more autonomy to select the information released and how it is discussed. We find that IPO roadshows have significantly more positive, less negative, and less uncertain language than the SEC filing. Using machine learning to classify roadshow sentences into five major topics from the registration statement, we find that roadshows differ in both the topics selected and the language used within each topic. We then examine the predictive ability of the roadshow language, finding that roadshow language predicts future accounting performance, whereas filing language does not. These results highlight the informational role of management presentations, despite the flexibility they grant managers.